Daily Archives: November 18, 2026

Case 001207

Error and/or relief

The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because nothing in the record supports that the defendant left the puppies in dangerous conditions overnight. We narrow one of the conditions of probation reflect that the order applies to only those medications expressly identified in the medical report.

First Holding:

To prove a violation of section 597.1(a)(1), the prosecution must establish that the defendant acted with criminal negligence—meaning the defendant (1) acted in a way that created a high risk of death or great bodily injury, and (2) a reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

Criminal negligence requires conduct more egregious than mere civil negligence; a defendant’s dereliction must be such a gross departure from the reasonably prudent that it amounts to reckless indifference with actual or imputed knowledge of the consequences.

Authority:

People v. Speegle (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1414, fn. 7

Second Holding:

In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, a trial court applies the same standard an appellate court applies in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.

Authority:

People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212 1213

Third Holding:

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the sufficiency of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record independently for substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

Speculation is not evidence, still less substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 804

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 735

Fourth Holding:

There was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant left the puppies in dangerous conditions. The conviction is reversed, and the court is directed to enter a judgment of acquittal on that count.

Authority:

People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591 [the defendant may not be retried if the judgment is reversed because, as a matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction]

Fifth Holding:

We agree with the parties one of the the conditions of probation is facially overbroad as presently drafted because it purports to require the defendant to take all medications prescribed by a doctor, regardless of whether the medications are for a mental disorder related to her offenses or to her reform and rehabilitation. We narrow the condition to reflect that the order applies to only those medications expressly identified in the medical report.

Authority:

People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1413, 1420 [striking a probation condition requiring the defendant to comply with all directions of his mental health worker, including taking medications as directed because, among other defects, the order was so broad that it could cover any form of medication, whether or not related to the defendant’s mental health or criminality]

Case 001206

Error and/or relief

We conclude defendant must be afforded the opportunity to assert an excessive fines objection in the trial court in light of Kopp. Accordingly, we vacate the restitution fine and remand for further proceedings.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in Kopp that although fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime, the excessive fines analysis under the state and federal Constitutions is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines, such as a restitution fine under section 1202.4. The trial court here imposed a restitution fine despite indications of defendant’s financial hardship.

Nevertheless, because neither defendant nor the court had the benefit of Kopp’s reasoning at the time of sentencing, we conclude defendant must be afforded the opportunity to assert an excessive fines objection and develop a factual record on the considerations relevant to that claim.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 [remanding to give defendant opportunity to assert excessive fines analysis and argue how facts of the case inform such inquiry]

Second Holding:

The touchstone of the excessive fines inquiry is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. Four considerations inform that inquiry: (1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728

Case 001205

Error and/or relief:

In light of Lopez, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage on the grounds that he could have raised, but did not, a relevant jury instruction challenge in his direct appeal from his conviction.

The instructions given in defendant’s case do not conclusively foreclose the possibility the jury convicted him of second degree murder by imputing malice to him. We find defendant has established a prima facie case for relief as required by section 1172.6(c). The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6(d)(3).

First Holding:

SB 1437 was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The statute’s text and legislative history clearly indicate that the Legislature intended to restrict culpability for murder outside the felony murder rule to persons who personally possess malice aforethought.

It accomplished this by amending section 188(a)(3), to require that all principals must act with express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime, with the exception of felony murder under section 189(e).

For a felony murder conviction under section 189(e), SB 1437 required the defendant be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the underlying felony who acted with the intent to kill, or a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

PEN 189(e)

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847, superseded on other grounds by sec. 1172.6(g)

Second Holding:

SB 1437 also created section 1172.6, which established a procedure for defendants already convicted of murder under the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if they believed they could not be convicted of that crime given the above amendments to sections 188 and 189. Section 1172.6(c) requires the court to appoint counsel for properly pleaded petitions, and then conduct a prima facie analysis, with briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before determining whether to issue an order to show cause.

Authority:

PEN 1172,6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961–970

Third Holding:

SB 775 amended section 1172.6, effective January 1, 2022, to permit relief if a murder conviction was based on a natural and probable consequences theory, a felony murder theory predating SB 1437, or, relevant here, some other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)(1)

Fourth Holding:

At the prima facie stage of the petition process, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion or make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief. In this regard, the jury instructions will be critical.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972, 974

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731

Fifth Holding:

On review, an appellate court considers de novo whether a petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima facie stage, such that he or she was not entitled to an order to show cause.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251

Sixth Holding:

Second degree implied malice murder exists where the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.

Aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid theory of murder liability notwithstanding the changes made by SB 1437 and SB 775. An aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing “‘can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850

People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859

Seventh Holding:

To be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.

