Daily Archives: November 16, 2026

Case 001195

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the fines and assessments properly.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly lists a $1,170 fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.5. At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed a $1,170 fine consisting of a fine pursuant to section 290.3 and penalty assessments on that fine. The trial court did not orally impose any fine pursuant to section 1202.5. However, the abstract of judgment shows the aggregate $1,170 fine as being imposed pursuant to section 1202.5 and excludes the fine and penalty assessments listed above. It also fails to detail the amounts of and statutory basis for the base fine and each of the penalty assessments imposed.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1459

Second Holding:

When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. We have inherent authority to correct errors to accurately reflect the “oral judgments of sentencing courts. We therefore order the abstract of judgment corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186

Case 001194

Error and/or relief:

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended, pursuant to section 1172.1, that the trial court recall the defendant’s sentence and resentence him based on recent changes in the law giving courts discretion to strike five-year serious felony enhancements under section 667(a)(1), as well as the nature of the offense and his conduct in prison. The court erred in declining to resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

The People contend we should dismiss this appeal as moot because the defendant has been released on parole. We disagree. An appeal becomes moot if without any fault of the opposing party, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of defendant, to grant him any effectual relief whatever.

As a parolee, the defendant is subject to significant restrictions on his liberty. For example, he may not travel more than 50 miles from his residence without his parole agent’s permission, and he is subject to search or seizure by any peace officer at any time without warrant. This appeal could potentially lead to a reduction in his sentence, which would in turn grant him effectual relief by reducing or terminating his period of parole.

Authority:

People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645

People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1069

Second Holding:

CDCR has long had the authority to recommend inmates in its custody to the trial court for resentencing. Such a recommendation gives the trial court the authority to resentence in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced. This means the court can impose any otherwise lawful resentence suggested by the facts available at the time of resentencing, so long as the new sentence was not longer than the original one.

Under the former version of the statute, however, the court was not required to resentence the defendant, or even “to respond to the recommendation

Authority:

PEN 1170(d) (former)

Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455-456

Third Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature enacted AB 1540 which, in recognition of the scrutiny that has already been brought to these referrals by the referring entity, forbade courts from ignoring recommendations for recall and resentencing. Under the new version of the law, codified as what is now section 1172.1, when the trial court receives a recommendation for resentencing, it must notify and appoint counsel to represent the defendant, and must set a status conference within 30 days. Following this notification, the statute sets forth a two-step process. The first step imposes a procedural gate on whether the defendant is eligible for recall and resentencing. Only if the defendant passes that initial eligibility test does the matter proceed to the second step, which is the resentencing hearing itself.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

Fourth Holding:

With regard to the first step, section 1172.1 creates a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if the trial court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18(c).

Section 1170.18(c) in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)]. This subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as super strikes.

In sum, CDCR’s recommendation creates a presumption in favor of a resentencing hearing unless the court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

PEN 1170.18

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818

Fifth Holding:

To support a finding of dangerousness under this standard, the evidence must show more than a generalized concern about the defendant’s ability to continue to commit crimes. Instead, the inquiry must focus on the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited subset of violent felonies.

The court’s finding must be based on supporting evidence, not speculation or the arguments of counsel. In addition, the proper focus is on whether the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, not merely whether he did at the time of his conviction.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 410

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450

People v. Saelee (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 754-755

People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 913

Sixth Holding:

We review the trial court’s denial of recall and resentencing for abuse of discretion. We review the factual findings underlying the decision, such as whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18(c) for substantial evidence.

(Gary note: At this point, the appellate court examined the specific facts and background in this case and determined that the evidence did not support a finding that the defendant was likely to commit a super strike.)

Authority:

People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082

People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409

Seventh Holding:

The trial court’s error in not holding a resentencing hearing had practical consequences in depriving the defendant of an opportunity to offer a statement in mitigation, to testify on his own behalf, and to present other information as of the resentencing hearing date regarding the appropriate sentence.

The court’s statements at step one indicate that it was unlikely to reduce the defendant’s sentence, but we can only speculate if the court would have felt the same after reviewing a full resentencing record which was never developed.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437

People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, 598-600

Eighth Holding:

Significantly, the People do not argue that we should apply the Watson standard or make any other argument regarding harmless error. We thus conclude the error was not harmless.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1178

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425 [the Watson standard for judging harmless error does not apply when it “does not properly take into consideration the more speculative inquiry of what choice the court is likely to make in the first instance” at resentencing]

Ninth Holding:

Upon holding a proper hearing, nothing in this opinion restricts the trial court’s discretion upon remand in resentencing the defendant or implies that he is entitled to a reduced sentence. Although a presumption favors granting recall and resentencing in the first place, the sentence ultimately imposed by the court is left to its discretion without any further application of the presumption.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707 [If the court on remand declines to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike an enhancement, that ends the matter and the defendant’s sentence stands]

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820

Case 001193

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to conclude that, because the original sentencing court struck the punishment for the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement at the time of sentencing, the defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

In 2019, the Legislature amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior prison term enhancements unless the prior prison term was for specific sexually violent offenses. The amendment was retroactive as to any case in which the judgment was not final on January 1, 2020. Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 was enacted to provide a means for defendants whose sentences included the now-invalid prior prison term enhancements to be resentenced.

