Daily Archives: November 19, 2026

Case 001209

Error and/or relief:

The defendant’s convictions are reversed because the statute of limitations barred the prosecution of his offenses.

First Holding:

In criminal cases, the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. If the limitations period expires without prosecution having begun, prosecution is forever time-barred. The People bear the burden to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that prosecution commenced within the statutorily prescribed time period.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 244, 248

People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1112

People v. Angel (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146–1147

Second Holding:

We review the the trial court’s statute of limitations ruling independently.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 765, 772 [standard of review]

People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271

Third Holding:

Generally, the length of a limitations period corresponds to the seriousness of the crime, as indicated by the maximum punishment permitted by statute for the offense. Under section 805(a), an offense is deemed punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by statute for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or imposed. Any enhancement of punishment prescribed by statute shall be disregarded in determining the maximum punishment prescribed.

Authority:

PEN 805

People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1595

Fourth Holding:

The crimes occurred prior to the enactment of the One Strike law (section 667.61). At the time the crimes were committed, the statute of limitations under then-section 800 was six years for crimes punishable by eight years or more. The maximum punishment for the the defendant’s crimes when they were committed was eight years.

Once the One Strike law was enacted (an alternative, harsher sentencing scheme), certain crimes were subject to an indeterminate life sentence when there are multiple victims. Section 799 provides that there is no statute of limitations where the offense is punishable for by imprisonment for life. As a result, when the One Strike law’s multiple-victim circumstance applies, it triggers section 799, and thus there is no time limit on a prosecution for that crime.

Authority:

PEN 800 (the earlier version that was in effect at the time of the crimes)

PEN 799

PEN 667.61

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741

People v. Canales (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1259

People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 238–240

Fifth Holding:

Because the One Strike law was enacted after the defendant’s offenses were committed, we must consider whether its application would violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. A legislature may not retroactively increase the punishment for a crime.

A state also violates ex post facto principles by reviving a time-barred prosecution after expiration of the previously applicable limitations period.

The state is not forbidden, however, from extending time limits applicable to the prosecution of future offenses or to prosecutions that have not yet become time-barred.

Section 803.6(b) provides that any change in the time period for the commencement of prosecution applies to any crime if prosecution for the crime was not barred on the effective date of the change by the statute of limitations in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the change.

Authority:

PEN 803.6(b)

U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 9

Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 610, 618, 632-633

Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42–43

People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158

Sixth Holding:

Courts have applied ex post facto principles to the One Strike law and its amendments.

Authority:

People v. Canales (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1259-1260 [because continuous sexual abuse of child (sec. 288.5) was not a One Strike crime at the time of the offense, the defendant’s sentence could not be increased under the multiple-victim circumstance]

People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 257–262 [One Strike punishment barred when timing of offenses not identified with any specificity and evidence only showed they occurred during time period of years that was both before and after effective date of One Strike]

People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1178 [because the one strike law was adopted after the defendant’s qualifying crime against one victim had occurred, applying it to the charges for that conduct violates the state and federal constitutional protections against ex post facto laws]

Seventh Holding:

Where the ex post facto clauses apply, it is the prosecution’s responsibility to prove to the jury that the charged offenses occurred on or after the effective date of the statute providing for the defendant’s punishment. When the evidence at trial does not establish that fact, the defendant is entitled to be sentenced under the formerly applicable statutes even if he raised no objection in the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 256

Eighth Holding:

When the charging document indicates on its face that the action is time-barred, a person convicted of a charged offense may raise the statute of limitations at any time.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 341

Ninth Holding:

Because the defendant’s crimes were completed prior to the enactment of the One Strike law, it does not matter that the six-year statute of limitations had not yet expired when the One Strike law went into effect. Section 799 applies only where the defendant is charged with a crime that is punishable by a life sentence. At the time these offenses were committed, the defendant was subject to no more than a determinate term of less than an indeterminate life sentence. Section 800 applies, and the statute of limitations expired long before the prosecution commenced more than 25 years later.

Authority:

PEN 799

PEN 800

People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 236-242 [qualifying offense that would have been time-barred, had offense been prosecuted individually, could be prosecuted as One Strike multiple-victim offense at any time—but only if offense occurred after One Strike law’s effective date]

People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1178 [because the one strike law was adopted after the defendant’s qualifying crime against one victim had occurred, applying it to the charges for that conduct violates the state and federal constitutional protections against ex post facto laws]

Case 001208

Error and/or relief

The court imposed unauthorized sentences for counts 5 and 12. We will correct the unauthorized sentences on appeal.

First Holding:

A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Second Holding:

In count 5, the defendant was convicted of violation of Penal Code section 288.7(b) and was sentenced to 25 years to life under section 667.61(j)(2) and (e)(4). Section 667.61(j)(2) mandates a sentence of 25 years to life for defendants who have been convicted of specified crime of a child under the age of 14 when certain specified circumstances are present including, as relevant here, when the crime is committed against more than one victim.

The defendant was not charged with committing the specified crime on more than one victim. He therefore does not qualify for the enhanced sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61(j)(2) and (e)(4). Accordingly, the sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61 was unauthorized because it could not be lawfully imposed under any circumstances presented here.

Instead, section 288.7(b) requires the trial court to sentence defendant to 15 years to life for the specified crime.

Authority:

PEN 667.61(j)(2)

PEN 288.7(b)

Third Holding:

Section 647.6(a) prohibits a person from annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18, and subdivision (c)(2) of that section provides for an enhanced sentence of two, four, or six years for defendants who are convicted under section 647.6 if they have previously been convicted under section 311.4.

The defendant was not charged with annoying or molesting a child under section 647.6 in count 12, and therefore could not be sentenced under that statute. He was charged and convicted under section 311.4(c), which does not state a sentencing triad.

Authority:

PEN 647.6(a)

PEN 311.4(c)

Fourth Holding:

An illegal sentence may be corrected whenever the error comes to the attention of the trial court or any reviewing court. This court can correct the sentences on appeal because this issue presents a pure question of law that can be corrected without relying on factual findings made at sentencing or remanding the matter for additional findings. We will therefore correct the sentence to reflect a term of 15 years to life for the conviction in count 5, the penalty for violation of section 288.7(b).

Authority:

People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 244

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130

Fifth Holding:

In sentencing the defendant on count 12, the court cited section 647.6(c)(2). But as the defendant was not convicted of that section, and was instead convicted of section 311.4(c), the court must impose a sentence as described in section 18. Where the penalty for a specific crime is not otherwise set forth for a crime, section 18 provides that the triad for a sentence to state prison is 16 months, two years, or three years. Because the trial court sentenced defendant under the wrong sentencing triad, it failed to exercise informed discretion when it imposed the upper term sentence of six years for count 12.

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record. In such situations, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion had it been aware of the scope of its discretion.

The record here clearly indicates the trial court would have imposed the upper term of three years had it been aware of the scope of its discretion under section 18. At the bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found all four of the alleged aggravating factors to be true and believing it had discretion to choose between two, four, or six years for count 12, the trial court chose the upper term. Based on this decision, the record clearly indicates that the trial court would again choose to impose the upper term—which is half the amount of time originally imposed—for count 12 had it understood its sentencing discretion under section 18.

We therefore correct the sentence to the upper term of three years for count 12.

Authority:

PEN 18

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391