Error and/or relief:
In light of Lopez, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage on the grounds that he could have raised, but did not, a relevant jury instruction challenge in his direct appeal from his conviction.
The instructions given in defendant’s case do not conclusively foreclose the possibility the jury convicted him of second degree murder by imputing malice to him. We find defendant has established a prima facie case for relief as required by section 1172.6(c). The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6(d)(3).
First Holding:
SB 1437 was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The statute’s text and legislative history clearly indicate that the Legislature intended to restrict culpability for murder outside the felony murder rule to persons who personally possess malice aforethought.
It accomplished this by amending section 188(a)(3), to require that all principals must act with express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime, with the exception of felony murder under section 189(e).
For a felony murder conviction under section 189(e), SB 1437 required the defendant be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the underlying felony who acted with the intent to kill, or a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Authority:
PEN 188(a)(3)
PEN 189(e)
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847, superseded on other grounds by sec. 1172.6(g)
Second Holding:
SB 1437 also created section 1172.6, which established a procedure for defendants already convicted of murder under the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if they believed they could not be convicted of that crime given the above amendments to sections 188 and 189. Section 1172.6(c) requires the court to appoint counsel for properly pleaded petitions, and then conduct a prima facie analysis, with briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before determining whether to issue an order to show cause.
Authority:
PEN 1172,6
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961–970
Third Holding:
SB 775 amended section 1172.6, effective January 1, 2022, to permit relief if a murder conviction was based on a natural and probable consequences theory, a felony murder theory predating SB 1437, or, relevant here, some other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.
Authority:
PEN 1172.6(a)(1)
Fourth Holding:
At the prima facie stage of the petition process, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion or make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief. In this regard, the jury instructions will be critical.
Authority:
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972, 974
People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658
People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731
Fifth Holding:
On review, an appellate court considers de novo whether a petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima facie stage, such that he or she was not entitled to an order to show cause.
Authority:
People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251
Sixth Holding:
Second degree implied malice murder exists where the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.
Aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid theory of murder liability notwithstanding the changes made by SB 1437 and SB 775. An aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing “‘can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.
Authority:
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850
People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859
Seventh Holding:
To be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.
Consistent with this framework, the relevant inquiry for a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder does not turn on the target offense the defendant intended to facilitate. Instead, it turns on whether the defendant aided the life-endangering act itself while personally harboring the requisite mens rea.
Authority:
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991
People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713
People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 655 [it is the fatal act, not any underlying crime, that an aider and abettor of second degree murder must aid or abet]
Eighth Holding:
Prior to Lopez, courts denied petitions under section 1172.6 if they were based on grounds that could have been raised in their appeal from their conviction. Lopez disapproved of that line of cases because they conflict with section 1172.6’s text and fundamental purpose and the procedural bar these decisions read into section 1172.6 aligns with neither the doctrine of issue preclusion that informs analysis of prima facie ineligibility nor the purposes that the Dixon bar serves in the habeas corpus context.
As a result, the Lopez court reversed and remanded the matter to enable the Court of Appeal to address in the first instance the merits of Lopez’s claim that the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted on a now-invalid theory.
Authority:
People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658
In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [Dixon established the rule a writ of habeas corpus will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.]

