Tag Archives: Unauthorized sentence

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000702

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing with directions that the trial court exercise its sentencing discretion without considering aggravating factors that were not found true by the jury.

First Holding:

The court relied on circumstances in aggravation that were not submitted to the jury. The trial court’s authority to impose an upper term sentence is addressed in section 1170(b), which authorizes an upper term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

There was no objection, and the upper term sentence could have been imposed based on only the aggravating factors of victim vulnerability and taking advantage of a position of trust, which were found true by the jury. Therefore, the upper term is not a sentence that could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.

Thus, the unauthorized sentence exception to the forfeiture rule may not apply under the facts in this case. However, to forestall a future claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to excuse any possible forfeiture and address defendant’s claim on the merits.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, 355–356 [holding defendant waived claim that trial court abused its discretion in aggravating his sentence based on factors that were inapplicable, duplicative, and improperly weighed]

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b) triggers the Sixth Amendment jury trial right with respect to every aggravating factor (other than a prior conviction) the trial court uses to justify an upper term sentence, and under the current statute a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Third Holding:

Such a violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapmn standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Fourth Holding:

Applying these principles, we find the trial court erred in relying on the defendant’s continuing failure to take accountability for his actions. This additional aggravating factor was not decided by the jury but, rather, was a conclusion made by the trial court based on both defendant’s trial testimony and his continuing claim of innocence at sentencing.

Although the jury did not believe defendant’s testimony as to six of the nine counts charged, it was never asked to decide the issue of his lack of accountability, and since the jury was excused before sentencing, it obviously could not have made a finding that defendant continued to fail to take accountability. Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084

Fifth Holding:

The People did not prove, and could not have proved, a lack of remorse or lack of accountability without burdening defendant’s constitutional right to testify at trial and maintain his innocence.

Authority:

People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 900 [lack of remorse may not be used as aggravating factor when defendant denies guilt and evidence is conflicting]

People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 356 [at penalty phase of capital crime prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant’s lack of remorse as relevant to whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance but may not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor]

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000690

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant cannot be convicted of both the robbery and the petty theft it resulted in, and the conviction and sentence for petty theft, along with associated fines and fees, must be reversed.

First Holding:

A defendant cannot be convicted of both robbery and petty theft based on the same conduct because theft is a lesser necessarily included offense of robbery.

Authority:

People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 699

Second Holding:

While section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, it is generally permissible to convict a defendant of multiple charges arising from a single act or course of conduct.

However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.

Authority:

PEN 654

PEN 954

People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692

People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736

Third Holding:

This is true even though the defendant first took items from the store and then took the same items from the loss prevention officer by force. The taking of the items from the loss prevention officer was the same as taking items from the store since the loss prevention officer was acting as an agent of the store.

Authority:

People v. Villa (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434–1435

People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 29

Fourth Holding:

The People contend the defendant forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal because he did not object to his separate convictions before the trial court. We consider the merits of the argument because a defendant may challenge an unauthorized sentence even if he or she failed to object below.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295

Fifth Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) requires a court to impose a $40 court operations assessment for every conviction of a criminal offense. Similarly, Government Code section 70373(a)(1), requires a $30 conviction assessment for each misdemeanor or felony conviction. The court also imposed a fine of $41 under section 1202.5 along with a restitution fine of $600 and a $600 parole revocation restitution fine, which was suspended unless parole is revoked.

Because we reverse the conviction for petty theft, we remand the matter for the superior court to vacate any portion of the fines and fees imposed for petty theft.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5

PEN 1202.4

PEN 1465.8(a)(1)

GOV 70373

Sentencing

Case 000686

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose sentence on both the murder and the burglary. Because the court has discretion to choose which sentence to execute and which to stay, the matter is remanded.

First Holding:

Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for an indivisible course of conduct. For example, when a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes. A claim of error under section 654 is nonwaivable.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 130

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17

Second Holding:

Here, murder was the felony underlying the prosecution’s burglary theory, so the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for both crimes. Because the trial court has discretion to decide which sentence should be stayed, remand is required.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000670

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of one count of felony vandalism and one count of misdemeanor vandalism. The court purported to sentence the defendant to a total of three years, with appellant ordered to serve 270 days in county jail and the balance of the three years time on mandatory supervision (a “split sentence”). This was error, because the concept of split sentence applies to felonies only, and the misdemeanor was not subject to mandatory supervision.

First Holding:

Under the Realignment Act, qualifying low-level felony offenders no longer serve their sentences in state prison. Instead, such offenders serve their sentences either entirely in county jail or partly in county jail and partly under the mandatory supervision of the county probation officer. Pursuant to section 1170(h)(5)(B), the court has discretion to impose a hybrid sentence consisting of county jail followed by a period of mandatory supervision. This option is only available for felony convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418-1419

People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 178

Second Holding:

As reflected in the court’s oral pronouncement and the corresponding minute order, the court “split” the total three-year sentence for both counts, imposing 270 days of jail time and the balance as mandatory supervision.

While respondent points to the subsequent nunc pro tunc order purporting to place appellant on two years of formal probation, a nunc pro tunc order is generally limited to correcting clerical errors and cannot declare that something was done that was not done.

