Error and/or relief
The defendant’s petition for writ of mandate is granted. Filed as a habeas corpus petition, the People aver that the instant petition should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s discovery motion and concede that the defendant established a plausible factual foundation for discovery.
The People assert, and the defendant agrees, the matter should be remanded for development of the record on the relevant factors governing Racial Justice Act [RJA] discovery and for the trial court to consider those factors in the first instance.
We conclude the trial court misapplied the applicable legal standards and erred by denying the defendant’s motion. We therefore grant the petition, direct the trial court to vacate its denial of the defendant’s discovery motion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
First Holding:
We have the discretion to treat a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate. Writ review is appropriate where a petition raises novel legal issues of widespread interest. The RJA remains fairly new legislation and has been amended several times since its inception. Though laudable in its purposes, the Act has proven challenging to the courts in its implementation. Given there are few appellate decisions interpreting the Act thus far, several appellate courts have found writ review appropriate in addressing issues raised under the RJA.
Authority:
People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340
Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 509
Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612
Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 816
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147, 156 [the RJA’s command is simple, but the implementation is somewhat complex; writ review appropriate to address questions of first impression including how to interpret the RJA’s discovery provision]]
Jackson v. Superior Court (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 372, 382
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 46 [writ of mandate issued and matter remanded for the trial court to determine if the defendant was entitled to the appointment of counsel]
Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 133 [writ of mandate issued, and the trial court’s order denying the petitioner a hearing vacated after the appellate court determined the petitioner met his burden and could proceed to an evidentiary hearing]
Second Holding:
Here, the parties agree without objection that the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate. We therefore exercise our discretion to construe the petition as a petition for writ of mandate of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s RJA discovery motion and address the court’s order on the merits.
Authority:
People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335
People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937 [appeal from nonappealable order treated as application for writ of mandate and addressed on the merits]
Third Holding:
Two courts of appeal have concluded, albeit with different reasoning, that a trial court’s order denying a request for discovery under the RJA is not appealable. Both courts recognized, however, that such an order may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate.
Authority:
In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071–1072, 1076 review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S287339
People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292, 293, review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S288202
In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692 [denial of a sec. 1054.9 discovery motion may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate]
Fourth Holding:
A discovery order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. We review the factual underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.
The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156
City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 55
Sargon Enterprises Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773
Fifth Holding:
Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA (Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system; to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing; and to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences. To achieve these objectives, the RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7.
Authority:
AB 2542
PEN 745
PEN 1473
PEN 1473.7
Sixth Holding:
Section 745(a) proclaims that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. It specifies four categories which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, constitute a violation of the RJA.
As relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745 (a)(3) where the defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.
Also relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745(a)(4)(A) where a longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
Authority:
PEN 745
Seventh Holding:
A defendant in custody may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of the RJA. Specifically, section 745(b) provides that a defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). The RJA also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.
Authority:
People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945
Eighth Holding:
If a habeas petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the RJA, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. If, after a hearing, the court finds a violation of section 745(a) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation pursuant to section 745(e).
Authority:
PEN 1473(e)
Ninth Holding:
If a court finds after judgment has been entered that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with section 745(a). If the court finds that the only violation of section 745(a) that occurred is based on paragraph (3) of section 745(a), the court may modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related offense.
If a court finds after judgment has been entered that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.
Authority:
PEN 745(e)
Tenth Holding:
The RJA contains a discovery provision in section 745(d). If a defendant believes a violation of the RJA has occurred, he or she may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released.
Authority:
PEN 745(d)
Eleventh Holding:
In Young, the Court of Appeal addressed what constitutes good cause for purposes of discovery under section 745(d). The court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the RJA’s enactment, as well as general provisions governing discovery in criminal cases.
Drawing on the Pitchess standard for discovery of law enforcement personnel records, the Young court held that in order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.
This standard for discovery under section 745(d) is even more relaxed than the Pitchess standard in two respects. First, while a Pitchess motion must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth a reasonable belief that the requested discovery is material to the subject matter of the case, there is no comparable affidavit requirement for discovery under the RJA. Second, unlike in a Pitchess motion, an RJA discovery motion has no materiality requirement, at least not in the sense that the defendant must show a logical link between some defense and a pending charge.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 149-160
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
Twelfth Holding:
The RJA’s counterpart to Pitchess materiality is relevance to a potential violation of section 745(a). Since a section 745(a) violation may be proved up in several different ways based on a variety of direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination under subdivision (a)(1)–(4), the threshold showing for good cause must be commensurately broad and flexible.
The limiting factor is relevance in the discovery sense—that is, each request for disclosure must be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745(a) violation. This subject matter limitation on the scope of discoverable material creates an outer boundary that, if crossed, may justify an order narrowing or otherwise limiting the obligation to respond. And as always in the context of discovery, the trial court has ample discretion to manage where the discovery-relevance boundary lies.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160
Thirteenth Holding:
The Young court found support for its articulated good cause standard for discovery in the escalating burdens of proof within section 745. The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
As the least onerous of the statute’s burdens of proof, the plausible justification standard should not be difficult to meet. Accordingly, where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the RJA, thus triggering access to all relevant evidence concerning a potential violation of section 745(a), it will likely be an abuse of discretion to totally foreclose discovery.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160-161, 168-169
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61