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was to prepare a list of such individuals and notify the courts of anyone who were serving a sentence that included a qualifying prison prior, whereupon the court was required to conduct a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342

Second Holding:

Following a conflict among the appellate courts regarding whether defendants whose sentences were not lengthened by the enhancements because the punishment had been stayed, the Supreme Court decided Rhodius and Espino. A prisoner is eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 even if the trial court stayed or struck the punishment for the now-invalid prior prison term.

In light of that clarification, the trial court’s finding defendant ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 is reversed and the matter is remanded with instructions to strike defendant’s section 667.5(b) prison prior enhancements in their entirety and to hold a resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1172.75(d).

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050. 1068[concluding that a prisoner whose punishment for the now-invalid prison term was stayed was nonetheless eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75]

People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57, 60 [concluding that a sentence is imposed for the purposes of section 1172.75 even if the sentencing court struck the punishment for the prison prior enhancement]

(Gary note: I have previously posted in Gary’s Musings a reminder that only those prior prison terms ordered under subdivision (b) of section 667.5 were affected. There has been no change to the three-year enhancement for prior prison terms served on the offenses listed in section 667.5(c), which enumerates at least two dozen offenses and circumstances under which a felony is deemed a “violent felony” for purposes of the three-year enhancement imposed under subdivision (a). I have described this in far more detail in the summaries of Case 001135 and Case 001190.)

Case 001192

Error and/or relief

It was improper for the court to select the upper based on aggravating factors that were not admitted or submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Tracking that standard, section 1170(b)(2) prohibits a trial court from imposing a sentence exceeding the middle term unless (1) circumstances in aggravation justify imposition of an upper term sentence and (2) the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Similar principles apply to enhancement sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Second Holding:

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to the imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. In particular, a jury must determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness before a trial court can rely on that fact to justify an upper term sentence.

Here, the trial court found defendant’s prior record of convictions was of increasing seriousness (the increasing seriousness factor) and then imposed and stayed certain upper terms after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. By not limiting itself to the aggravating factors the jury found true, the trial court erred.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1086

Third Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.

Under that standard, a sentenced imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified.

When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman.

The increasing seriousness factor requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. Because the inquiry is a comparative and qualitative one, it is difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as the trial court.

Here, defendant has a single prior conviction – a misdemeanor (more than 12 years earlier) for driving under the influence. Based on the Wiley standards, we agree with the parties that we cannot conclude the jury would have found the increasing seriousness factor true beyond a reasonable doubt. We remand for full resentencing, thereby mooting defendant’s other sentencing claims.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082, 1087, 1090

Case 001191

Error and/or relief

We vacate the portion of the judgment concerning the imposition of court-ordered payments, and remand the matter for further sentencing proceedings consistent with the standards set forth in Kopp.

First Holding:

The defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of the court operations assessment, court facilities assessment, and drug program fee without consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. He also contends that the $300 restitution fine (violates the excessive fines clause, due process, and equal protection.

Authority:

PEN 1465.8(a)(1)

GOV 70373(a)(1)

HSC 11372.7(a)

PEN 1202.4

Second Holding:

Although the defendant failed to object to the imposition of these court-ordered payments in the trial court at his sentencing in 2018, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of any arguably forfeited claim.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9 [explaining that review was granted to resolve a divergence among the Courts of Appeal regarding court-ordered financial obligations imposed on criminal defendants]

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 127 [Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a right derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law]

Third Holding:

In Kopp, the California Supreme Court held that a challenge to the amount of a criminal fine—such as the minimum restitution fine imposed here under Penal Code section 1202.4(b)—should initially be reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions.

The Supreme Court further held that equal protection issues require a trial court to, upon request, consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment or a court facilities assessment. And, as relevant here, the Supreme Court observed that Health and Safety Code section 11372.7(b), mandates that a drug program fee under subdivision (a) of that section only be imposed upon a finding of an ability to pay.

We remand the matter to permit the defendant to challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive under the federal and state Constitutions or to raise any other challenge compatible with the standards set forth in Kopp.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 18, 30