Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Case: 000412

Error and/or relief

The electronics search condition is invalid under Lent and must be stricken.

First Holding:

In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. The court may impose and require such reasonable conditions as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer. The trial court’s discretion, although broad, nevertheless is not without limits.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120–1121

Second Holding:

A three-prong test determines whether a probation condition is unreasonable. A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. All three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first Lent prong is satisfied because the record does not show a relationship between the defendant’s use of electronic devices and the offending conduct sufficient to justify the search condition. There is no information in the record that he used any kind of electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his offenses of molesting a child or dissuading a witness. Nor is there any mention whatsoever of his use of a mobile phone, computer, or social media account in connection with the victim or any other conduct that might be said to relate to the offenses in this case.

Authority:

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720 [defendant met victim through social media]

Fourth Holding:

As for the second Lent prong, it goes without saying that the use of electronic devices is not criminal in and of itself.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Fifth Holding:

The third Lent prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. It requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality. Nothing in the testimony at the preliminary hearing, the probation report, or the record of the defendant’s personal history revealed anything about his electronics use that might be connected to his past crimes or potential future criminality. The defendant had no prior history of arrests, convictions, or probation, and his risk of recidivism was assessed as below average. Thus, as in Ricardo P., the burden imposed by the electronics search condition on the defendant’s privacy is substantially disproportionate to the condition’s goal” of deterring future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 663–664

Case: 000406

Error and/or relief

The provision in the probation order requiring the defendant to reimburse the county for public defender and probation related services must be stricken.

Holding:

Section 1465.9(a) provides that the balance of any court-imposed costs imposed under former section 987.8, authorizing public defender fees, and former section 1203.1b, authorizing probation services fees, as those sections read on June 30, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. Accordingly, we will strike the portion of the probation order authorizing these fees.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(a)

People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 602-603

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 625

Case: 000359

Error and/or relief

The minor challenges a probation condition prohibiting use of “illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician,” and another condition stating defendant “must not be around persons the minor knows to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances.” The minor contends these conditions are constitutionally vague and overbroad because “mind altering substances” could include legal substances such as caffeine.

We hold the conditions, reasonably read, apply only to illegal drugs and illegal mind-altering substances, and therefore are neither vague nor overbroad. To avoid any ambiguity between the two conditions, however, we modify the second condition to include the same exception for physician-prescribed substances present in the first condition. As modified, we affirm the dispositional order.

First Holding:

To withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated. The question is not whether a greater degree of precision would be desirable in principle, but whether it is constitutionally compelled. The vagueness doctrine demands no more than a reasonable degree of certainty. When reviewing the language of a probation condition, we assign it the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. A probation condition is overbroad if it imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights but is not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

Second Holding:

Although the minor did not assert his constitutional challenge in the trial court, that challenge presents pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court and therefore may be raised for the first time on appeal. We review this constitutional challenge de novo.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901

Third Holding:

The minor argues that the conditions are vague as to whether they are limited to illegal mind-altering substances, or apply to legal mind-altering substances as well. Specifically, he contends it is ambiguous whether the term “illegal” modifies “mind altering substances” or simply modifies “drugs,” the term “illegal” directly precedes. We do not think a reasonable, objective reader would parse the conditions to apply the term “illegal” to “drugs” but not to “mind altering substances.”

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

Fourth Holding:

Defendant correctly notes condition No. 18 does not contain a prescription exception. Again, because condition No. 18 is limited to illegal substances, a prescription exception strictly speaking is unnecessary, and therefore, read by itself, the language of condition No. 18 is neither vague nor overbroad. In tandem with condition No. 17, however, the presence of a prescription exception in one condition and not the other arguably could create confusion. To remedy any such confusion, we modify condition No. 18 to include a prescription exception. Condition No. 18 is modified to read, “You must not be around persons you know to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician.”

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892 [approving reviewing court’s insertion of language to secure the constitutional validity of the probation condition]

In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 192 [tailoring probation condition to remedy vagueness and overbreadth]

Case: 000304

Error and/or relief

The defendant filed a petition for dismissal citing three different Penal Code sections—sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and 1203.41. The trial court denied the petition based on section 1203.41, under which the defendant was not entitled to relief. We reverse and remand to allow the court to consider the defendant’s claim for relief under section 1203.4.

First Holding:

The trial court’s denial of relief under any of these statutes (1203.4, 1203.41, 1203.4a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 572

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 authorizes the trial court to expunge a criminal record if the defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period, the defendant was discharged before the probation period ended, or if the court believes relief should be granted in the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

Third Holding:

Section 1203.4a authorizes dismissal of charges against defendants who are convicted of misdemeanors but were not granted probation.
Authority:

Authority:

PEN 1203.4a

Fourth Holding:

Section 1203.41 allows an individual convicted of a felony, under certain circumstances, to withdraw a guilty or nolo contendere plea, or set aside a guilty verdict in the interests of justice, in the court’s discretion. The crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty is a wobbler. In this case, because the defendant was sentenced to probation with 364 days in county jail, it is a misdemeanor offense.

Authority:

PEN 1203.41

People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874, 880

Fifth Holding:

it appears the trial court may have been confused by the defendant’s petition, which sought relief under all three statutes. Relief was not authorized to the defendant under sections 1203.4a and 1203.41, and the court did not err in denying relief under section 1203.41. When a trial court evaluates a petition under the incorrect statute or misunderstands the scope of its discretion, this is an abuse of discretion and the case must be reversed and remanded for an exercise of informed discretion, unless the record clearly indicates the same result would follow.

Authority:

People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required]

People v. Parker (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 498, 501–502 [case remanded because trial court mistakenly believed an imposed but suspended sentence is a bar to section 1203.4 relief]

Case: 000298

Error and/or relief

Although a trial court has broad discretion in imposing terms and conditions when sentencing a criminal defendant to probation instead of imprisonment, any conditions imposed must have some relationship to the crime and be designed to prevent future criminality. In this case, one of the probation conditions imposed required defendant to participate in mental health and substance abuse testing and treatment. Not only was this unconnected to the underlying crime, any suggestion in the probation and sentencing report that defendant suffered from mental health or substance abuse issues was wholly unsupported. Therefore, that probation condition must be stricken.

Holding:

A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. But such discretion is not unlimited: A condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. A probation condition will be upheld unless all of the following are true: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. We review a challenge to the conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486