Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Abstracts and Minutes, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000500

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The condition that the defendant participate in and complete, at his expense, any counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program deemed appropriate by his probation officer is unconstitutional. The sentencing memorandum must be amended to reflect the court’s waiver of all fines and fees.

First Holding:

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3), judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.

The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended. Here, defendant’s condition does not specify the kind of program defendant might be required to complete; rather, it allows defendant’s probation officer to determine whether and in what type of program defendant could be ordered to participate. Thus, the probation condition improperly delegates judicial authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

Cal. Const. art. III sec. 3

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359

Second Holding:

Where the condition includes the possibility of participation in a residential treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, it is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903

People v. Cruz (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310 [Invalidating probation condition that gave the probation officer sole discretion to decide whether the defendant should be subject to global positioning system monitoring]

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 1359 [Invalidating condition that provided that the defendant shall not associate socially, nor be present at any time, at any place, public or private, with any person, as designated by your probation officer] [CONTRA] People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240-1241 [Upholding probation condition which directed defendant to follow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe] [CONTRA:] People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307 [Upholding condition that probation officer may unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation program and determine whether defendant successfully completed that program]

Third Holding:

The sentencing memorandum should be modified to accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement that all applicable fines and fees be waived. We shall direct the court to correct the sentencing memorandum.

Authority:

People v. Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1340 [The oral pronouncement of judgment ordinarily controls when there is a discrepancy between it and the clerical recording of the judgment]

People v. Contreras (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1300, fn. 3 [The reviewing court has the authority to correct clerical errors]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000480

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to apply Penal Code section 1170(h)(5)(A) and (B), regarding mandatory supervision, after sentencing the defendant to county jail.

First Holding:

Punishment for a conviction of possession for sale of methamphetamine is governed by section 1170(h), which provides that punishment shall be by imprisonment in county jail. Although the section 12022(c) firearm enhancement directed imprisonment in state prison, section 1170(h)(9) required the sentence to be punishable as directed by the underlying offense. Under section 1170(h)(5)(A) and (B), a court imposing a sentence under subdivision (h)(1) must suspend execution of a concluding portion of the term for a period selected at the court’s discretion, known as mandatory supervision, unless it finds, in the interest of justice, that it is not appropriate in a particular case.

This section creates a statutory presumption in favor of the imposition of a period of mandatory supervision in all applicable cases, and, if the court denies mandatory supervision, it must state its reasons on the record. Given that the court ordered a term of imprisonment in county jail under section 1170(h), it is appropriate to remand for resentencing for consideration of mandatory supervision.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

Second Holding:

After the date of offense in this matter, section 12022(c)(2) was amended and now provides for imprisonment in state prison as punishment for a violation with a firearm enhancement under that section, not under section 1170(h). Applying this statute retroactively would likely violate the ex post facto clause.

Authority:

PEN 12022(c)

U.S. Const., art. I, secs. 9, 10

People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 360 [A statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws if it increases the punishment for a crime after it is committed]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000459

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to revoke the defendant’s probation after its term expired as a matter of law. He had been placed on five years’ probation, and just before the five years expired, the court found him in violation and ordered his suspended prison sentence executed. During his probation, the law changed, and by operation of law his probation was shortened to three years, which expired long before the events on which the probation revocation was based.

First Holding:

While appellant was serving his five-year term of probation, the Legislature amended the statute governing probation, section 1203.1. The previous version of the statute allowed the trial court to grant probation for a period of time not exceeding the maximum term for which the person could be imprisoned, or not over five years for an offense with a maximum sentence of five years or less. Under the amended version of section 1203.1, the relevant portion of which took effect January 1, 2021, the maximum term of probation a trial court may impose for most felony offenses is a period of time not exceeding two years. Appellant’s offense of conviction is one for which the trial court may now impose a maximum probation term of three years.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 207

People v. Kite (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986, 994-998

Second Holding:

The new limitations on the maximum term of probation in amended section 1203.1 apply to existing, nonfinal plea agreements while otherwise maintaining the remainder of the bargain. Probation terms exceeding those permitted under amended section 1203.1 effectively end by operation of law on the date of the maximum term now authorized.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 963, 969, 979,

People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 218

Third Holding:

Once probation ends, a court’s power is significantly attenuated. Its power to impose a sentence over the defendant ceases entirely. The collateral effect of the retroactive application of amended section 1203.1 is to undo or unravel the orders terminating appellant’s probation and ordering execution of the suspended sentence. Thus, if a probation term is shortened under amended section 1203.1, conduct that would have constituted a probation violation, but is now deemed to have occurred outside this term, may not be the basis for terminating that probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.3(a) [court has jurisdiction to revoke probation during the term of probation]

People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 782

People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 220

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000454

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find that a condition of probation that requires the defendant participate and complete any counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program deemed appropriate by the probation officer was not an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine, it was improper to impose as a condition of probation that the defendant participate at his own expense.

