Tag Archives: Vagueness

Appellate Principles, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000941

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor challenges several conditions of probation. We modify two of them.

First Holding:

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate probation conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. The juvenile court’s discretion, while broad, is not unlimited.

A probation condition is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.

In order to invalidate a condition of probation under this Lent test, all three factors must be found to be present. A condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Second Holding:

We review a juvenile court’s imposition of a probation condition for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6

Third Holding:

Hearsay can at least sometimes be considered at dispositional hearings, and courts may base probation conditions upon information in probation reports.

Authority:

In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 243–244

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

Fourth Holding:

Probation conditions are to be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable reader. We modify the probation condition that the minor not be around anyone known to him to be in possession of any dangerous or deadly weapons by inserting “known to him to be unlawfully in possession of the same.”

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

(Gary note: Olguin supports the first sentence of that summary of the holding. The court did not cite any specific authority in the paragraphs in which it modified the language of that condition itself. However, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, authorizes an appellate court to modify conditions of probation to render them constitutional.)

Fifth Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights.

People have a constitutional right to self-defense. The condition that “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone” must be tailored to, “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone, except for acts of lawful self-defense.”

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 1

In re Carlos C. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 997, 1002, 1004

People v. McDonnell (1917) 32 Cal.App. 694, 704

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000901

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A condition of probation must be modified, as it is not sufficiently clear on what exact conduct is proscribed.

First Holding:

Probation condition number 48 provides: “You shall not associate with any person known to you as a gang member, and you shall not frequent any area where gang members are known to congregate, or areas known for gang-related activity.” The defendant argues the terms frequent and areas known for gang-related activity are unconstitutionally vague.

Authority:

In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 [probation condition that the minor not frequent any areas of gang related activity was objectionable because the verb ‘frequent’ would be especially challenging to understand; ‘frequent’ should be replaced with “visit”]

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913–914 [probation condition prohibiting minor from being in areas known for gang-related activity was impermissibly vague in that it does not provide notice of what areas the minor may not frequent or what types of activities he must shun]

Second Holding:

Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated. The doctrine invalidates a condition of probation so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

Authority:

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910

Third Holding:

In Victor L., we considered a similar probation condition that required the minor to stay away from areas known by him for gang-related activity. We found the condition as written, without further specificity, was not sufficiently clear to put the minor on notice of the prohibited conduct.

However, we declined to remand the matter to the trial court to reform the probation condition, observing, that to require the judge in each probation order to specify exactly which areas are forbidden to the individual gang member would impose an undue burden on the judiciary.

Instead, we elected to modify the condition of probation to provide for the probation officer to notify the minor of the areas he must avoid, as this approach was implied in law in order to avoid a claim of unconstitutional vagueness. We modified the probation term to read in relevant part, “The Minor shall not be in areas known by Minor for gang-related activity (or specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity).

Similarly here, we will modify the condition to read: “You shall not associate with any person known to you as a gang member, and you shall not visit any area where gang members are known by you to congregate or any area known by you for gang-related activity (or as designated by your probation officer), unless you have prior authorization from your probation officer.”

Authority:

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913, 916-918, 931-932

In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000899

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The electronic-data conditions are unreasonable under People v. Lent. We therefore strike them and remand for the juvenile court to consider whether to impose revised conditions. We also agree with the parties that the association condition should be modified to include a knowledge requirement.

First Holding:

When a ward of the juvenile court is placed on probation, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward, including conditions of probation that (1) are individually tailored, developmentally appropriate, and reasonable; (2) impose a burden that is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the conditions; and (3) are determined by the court to be fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. A condition of probation that is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Second Holding:

We review conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. To determine whether a probation condition is reasonable, we apply a three-part test under Lent.

