Error and/or relief:
The court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because of juror misconduct. It came to light that one juror intentionally concealed during voir dire an important fact that likely would have resulted in the juror’s removal for cause, and the juror spoke to a witness during jury deliberations during a recess.
In exercising its discretion to impose a lesser firearm enhancement, it was error to stay rather than to strike the greater enhancement.
The abstract of judgment needs to be corrected on the description of attempted murder.
First Holding:
A juror who violates his or her oath and the trial court’s instructions is guilty of misconduct. When a person violates his oath as a juror, doubt is cast on that person’s ability to otherwise perform his duties. Accordingly, once a court determines a juror has engaged in misconduct, a defendant is presumed to have suffered prejudice. It is for the prosecutor to rebut the presumption by establishing there is no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant. Unless the prosecutor rebuts that presumption by proof that no prejudice actually resulted, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Authority:
People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194
In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 797
Second Holding:
In determining whether juror misconduct occurred, we accept the trial court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s independent determination.
If we find a substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, we must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased jury would have reached the same verdict, because a biased adjudicator is one of the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a harmless error standard.
Authority:
People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194
People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 579, 582
People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1263–1265, 1267
Third Holding:
One accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. The impartiality of prospective jurors is explored during voir dire, which plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.
Voir dire may expose possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror’s being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges.
Authority:
In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110-111
Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 554
Fourth Holding:
The prosecution, the defense and the trial court rely on the voir dire responses in making their respective decisions, and if potential jurors do not respond candidly the jury selection process is rendered meaningless. Falsehood, or deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of facts and attitudes deprives both sides of the right to select an unbiased jury and erodes the basic integrity of the jury trial process.
A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct.
Authority:
In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111-112
Fifth Holding:
The juror failed to disclose material information that clearly would have been responsive to a direct question that the juror was asked. That failure constitutes misconduct.
Authority:
In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111
People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 925, 929–930 [juror who failed to disclose personal experience with domestic violence and alcoholism in response to specific questions committed misconduct]
Sixth Holding:
In advertent concealment may not constitute juror misconduct, but the juror’s testimony at the hearing disclosed that this concealment was intentional.
Authority:
People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 644–646 [concealment inadvertent where juror believed a drug charge had been dropped and testified a stabbing incident that happened 22 years before never crossed his mind during voir dire]
Seventh Holding:
It is misconduct for a juror to discuss a case with a nonjuror during the course of a trial, to even inadvertently receive information about a party or the case from a nonparty, or to communicate with anyone associated with the case. The juror admitted to at least two interactions with a defendant witness in the case and discussed the case, at least one of which communication was while the jury was deliberating.
Authority:
People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 333–334 [jurors’ conversation with prosecution expert was misconduct]
People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1082 [jurors’ friendly conversation with prosecution witness was misconduct]
Eighth Holding:
The juror’s misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice. Intentional nondisclosure is strong proof that can sustain the presumption of prejudice raised by juror concealment. In most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response [to a question on voir dire] is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial.
A juror who intentionally conceals information to secure a place on the jury raises particular concerns: How can someone who herself does not comply with the duty to tell the truth stand in judgment of other people’s veracity?
Authority:
In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 797
In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 119, 120
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 556
Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 970, 983
Clark v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 1, 11 [position of juror who secures place by fraud is tainted in its origin]
People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 932 [the juror’s self-serving statement regarding her ability to deliberate impartially was insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice]
United States v. Olsen (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1172, 1192 [acknowledging application of implied bias doctrine where the juror in question, or a close relative, has had some personal experience that is similar or identical to the fact pattern at issue in the trial]
United States v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1109, 1113 [court erred by refusing to excuse juror in cocaine trafficking case whose ex-husband’s cocaine trafficking led to breakup of family]
United States v. Eubanks (9th Cir. 1979) 591 F.2d 513, 516–517 [remanding for new trial where juror in heroin trafficking case concealed his sons were heroin users serving prison sentences for crimes they committed in attempt to procure heroin]
People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1083 [presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome by a juror’s affidavit denying that misconduct had any effect on the deliberations]
United States v. Sanchez (9th Cir. 2026) 175 F.4th 1134, 1156 [juror’s good faith belief in his own impartiality is not dispositive]
Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 221–222 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [Determining whether a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it]
Ninth Holding:
Evidence Code section 1150 prohibits use of evidence of the jurors’ subjective reasoning processes either to establish misconduct or rebut the presumption of prejudice, meaning the juror’s statements as to the effect of the misconduct on his ability to fairly and impartially decide the case cannot be considered.
Authority:
EVID 1150
People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1082-1083
In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 799-800
In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 651–652
People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 81
Tenth Holding:
In exercising its discretion under section 12022.53(h), a court may strike a section 12022.53(d) enhancement for gun use causing death or serious bodily injury and impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement when the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by the jury. When discretion is thus exercised, however, the greater enhancement must be struck, not stayed.
Authority:
People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 697–702
Eleventh Holding:
The abstract of judgment characterized the attempted murder with premeditation as attempted first degree murder. Attempted murder is not divided into degrees. If the jury finds true an allegation the defendant attempted murder that was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, the punishment is increased pursuant to section 664(a). But that penalty provision does not create degrees of attempted murder.
In any event, the prosecution withdrew this allegation, so the jury never found it to be true. Accordingly, the abstract’s notation of a conviction for attempted first degree murder was erroneous.
Authority:
People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 668-669, overruled on another ground in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550

