Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000203

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying his expungement request under Penal Code section 1203.4 and in failing to consider his request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). Because the court did not address his request under section 17(b), on remand it must do so.

First Holding:

An order denying relief under section 1203.4 is appealable.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 114

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 provides in pertinent part that a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation is entitled as a matter of right to have the plea or verdict changed to not guilty, to have the proceedings expunged from the record, and to have the accusations dismissed. If the petitioner meets the criteria for relief under section 1203.4, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 249-250

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991

People v. Lewis (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 294, 297-298

Third Holding:

As of 2023, section 1203.4 provides that a petition for relief under this section shall not be denied due to an unfulfilled order of restitution, and an unfulfilled order of restitution shall not be grounds for finding that a defendant did not fulfill the condition of probation for the entire period of probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(c)(3)(A) & (B)

Fourth Holding:

When a crime is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor it is commonly referred to as a “wobbler,” and the trial court may reduce the offense to a misdemeanor at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor. In exercising its discretion, the court considers several factors, including “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.

Authority:

PEN 17(b)(3)

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877,

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 790-791

Fifth Holding:

Grand theft by embezzlement of property valued at more than $950, the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is a wobbler. The trial court should have addressed the defendant’s request to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.

Authority:

People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 75

Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000199

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was sentenced to state prison after pleading no contest to robbery and injury a girlfriend. The trial court improperly imposed a domestic violence fee. We strike the fee.

Holding:

A domestic violence fee is only authorized when a defendant is granted probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000194

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant appeals the trial court’s written order vacating its prior order appointing counsel and scheduling a Franklin hearing to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful offender parole hearing. Defendant asks this court to remand the matter so he may present additional argument to the trial court. The People do not oppose giving defendant an opportunity to establish his eligibility for a Franklin hearing. We accept the People’s concession and will reverse and remand the matter.

First Holding:

As of January 1, 2020, defendants who committed crimes when they were 25 years old or younger are generally eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after specified periods, depending on their sentence. However, the statute excludes those defendants who, like defendant here, were sentenced to LWOP for crimes they committed when they were 18 to 25 years old.

[GARY NOTE: A defendant who is eligible for future consideration of parole as a youthful offender may make a record in the superior court to preserve facts that may be persuasive in a future hearing on whether to grant parole.]

Authority:

PEN 3051

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

Although Hardin rejected an equal protection challenge to section 3051 by an offender sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder, it did not foreclose other as-applied challenges to the statute based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484-495 [the defendant successfully raised an as-applied challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder under section 190.2(d)]

Third Holding:

There are cases with possibly similar crimes by possibly equally culpable offenders who would now be eligible for parole while the defendant is not. Although these authorities do not conclusively establish any violation of defendant’s right to equal protection, they do allow for the possibility that he might be able to develop such an argument under Harden.

Authority:

People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831

People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532

People v. Fortman (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 45

Fourth Holding:

Some states have constitutions that prohibit imposing an LWOP sentence on youthful offenders. While these authorities do not conclusively establish that section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution, they allow for the possibility that defendant might be able to develop such an argument.

Authority:

Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024) 493 Mass. 216, 234-235

Equal protection, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000187

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends on this appeal that the trial court erroneously found he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and erred in denying his Franklin motion as successive. In 2018, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a Franklin hearing.

(The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing.)

That court (in 2018) denied that petition on the basis that he was not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he would already be released before reaching the 15 years’ threshold for youth offender parole. In 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that it was a successive motion. The People agree with defendant that the court erred when it denied his motion as successive. We conclude the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing as successive. We reverse the court’s order and remand for the court to consider defendant’s motion under Penal Code section 1203.01.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2014, SB 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) enacted sections 3051, 3046(c), and 4801(c) to provide a parole eligibility mechanism for youthful offenders. Defendants who were 25 years old or younger at the time they committed the offense and were convicted of a determinate term are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 15th year of incarceration. The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. For defendants whose judgments were final, the proper procedure to obtain a Franklin hearing is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and the Cook decision.

Authority:

PEN 1203.01

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261,283-284

People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

There is no express bar to successive motions or requests for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The defendant’s section 1203.01 motion should not have been denied as successive.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Third Holding:

The trial court’s order denying a defendant’s Franklin motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. In deciding whether the court abused its discretion we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Critical to the resolution of this case, we note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459

People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749

People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746

Fourth Holding:

Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. As such, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the sole basis he had already sought a Franklin hearing by filing a habeas petition. Therefore, the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion as successive.

Authority:

ADIn re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 457-458

Abstracts and Minutes, Eighth Amendment, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000176

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The $150 restitution fine and the parole revocation fine imposed on count three are unauthorized and must be vacated or stayed. The fine had been imposed on a count that was stayed under Penal Code section 654. Aside from that problem, a separate parole revocation fine cannot be imposed on a misdemeanor offense. Also, the abstract of judgment must be corrected because it incorrectly states that he has a prior strike and was sentenced under Penal Code section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12.

First Holding:

When a court imposes multiple punishments in violation of section 654, it acts in excess of its jurisdiction and imposes an unauthorized sentence that can be challenged for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1234

Second Holding:

Defendant is not subject to parole separately for the misdemeanor and is thus not subject to a parole revocation restitution fine on it.

Authority:

People v. Holmes (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 539, 547

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected because it erroneously states that he has a prior strike and that he was sentenced under section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12. There is no indication in the record defendant has sustained a prior strike conviction. We will order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect that he does not have a strike prior, and he was not sentenced pursuant to section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12.

[Gary note: The court cited no authority for the obvious proposition that the abstract of judgment needs to be corrected. I have listed below some of many cases that the court could have relied on.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2