Error and/or relief:
We grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the extent that we vacate the defendant’s conviction on count 6 because of ineffective assistance of counsel.
First Holding:
The right to counsel is a fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process. The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. Construed in light of its purpose, the right to counsel entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. Specifically, it entitles him to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.
Authority:
Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 374
People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215
Second Holding:
In order to establish ineffective representation, the defendant must prove both incompetence and prejudice. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance. The defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.
The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. The defendant shows that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffectiveness by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. And, in determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court ‘must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.
Authority:
Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 374
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688–689, 694–695
Third Holding:
Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a presumptively final criminal judgment, the defendant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. We independently review prior testimony, as well as all mixed questions of fact and law. Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review.
Authority:
In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1072
In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993–994
Fourth Holding:
The defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact.
A mistake of fact that disproves the required intent for a crime is a defense to criminal liability. Generally, a mistake of fact defense is not available unless the mistake disproves an element of the offense. Put another way, a mistake of fact instruction is only appropriate where the defendant’s mistaken belief negates an element of the crime. The trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to give a mistake of fact instruction. The court is, however, required to give such an instruction on request, where a defendant presents substantial evidence on mistake of fact and the instruction is legally correct.
Authority:
People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791
Fifth Holding:
For general intent crimes, the defendant’s mistaken belief must be both actual and reasonable, but if the mental state of the crime is a specific intent or knowledge, then the mistaken belief must only be actual.
Authority:
People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793
People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249 [As a specific intent crime, defendant’s crime is subject to a good faith, unreasonable mistake of fact defense.]
People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350 [an unreasonable mistake of fact may be asserted in a specific intent crime, so long as the defendant had an actual mistaken belief.]
Sixth Holding:
Threatening a public officer in violation of section 71 is a specific intent crime, as it requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to influence the performance of the officer’s official duties. Thus, a mistake of fact instruction would have been warranted, upon request, if there was substantial evidence that the defendant threatened the officer because he actually believed that he was being illegally abducted by the arresting deputies.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant subjectively, albeit unreasonably, believed he was being abducted. For a specific intent crime like a violation of section 71, an instruction on mistake of fact is warranted, upon request, so long as there is substantial evidence that the defendant subjectively harbored the mistaken belief at issue.
Authority:
People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 36, 40–41
People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793
People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249
People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350
Seventh Holding:
(Gary note: The court outlined the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition, but I’m not presenting them in this summary.) On the record before us, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact fell below prevailing professional norms. The duty of counsel to a criminal defendant includes careful preparation of and request for all instructions which in his judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests.
As discussed, a mistake of fact instruction was warranted because there was substantial evidence that the defendant subjectively believed that the deputies were abducting him or otherwise detaining him illegally. Further, the People do not dispute that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to request the instruction. Trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction as a result of his ignorance or misunderstanding of the law, rather than because of an informed tactical determination, constitutes deficient performance, i.e., representation which falls below the standard of competence demanded of criminal defense attorneys.
Authority:
People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 270
In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 955–956
Eighth Holding:
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. To obtain relief, the defendant must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The defendant need not establish a reasonable probability that the entire jury would have acquitted the petitioner; rather, the petitioner only needs to demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different verdict.
(Gary note: The court then analyzed facts specific to the case to arrive at a conclusion that the error was not harmless under Strickland.)
We vacate the defendant’s count 6 conviction. The prosecution may retry the defendant on count 6 within the timeframe allowed by law.
(Gary note: Business and Professions Code section 6086.7(a)(2) requires the court to notify the State Bar whenever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct, incompetent representation, or willful misrepresentation of an attorney. The court directed its clerk to notify the respective entities, including the prosecutor’s office and the attorney in question, of the reversal based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.)
Authority:
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691
In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1086
In re Welch (2015) 61 Cal.4th 489, 521