Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case: 000203

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying his expungement request under Penal Code section 1203.4 and in failing to consider his request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). Because the court did not address his request under section 17(b), on remand it must do so.

First Holding:

An order denying relief under section 1203.4 is appealable.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 114

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 provides in pertinent part that a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation is entitled as a matter of right to have the plea or verdict changed to not guilty, to have the proceedings expunged from the record, and to have the accusations dismissed. If the petitioner meets the criteria for relief under section 1203.4, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 249-250

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991

People v. Lewis (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 294, 297-298

Third Holding:

As of 2023, section 1203.4 provides that a petition for relief under this section shall not be denied due to an unfulfilled order of restitution, and an unfulfilled order of restitution shall not be grounds for finding that a defendant did not fulfill the condition of probation for the entire period of probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(c)(3)(A) & (B)

Fourth Holding:

When a crime is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor it is commonly referred to as a “wobbler,” and the trial court may reduce the offense to a misdemeanor at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor. In exercising its discretion, the court considers several factors, including “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.

Authority:

PEN 17(b)(3)

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877,

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 790-791

Fifth Holding:

Grand theft by embezzlement of property valued at more than $950, the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is a wobbler. The trial court should have addressed the defendant’s request to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.

Authority:

People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 75

Case: 000192

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment contains a clerical error regarding the imposed fines. The defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence on some counts and a determinate sentence of others. Two different forms are used–one is the abstract for the indeterminate sentence, the other for the determinate sentence. Though the court imposed only one restitution fine and one parole revocation restitution fine, both fines appear on both forms. While not necessarily improper, it can lead to an ambiguity. In an abundance of caution, and because we agree the duplicate reference could possibly lead to confusion, we direct the clerk of the court issue an amended determinate abstract of judgment, leaving the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine reflected only on the indeterminate abstract of judgment, form CR-292.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction and it cannot add to or modify the judgment which it purports to digest or summarize. Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts that have properly assumed jurisdiction can order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Caudillo (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 122, 126

Second Holding:

A trial court must accurately set forth all fines and fees in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 [If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency]

Third Holding:

The court has authority to order correction of abstracts of judgment to avoid ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Frey (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 139, 142 [finding ambiguity between the court’s order and the statement on the abstract of judgment form required correction]

Case: 000185

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.75 petition for resentencing asked the trial court to strike certain sentencing enhancements that were no longer valid under current law and to exercise its discretion to strike other enhancements and prior strike convictions. The trial court held a resentencing hearing, struck the invalid enhancements, but declined to further reduce defendant’s sentence. We reverse for some certain conceded errors in the pronouncement of sentence, including with respect to custody credits, but otherwise affirm.

First Holding:

A trial court conducting a resentencing under section 1172.75 has discretion to dismiss a “strike” allegation under the Three Strikes law. There was no abuse of discretion here.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

Second Holding:

The trial court calculated certain elements of the defendant’s sentence by subtracting the one-year prior prison term enhancements from his original sentence as opposed to the later sentence imposed on remand following a determination that it was error to sentence on two–rather than just one–of the counts because of Penal Code section 654. There was some further ambiguity in the sentence imposed at the section 1172.75 hearing. The matter must be remanded to the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancements on Counts Two and Three, to clarify the sentence on Count Three remains stayed, and to clarify the status of the prior serious felony enhancement on Count Two.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 834, 838-839

Third Holding:

The trial court improperly delegated calculation of his custody credits to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

PC 2900.1

PC 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23-24

000184

Error and/or relief

A jury found the defendant guilty of felony reckless evasion of a police officer. There were evidentiary conflicts. Under the highly deferential substantial evidence review standard, we conclude the conflicting trial evidence nonetheless supports his conviction. These evidentiary conflicts were sufficient, however, to raise a substantial question about whether all the elements of reckless evasion were present, warranting an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple evasion. We conclude failure to give this instruction was prejudicial error.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment with the direction that if the People do not timely elect to retry the defendant for reckless evasion, then the judgment shall be modified to reflect a conviction for simple evasion and the trial court shall resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

It is undisputed that misdemeanor simple evasion (Veh. Code, sec. 2800.1) is a lesser included offense of felony reckless evasion (Veh. Code, sec. 2800.2) and that the only distinction between the two crimes is that the greater offense requires proof of the additional element that the defendant drove the pursued vehicle in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. The greater offense’s additional element can be established by proving that during the evasion the defendant committed three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under section 12810.

Authority:

VEH 2800.1

VEH 2800.2

People v. Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680

People v. Diaz (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1486

Second Holding:

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a convictionIf the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 819–820

People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638, 639

Third Holding:

California law has long provided that even absent a request, and over any party’s objection, a trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed. This venerable instructional rule ensures that the jury may consider all supportable crimes necessarily included within the charge itself, thus encouraging the most accurate verdict permitted by the pleadings and the evidence. The rule prevents either party, whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice between conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other.

Thus, a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support. In this context, substantial evidence is not any evidence, no matter how weak; it is evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive. If there is no proof, other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution’s evidence, that the offense was less than that charged, such instructions shall not be given. Although we concluded above that substantial evidence supports the finding that the defendant committed at least three qualifying Vehicle Code violations during the pursuit, there is also substantial evidence that he did not commit at least three qualifying violations. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding this lesser included offense.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239–240

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154

People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263

People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1063

Fourth Holding:

We apply the generally applicable California test for harmless error under which we deem an error harmless unless it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error. Other than in cases involving the unique relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter, the general rule is that the failure to instruct on other forms of lesser included offenses in noncapital cases is an error of state law. A reasonable probability in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. In assessing prejudice, we consider both the magnitude of the error and the closeness of the case. Applying this standard, we find the error here prejudicial.

Authority:

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 251

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 944

People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 798

Case: 000181

Error and/or relief

The trial court employed an incorrect standard of review for determining whether the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under Penal Code section 1172.6 should be denied. Reversed and remanded for another new hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.

It also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. If the trial court finds that a petitioning defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

PEN 188(a)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986,

Second Holding:

On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court reviews the superior court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066

Third Holding:

For the trial court to properly conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant here was guilty of murder under the law as amended, the People had to prove he was the actual killer, or that he directly aided and abetted the murder and thus possessed malice aforethought. Felony murder is not at issue in this case.

Authority:

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [sec. 1172.6 relief is unavailable if the defendant was the actual killer]

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [SB 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought], [abrogated on another ground as stated in People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 836]

Fourth Holding:

It was an error for the trial court to conclude that the court had to determine whether the People could prove they could obtain a conviction of the defendant based on basic accomplice liability or whether he acted with reckless disregard for the life of the victim. The correct standard for the trial court at defendant’s section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing was whether the prosecution has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of murder under California law as amended.

The trial court’s reference to whether defendant acted with reckless disregard for life is inapposite, because that aspect is relevant only in the context of whether a defendant was a major participant in the commission of a different felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life–i.e., it is relevant only to felony murder, which is not at issue in this case. Further, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would convict the defendant as he was charged. But at the section 1172.6 hearing, it is the trial court that is the fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Authority:

People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 632