A condition cannot be held invalid under Lent unless it meets all three of the following prongs: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not related to future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118-1119

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Third Holding:

In addition to being reasonable, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, or else it is void for vagueness. And when a probation condition imposes limitations on a probationer’s constitutional rights, it must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition—the person’s reformation and rehabilitation—to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Fourth Holding:

Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

Authority:

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 661

Fifth Holding:

We conclude that the conditions are invalid under Lent. As to the first prong of Lent, there is no question that restricting the use of electronics The minor’s conduct involved asking the victim for her phone number, and asked the victim to put his number in her phone contacts list–which she did, but later deleted it. These acts do not establish the requisite relationship between the challenged probation conditions and the minor’s offense (sexual battery by restraint). Generally, decisions finding a sufficient connection between electronics search conditions and an offense rely on the probationer’s use of electronic devices to facilitate the offense.

In Appleton, the defendant met the minor victim online and later sexually assaulted him. The Court of Appeal held that the nexus between the offense and the probation condition at issue was sufficient even though it was somewhat attenuated. In Flores, the Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the condition at issue and the defendant’s drug offense because the defendant used a website and an online program to arrange drug sales through a disguised phone number. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that electronic devices played any role in facilitating the offense.

Here, in contrast, there is no indication that the minor ever actually contacted the victim through an electronic device. Indeed, he did not even have the ability to do so, as he never obtained her contact information. Nor is there any evidence that the victim attempted to communicate with the minor after the offense. The first two prongs of Lent have been met–the condition has no relation to the criminal conduct, and it restrains otherwise lawful conduct.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720

People v. Flores (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 563, 565-566, 573

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Sixth Holding:

The third prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. Thus, the mere fact that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct is insufficient to justify a broad electronics search condition. The electronic-data conditions burden the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the claimed purposes of ensuring compliance with two of his other probation conditions (a no-contact order and prohibition from possessing sexual materials).

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 and fn 4

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 567-568

Seventh Holding:

The court ordered the following probation condition: “The Minor shall not associate with minors under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless in the presence of a responsible adult, or associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad if it (1) impinges on constitutional rights, and (2) is not tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the probationer’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

The restriction is not unreasonable, but it must be tailored to require the minor’s express knowledge that the minor is under the age of 14. Generally speaking, if a probation condition prohibits a probationer from associating with a certain group of people, the condition is unconstitutionally vague unless it also requires that the probationer know a given person is in that group. Here, the minor may not reasonably know that an individual is under 14 years of age.

Thus, we modify the association condition to read: “The Minor shall not associate with minors whom he knows or reasonably should know are under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless he is in the presence of a responsible adult, or unless the associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

Authority:

People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

People v. Bray (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 494, 503

People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 [modifying condition prohibiting association with people under age 18].

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case 000717

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed a condition requiring the minor to participate in counseling and/or an education program as directed by his probation officer. This condition is too indefinite and we reverse and remand for the court to modify or strike it.

First Holding:

Although the minor did not object to this condition, we may still consider his challenge because it presents a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887

Second Holding:

A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation. And the court may empower the probation department with authority to supervise probation conditions. But, while a court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may also result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Third Holding:

The court did not specify any particular kind of counseling or education program. Indeed, by putting “and/or” between education and counseling, the court did not make clear whether the minor must participate in education, counseling, or both. Because the condition in this case contains no standard by which the probation department is to be guided, the condition is too broad and must either be stricken or rewritten to provide the necessary specificity.

Authority:

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359

Fourth Holding:

We acknowledge the line between an appropriate delegation of details and an improper delegation of judicial authority may not always be clear. But the trial court must at least select a specific category of educational or therapeutic programming.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902–903 [striking condition requiring defendant to participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation officer because the court must choose between residential and outpatient programming]

Cf. People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 301, 302, 308 [approving condition requiring defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program as approved by the Probation Officer because any attempt to specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious practical difficulties]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000692

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The condition of probation requiring the minor to “report to your probation officer as directed and follow his or her orders” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and must be modified.

First Holding:

We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Second Holding:

A probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Third Holding:

Courts may not delegate to probation officers the authority to set probation conditions. A probation officer has wide discretion to enforce court-ordered conditions and to give directives to a probationer, if those directives are reasonably related to previously imposed terms. The condition as drafted does not clearly demarcate the scope of the probation officer’s wide discretion to enforce the court’s conditions. To remove any ambiguity on this point, we will direct that the condition be modified to read “Report to [the probation officer] as directed and follow his/her orders related to the probation conditions imposed by the court.”