The record indicates that at least some portion of the court’s order imposing mandatory supervision applied to the misdemeanor conviction. As mandatory supervision under section 1170(h)(5)(B) is only applicable to felony convictions, we must remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Borja (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 481, 485

Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 256

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000667

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, it was error to reimpose the restitution fine (as it was more than 10 years old) and to impose various fees that were not enacted until after the defendant was originally sentenced.

First Holding:

A restitution fine cannot be re-imposed more than 10 years after initially imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d) [setting a 10-year limit as to the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038, on another issue

Second Holding:

The assessment and fee did not become law until after defendant’s 1996 sentencing, and thus cannot be imposed.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754 [applying section 1465.8 only to convictions imposed after its operative date of August 17, 2003]

People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, 1000-1001 [applying Government Code section 70373 only to convictions after its effective date of January 1, 2009]

Sentencing

Case 000651

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a term of 25 years to life for the murder (doubled to 50 years to life because of a prior strike) and two terms oflife without the possiblity of parole (LWOP) for the murder because of true findings on two separate special circumstance, even though the court stayed the 50 years to life term and one of the LWOP terms.

First Holding:

Once a defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder and an accompanying special circumstance allegation under section 190.2 has been found true, the penalty is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. A special circumstance finding removes the possibility of penalty less than life without parole. Thus, the trial court’s imposition and stay of the 50-years-to-life sentence on the murder count was unauthorized and must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

People v. Noble (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016

Second Holding:

Appellate court can correct a legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence at any time.

Authority:

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13

Third Holding:

The defendant should not have received two life without parole sentences based on the two special circumstance findings. Under section 190.2(a), a defendant is sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole if one or more of the enumerated special circumstances has been found true. Defendants do not receive additional punishment based on additional special circumstance findings.

Authority:

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 874 [a defendant faces no additional punishment merely as a result of additional special circumstance finding]

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000640

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by staying the sentence on the vandalism and first degree residential burglary counts without first imposing a sentence, and we therefore remand to the court to impose a sentence on these counts.

First Holding:

When a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence and to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence. The trial court is required to impose judgment on each count, which involves selecting a term, and then staying execution of the duplicative sentence, the stay to become permanent upon defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.

This procedure ensures that the defendant will not receive a windfall of freedom from penal sanction if the conviction on which the sentence has not been stayed is overturned. Thus, it is improper to impose no sentence or to stay imposition of the sentence. Under section 654, a court’s failure to impose a sentence before staying it results in an unauthorized absence of sentence.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000633

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the defendant’s pretrial custody credits and awarded him too few. The judgment is modified accordingly.

Holding:

We independently review whether a trial court has correctly awarded custody credits. A defendant accrues actual custody credits pursuant to section 2900.5 for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. Actual custody credits are calculated by adding together “all days of custody” the defendant has served. The failure to award earned custody credits results in an unauthorized sentence, which we may correct. Because the amount of presentence credits appears from our record, we may modify the award of presentence credits to reflect the correct amount.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827

People v. Anaya (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 608, 611

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 65–71

People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493

Jurisdiction, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000602

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although the trial court had the jurisdiction to correct clerical errors, it had no jurisdiction after the judgment was final to correct judicial errors. Thus, it had no jurisdiction to set aside the credit for time served that it had awarded years earlier. The order eliminating the credits must be vacated.

(Because the new offenses were committed in prison while serving an earlier commitment, the new sentence was required to run consecutively, and he was not entitled to credit for time while serving his term on the original offense to be applied against the new consecutive sentence. Nonetheless, the court originally awarded him nearly two years credit for time served.)

First Holding:

The question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to eliminate custody credits after a final judgment is a pure question of law we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467

Second Holding:

Under the general common law rule, a trial court loses jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has begun. While there are some exceptions to that rule, none justifies the court’s elimination of the defendant’s custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

Third Holding:

A court has inherent power to correct a clerical error at any time. Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered. Here, the trial court’s orders imposing the custodial credits in 2010, 2021, and again in 2024 were plainly judicial—not clerical—errors.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63

In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 154

Fourth Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(1) does not apply here, because (1) it was not the Caliofrnia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation secretary who sent the letter pointing out the errors, but a records analyst who sent the letter; (2) the sentencing was not within 120 days of the date of commitment; and (3) the request did not relate to a change of sentencing laws since the original sentencing. Moreover, the sentence was in fact greater than the original sentence.

Authority:

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 987 [letter came from a case records manager, not the secretary and did not reference section 1172.1 or use the terms recall or resentencing]

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 791–792

Fifth Holding:

Regarding jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence, we find King to be a better reasoned case than Codinha. King reasoned that the “venerable notion” that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time had been rejected by the Supreme Court in In re G.C.. The unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the waiver doctrine, in that a party does not forfeit the right to argue that a sentence is unlawful by failing to object in the trial court. It is not, however, an exception to the requirement of jurisdiction. Rather, in order to invoke the unauthorized sentence doctrine to remedy a judgment of conviction, the trial court must still have jurisdiction over the judgment.

Authority:

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 635

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 66

People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 139, 145–146

People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123

Sixth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Sentencing

Case 000566

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to rely on the same facts to impose an enhancement and the upper term.