The challenged probation condition should be modified to delete the portion of the condition requiring defendant to be responsible for the payment of the costs/fees of any counseling or rehabilitation/treatment program. The court is directed to issue a separate order for the payment of such costs and fees. Before the court may order defendant to pay any or all costs associated with his probation, it must make an inquiry and determination as to his ability to pay and determine the amount of payment.

First Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation. Instead, the court must issue a separate order for the payment of such costs. Moreover, before ordering a defendant to pay costs of probation, the court must make an inquiry and determination of the defendant’s ability to pay and the amount of payment.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1b(a)

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

Second Holding:

Though we find there was no improper delegation, the defendant’s claim that the condition of probation is an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine has not been forfeited for lack of objection, because it raises a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888

People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172

Third Holding:

A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. Further, the court has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions. We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143

Fourth Holding:

A trial court is governed by the separation of powers doctrine. The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. Although the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212

Fifth Holding:

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359

Sixth Holding:

A probation condition directing that a defendant participate in any treatment program when considering another condition requiring a defendant complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with treatment as prescribed by the probation officer, passes constitutional muster. This is particularly true where the court’s oral comments reflect that the defendant needs treatment for a substance abuse problem. However, where the condition includes the possibility of participation in a residential treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, it is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902-903

People v. Cruz (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310 [Invalidating probation condition that gave the probation officer sole discretion to decide whether the defendant should be subject to GPS monitoring.]

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 1359 [Invalidating condition that provided, “You shall not associate socially, nor be present at any time, at any place, public or private, with any person, as designated by your probation officer.”]

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238,-1241 [Upholding probation condition that directed defendant to “follow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe”]

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307 [Upholding condition that probation officer may unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation program and determine whether defendant successfully completed that program.]

Seventh Holding:

A probation condition should be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. Following that precept, we read the challenged provision here not as delegating adjudicatory powers to the probation officer but as indicating the court’s advance approval of an agreement that the probation officer might reach with defendant. If a probation officer does interpret the condition in an arbitrary manner, defendant may then file a petition for modification of his probation condition. Thus, the probation condition did not improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(b)(1)

PEN 1203.3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 211

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation officer’s actions]

People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658 [If probation officer interprets probation condition in an arbitrary way, the defendant can file a petition for modification of his probation condition.]

Appellate Principles, Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000414

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erroneously applied the doctrine of the law of the case to deny the defendant’s section 1170(d) petition in which he sought resentencing under its provisions because 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).

First Holding:

In his original appeal from the 2010 conviction the Court of Appeal concluded that 50 years to life was not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. The trial court denied his petition under section 1170(d) in 2023 on the basis that, under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court had previously ruled that his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. However, years after the original appeal was decided, the Supreme Court determined that 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

Second Holding:

The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and this although in its subsequent consideration the court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.

Authority:

People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6

People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 442 [The law-of-the-case doctrine binds the trial court as to the law but controls the outcome only if the evidence on rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based.]

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 430 [The doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case bar a defendant from raising an issue that was raised and rejected in a prior appeal.]

Third Holding:

The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate review of the same issue more than once in a single action. It is well settled, however, that the doctrine may be disregarded where the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations.

Authority:

Truck Ins. Exchange v. Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 67, 87, fn. 6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716-717 [Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) does not apply when there has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.]

Fourth Holding:

Here, although defendant raised and this court previously rejected the issue of whether, as a juvenile offender, defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, the law on the issue has changed significantly and is currently split.

Authority:

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to sec. 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for sec. 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 441 [140 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061 [107 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 513, dis. opn. of Feuer, J. [ majority holds 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP, but the dissent would hold that it is], review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 999 [44 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540 [50 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [parole eligibility at 47 years of age was by no stretch of the imagination functional or de facto LWOP]

People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]