Consistent with this framework, the relevant inquiry for a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder does not turn on the target offense the defendant intended to facilitate. Instead, it turns on whether the defendant aided the life-endangering act itself while personally harboring the requisite mens rea.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 655 [it is the fatal act, not any underlying crime, that an aider and abettor of second degree murder must aid or abet]

Eighth Holding:

Prior to Lopez, courts denied petitions under section 1172.6 if they were based on grounds that could have been raised in their appeal from their conviction. Lopez disapproved of that line of cases because they conflict with section 1172.6’s text and fundamental purpose and the procedural bar these decisions read into section 1172.6 aligns with neither the doctrine of issue preclusion that informs analysis of prima facie ineligibility nor the purposes that the Dixon bar serves in the habeas corpus context.

As a result, the Lopez court reversed and remanded the matter to enable the Court of Appeal to address in the first instance the merits of Lopez’s claim that the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted on a now-invalid theory.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [Dixon established the rule a writ of habeas corpus will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.]

Case 001204

Error and/or relief:

We grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the extent that we vacate the defendant’s conviction on count 6 because of ineffective assistance of counsel.

First Holding:

The right to counsel is a fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process. The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. Construed in light of its purpose, the right to counsel entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. Specifically, it entitles him to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.

Authority:

Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 374

People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215

Second Holding:

In order to establish ineffective representation, the defendant must prove both incompetence and prejudice. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance. The defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.

The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. The defendant shows that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffectiveness by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. And, in determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court ‘must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.

Authority:

Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 374

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688–689, 694–695

Third Holding:

Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a presumptively final criminal judgment, the defendant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. We independently review prior testimony, as well as all mixed questions of fact and law. Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review.

Authority:

In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1072

In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993–994

Fourth Holding:

The defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact.

A mistake of fact that disproves the required intent for a crime is a defense to criminal liability. Generally, a mistake of fact defense is not available unless the mistake disproves an element of the offense. Put another way, a mistake of fact instruction is only appropriate where the defendant’s mistaken belief negates an element of the crime. The trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to give a mistake of fact instruction. The court is, however, required to give such an instruction on request, where a defendant presents substantial evidence on mistake of fact and the instruction is legally correct.

Authority:

People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791

Fifth Holding:

For general intent crimes, the defendant’s mistaken belief must be both actual and reasonable, but if the mental state of the crime is a specific intent or knowledge, then the mistaken belief must only be actual.

Authority:

People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793

People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249 [As a specific intent crime, defendant’s crime is subject to a good faith, unreasonable mistake of fact defense.]

People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350 [an unreasonable mistake of fact may be asserted in a specific intent crime, so long as the defendant had an actual mistaken belief.]

Sixth Holding:

Threatening a public officer in violation of section 71 is a specific intent crime, as it requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to influence the performance of the officer’s official duties. Thus, a mistake of fact instruction would have been warranted, upon request, if there was substantial evidence that the defendant threatened the officer because he actually believed that he was being illegally abducted by the arresting deputies.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant subjectively, albeit unreasonably, believed he was being abducted. For a specific intent crime like a violation of section 71, an instruction on mistake of fact is warranted, upon request, so long as there is substantial evidence that the defendant subjectively harbored the mistaken belief at issue.

Authority:

People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 36, 40–41

People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793

People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249

People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350

Seventh Holding:

(Gary note: The court outlined the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition, but I’m not presenting them in this summary.) On the record before us, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact fell below prevailing professional norms. The duty of counsel to a criminal defendant includes careful preparation of and request for all instructions which in his judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests.

As discussed, a mistake of fact instruction was warranted because there was substantial evidence that the defendant subjectively believed that the deputies were abducting him or otherwise detaining him illegally. Further, the People do not dispute that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to request the instruction. Trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction as a result of his ignorance or misunderstanding of the law, rather than because of an informed tactical determination, constitutes deficient performance, i.e., representation which falls below the standard of competence demanded of criminal defense attorneys.

Authority:

People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 270

In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 955–956

Eighth Holding:

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. To obtain relief, the defendant must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The defendant need not establish a reasonable probability that the entire jury would have acquitted the petitioner; rather, the petitioner only needs to demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different verdict.

(Gary note: The court then analyzed facts specific to the case to arrive at a conclusion that the error was not harmless under Strickland.)

We vacate the defendant’s count 6 conviction. The prosecution may retry the defendant on count 6 within the timeframe allowed by law.

(Gary note: Business and Professions Code section 6086.7(a)(2) requires the court to notify the State Bar whenever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct, incompetent representation, or willful misrepresentation of an attorney. The court directed its clerk to notify the respective entities, including the prosecutor’s office and the attorney in question, of the reversal based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.)

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691

In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1086

In re Welch (2015) 61 Cal.4th 489, 521

Case 001203

Error and/or relief

The minute order must be corrected to reflect the credit for time served ordered by the court.

Holding:

The minute order must be corrected to reflect the number of days of credit the trial court orally pronounced during his resentencing. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. We thus accept the People’s concession the matter should be remanded for the trial court to correct the number of credits on the minute order.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 81