First Holding:

Generally, error occurs when the same facts are considered both to aggravate the base term and to impose an enhancement.

Authority:

1170(b)(5) [The court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law]

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Second Holding:

Where there is an improper dual or overlapping use of facts, remand is required if it is reasonably probable the defendant would obtain a more favorable result absent the error.

Authority:

People v. Barker (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 921, 941

Third Holding:

A trial court may impose an upper term sentence based on a single, properly proven aggravating circumstance only, if, in the court’s discretion, that circumstance alone justifies a sentence exceeding the middle term.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 764

Abstracts and Minutes, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000557

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in placing the defendant on probation for a period of five years, because the maximum allowed in this case is three years. The matter is remanded for resentencing. There are also errors in the abstract of judgment that should be corrected in keeping with the resentencing.

First Holding:

Under the Penal Code, in granting probation, a trial court generally may suspend imposition or execution of sentence “for a period of time not exceeding two years. However, this two-year limit does not apply where an offense includes specific probation lengths within its provisions. Nevertheless, for such offenses, probation may continue for a period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence.

Under Vehicle Code section 23600, under which violations of section 23152 are punishable, a period of probation not less than three nor more than five years may be imposed. But the defendant faced a maximum possible term of imprisonment of only three years. Accordingly, under section 1203.1(l)(1), the maximum authorized term of probation was three years, as the People concede.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(a)

Second Holding:

An unauthorized sentence is subject to correction at any time without objection.

Authority:

People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 127, fn. 22

Third Holding:

The minute order contains errors, including a lab fee that was not ordered and transposing the fines to $2905 rather than the $2095 that was actually ordered by the court. Though because we are remanding for resentencing and thus the issue is moot, we point out that the minute order should accurately reflect fines, fees, and assessments pronounced by the trial court.. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order. In addition, the trial court retains the authority to correct clerical errors.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000540

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of five offenses arising from a violent, domestic-violence-related altercation. The trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. The court issued a protective order outside of its jurisdiction under Penal Code section 136.2. The court miscalculated the total assessment due from the defendant pursuant to Government Code section 70373(a). We vacate the protective order and reverse the judgment, remanding for a possible retrial on one conviction and for a full resentencing.

First Holding:

We review de novo a claim that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the applicable principles of law.

Authority:

People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 195

Second Holding:

In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. When an accusatory pleading charges the defendant with a single criminal act, and the evidence presented at trial tends to show more than one such unlawful act, either the prosecution must elect the specific act relied upon to prove the charge to the jury, or the court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same specific criminal act. The unanimity instruction requirement is intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed. If required, the instruction must be given sua sponte.

Authority:

People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132

People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534

People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199

Third Holding:

If a prosecutor elects to rely upon a specific act to prove a charged crime, then the trial court has no duty to give the jury an instruction that it must unanimously agree on the act that constituted the crime charged.

Authority:

People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455

Fourth Holding:

The trial court instructed the jury with the elements of assault with a deadly weapon, but did not instruct them with the elements of simple assault. We conduct an independent review of the question of whether this was error.

Authority:

People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705

Fifth Holding:

We conclude that it was error for the to not instruct the jury with the elements of simple assault. A trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses, even in the absence of a request, whenever there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense are present. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury, that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive. Simple assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault The trial court, accordingly, was required to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault if a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant committed only a simple assault and not an assault with a deadly weapon.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645

People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747

Sixth Holding:

Under section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon), an object may be a deadly weapon in two ways. First, objects are considered deadly weapons as a matter of law, or deadly per se, when the ordinary use for which they are designed establishes their character as such. Typical examples include dirks and blackjacks. Second, if an object is not inherently deadly, the prosecution must prove to the trier of fact that the object was used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury. Objects which have been found to be a deadly weapon based on the way they were used include a pillow, an automobile, a large rock, a razor blade, and a fingernail file. A wrench is not inherently deadly as a matter of law. It is designed and typically used for innocent purposes.

Authority:

People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028-1029

People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1054

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 6

Seventh Holding:

Based on the evidence, we conclude reasonable jurors could have decided the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant assaulted the victim with the wrench but was insufficient to prove he did so in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. And so we must reverse the judgment and conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Under settled law, the judgment will be modified unless the People elect to retry the defendant on the greater charge and are successful.

Authority:

People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118

Eighth Holding:

Whether section 136.2(i)(1) authorized the court to issue a protective order against a defendant is an issue of statutory interpretation we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 645

Ninth Holding:

Under section 136.2(i)(2), trial courts, generally speaking, are authorized to issue postconviction orders restraining a criminal defendant who has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime who has been harassed by the defendant. It was improper to issue a protective order under section 136.2(i) where the person was not a percipient witness. The broader protective orders under section 136.2 are limited to the time frame during the pendency of the criminal action. It does not apply to postconviction orders.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461, 465 and fn. 4, 466

People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 140–144

Tenth Holding:

The court imposed $180 as the court facilities funding assessment for the five counts. However, at $30 for each count, the assessment should have been $150, not $180.

Authority:

GOV 70373(a)