Error and/or relief
The court imposed a condition requiring the minor to participate in counseling and/or an education program as directed by his probation officer. This condition is too indefinite and we reverse and remand for the court to modify or strike it.
First Holding:
Although the minor did not object to this condition, we may still consider his challenge because it presents a pure question of law.
Authority:
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887
Second Holding:
A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation. And the court may empower the probation department with authority to supervise probation conditions. But, while a court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.
By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may also result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.
Authority:
Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3
In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293
People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240
People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902
Third Holding:
The court did not specify any particular kind of counseling or education program. Indeed, by putting “and/or” between education and counseling, the court did not make clear whether the minor must participate in education, counseling, or both. Because the condition in this case contains no standard by which the probation department is to be guided, the condition is too broad and must either be stricken or rewritten to provide the necessary specificity.
Authority:
People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359
Fourth Holding:
We acknowledge the line between an appropriate delegation of details and an improper delegation of judicial authority may not always be clear. But the trial court must at least select a specific category of educational or therapeutic programming.
Authority:
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902–903 [striking condition requiring defendant to participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation officer because the court must choose between residential and outpatient programming]
Cf. People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 301, 302, 308 [approving condition requiring defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program as approved by the Probation Officer because any attempt to specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious practical difficulties]