Error and/or relief
The trial court gave two conflicting instructions on unlawfully taking or deriving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. One of the instructions omitted an element of the crime. We reverse the conviction on that count and remand for retrial.
First Holding:
Vehicle Code section 10851 can be violated in two general ways, by taking the vehicle (driving theft) or by driving the stolen vehicle after the theft is complete (posttheft driving). The theft of the vehicle may be considered complete when the driving is not part of the original taking; when the driving is an act distinct from the taking; when the driving is for purposes unconnected with the original taking; when the driving is no longer part of a continuous journey away from the locus of the theft; or when the driving is not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.
Authority:
People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 394–395
People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1285
Second Holding:
Posttheft driving consists of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent after the vehicle has been stolen, with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of title or possession. Where the evidence shows a substantial break between the taking and the driving, posttheft driving may give rise to a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 distinct from any liability for vehicle theft.
Authority:
People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1188
People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136
Third Holding:
Stealing a vehicle and continuing to drive it after the theft is complete are separate and distinct violations of Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Driving theft is a theft conviction; posttheft driving is not. While a theft-based violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 may be punished as a felony only if the vehicle is shown to have been worth over $950, a violation committed by posttheft driving may be charged and sentenced as a felony regardless of value.
Authority:
People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395
People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1285-1286
People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136
Fourth Holding:
There are alternative versions of the CALCRIM No. 1820 jury instruction pertaining to section 10851. The first version indicates that the People must prove; 1 The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent; 2. When the defendant took the vehicle, the defendant intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time; AND 3. The vehicle was worth more than $950.
The second alternative differs as to only the third element, requiring that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.
After telling the jury that the defendant was charged with unlawfully driving [sic] a vehicle in violation of section 10851, the court instructed only as to the first alternative, except that instead of “The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent,” it stated “The defendant drove [sic] someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent.” Neither the written nor the oral instruction contained the third element for posttheft driving, that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.
Authority:
CALCRIM No. 1820
Fifth Holding:
We review instructional error de novo, assessing whether the instruction accurately states the law. Further, we review a challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. All criminal defendants have the right to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which the defendant is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900
People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824
Sixth Holding:
A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is reviewed under the standard in Chapman. Under Chapman, we must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances,” we determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Merely showing the evidence presented at trial could support a conviction, however, is not sufficient. Instructional error is harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. The Attorney General bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Gary note: The court then discussed aspects of the case that caused it to conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case.)
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 838-839
People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1138
People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13