Authority:

In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372-1373

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 [While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.]

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000359

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor challenges a probation condition prohibiting use of “illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician,” and another condition stating defendant “must not be around persons the minor knows to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances.” The minor contends these conditions are constitutionally vague and overbroad because “mind altering substances” could include legal substances such as caffeine.

We hold the conditions, reasonably read, apply only to illegal drugs and illegal mind-altering substances, and therefore are neither vague nor overbroad. To avoid any ambiguity between the two conditions, however, we modify the second condition to include the same exception for physician-prescribed substances present in the first condition. As modified, we affirm the dispositional order.

First Holding:

To withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated. The question is not whether a greater degree of precision would be desirable in principle, but whether it is constitutionally compelled. The vagueness doctrine demands no more than a reasonable degree of certainty. When reviewing the language of a probation condition, we assign it the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. A probation condition is overbroad if it imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights but is not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

Second Holding:

Although the minor did not assert his constitutional challenge in the trial court, that challenge presents pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court and therefore may be raised for the first time on appeal. We review this constitutional challenge de novo.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901

Third Holding:

The minor argues that the conditions are vague as to whether they are limited to illegal mind-altering substances, or apply to legal mind-altering substances as well. Specifically, he contends it is ambiguous whether the term “illegal” modifies “mind altering substances” or simply modifies “drugs,” the term “illegal” directly precedes. We do not think a reasonable, objective reader would parse the conditions to apply the term “illegal” to “drugs” but not to “mind altering substances.”

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

Fourth Holding:

Defendant correctly notes condition No. 18 does not contain a prescription exception. Again, because condition No. 18 is limited to illegal substances, a prescription exception strictly speaking is unnecessary, and therefore, read by itself, the language of condition No. 18 is neither vague nor overbroad. In tandem with condition No. 17, however, the presence of a prescription exception in one condition and not the other arguably could create confusion. To remedy any such confusion, we modify condition No. 18 to include a prescription exception. Condition No. 18 is modified to read, “You must not be around persons you know to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician.”

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892 [approving reviewing court’s insertion of language to secure the constitutional validity of the probation condition]

In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 192 [tailoring probation condition to remedy vagueness and overbreadth]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000034

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of probation conditions regarding association with minors, completion of a sex offender treatment program, polygraph examinations, possession of pornography, electronic search, and electronic monitoring. We conclude the association with minors and pornography conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and will remand the case to the trial court to modify them

First Holding:

Regarding the conditions of probation. we conclude the association with minors and pornography conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and will remand the case to the trial court to modify them.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

Second Holding:

A probation condition is valid under the statutory scheme if it relates to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, relates to other criminal conduct, or requires or forbids conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality.

Authority:

People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 498

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Third Holding:

The Lent test is conjunctive—all three factors must be found in order to invalidate a probation condition.

Authority:

People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, fn. 3

Fourth Holding:

A trial court abuses its discretion only when the probation conditions imposed are arbitrary, capricious, or exceed the bounds of reason.

Authority:

People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234

Fifth Holding:

Even valid probation conditions must not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Vagueness considers whether a condition is sufficiently precise to give the probationer fair warning of what conduct is required or prohibited; overbreadth considers the closeness of fit between the state’s interest in reformation and rehabilitation and the burden imposed on the [probationer’s] constitutional rights.

Authority:

People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1126-1127

In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 260

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Sixth Holding:

A probation condition must be sufficiently definite for the probationer to know what conduct is required or prohibited, and to allow the court to determine when that condition has been violated.

Authority:

People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500

Seventh Holding:

A probation condition also must be closely tailored to its legitimate objective to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad

Authority:

People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-102 [such conditions must be narrowly drawn]

Eighth Holding:

We review de novo constitutional challenges to probation conditions.

Authority:

People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172