Tag Archives: Unauthorized sentence

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000845

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court incorrectly imposed a consecutive subordinate term for the child abuse and a concurrent term for the false imprisonment because those counts were stayed under Penal Code section 654.

The abstract of judgment does not reflect the correct amount of the defendant’s local conduct credits. We therefore exercise our inherent authority to modify the judgment to correct these errors.

First Holding:

Section 654 generally precludes multiple punishments for a single physical act that violates different provisions of law as well as multiple punishments for an indivisible course of conduct that violates more than one criminal statute.

Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.

If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.

If, on the other hand, the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives that were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.

Authority:

PEN 654

In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, 94

Second Holding:

The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.

We view the evidence favorably to support the judgment and presume every factual finding that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935, 946–947

Third Holding:

Because the court stayed counts 3 and 5 under section 654, count 3 should not be a consecutive one-third term and count 5 should not be concurrent. Remand is not necessary to correct these matters. The trial court clearly intended to impose the midterm for all counts and enhancements, and to stay execution of the sentences in counts 3 and 5 and the enhancement attached to count 5. We will therefore exercise our authority to modify the judgment to correct the unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796

People v. Cantrell (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1164

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473

Fourth Holding:

There were errors in the abstract of judgment, including the failure to mark that counts 3 and 5 were stayed under section 654, and reflected seven days credit for time served less than ordered by the court. We exercise our authority to correct this error as well

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000835

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erroneously imposed an enhancement that had been vacated as a result of an earlier appeal. The court also erred by not recalculating the credit for time served through the date of the resentencing. Further, the restitution fine must be vacated, as it was imposed at least 10 years ago.

First Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is responsible for calculating any postsentence custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397

Second Holding:

After 10 years have elapsed from the imposition of a restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4, any remaining balance is unenforceable and uncollectible. Any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Third Holding:

The trial court struck the six one-year prior prison terms but declined to otherwise modify the sentence. However, although this court had previously vacated the three-year term imposed on count 1 pursuant to section 12022.7,(a), in resentencing the defendant, the trial court again imposed the enhancement and three-year term. The parties agree this was error, as do we. The great bodily injury enhancement imposed as to count 1 must be stricken and the three-year term vacated.

(Gary note: The court cited no authority for its order striking the enhancement that had been stricken in the earlier appeal. The relief seems obvious enough. Under section 1260, “The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.”

(If that doesn’t precisely address the issue, one could also look at Dutra, although it, too, is not exactly on point. It dealt with the trial court’s act of not complying with the instructions in the remittitur because of a change in the law, but the change did not permit it to act outside the direction of the remittitur. Again, not exactly what happened here.

(Or one could argue that imposing the enhancement resulted in an unauthorized sentence (again), which can be corrected whenever the matter is before the court. See, for example, Sanders.

(It just seems so intuitive that the trial court, on resentencing, could not reimpose an enhancement that was stricken as unlawful in the earlier appeal. I’m not surprised the appellate court did not see a need to cite authority, particularly where the parties both agreed on the error and remedy. The authorities I have listed below were not cited by the court, and the two cases are fairly distinguishable from this situation, but might prove interesting reading nonetheless.)

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1367

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13

Abstracts and Minutes, Defenses, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000827

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Three Strikes sentence is unauthorized because the prior strike allegation was never admitted or found true by the jury or court.

First Holding:

A defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he suffered an alleged prior conviction. He may waive that right and submit to a court trial or admit the truth of the prior conviction allegation. Here, there is nothing in the record showing there was any trial on the prior strike. After returning their verdicts on the substantive offenses, the jurors were discharged without considering the strike.

Authority:

PEN 1025(b)

PEN 1158

People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25

Second Holding:

Had the matter been brought to the attention of the court, the court could have convened a new jury to try the prior conviction allegation.

Authority:

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 595–596 [when the court improvidently discharged the jurors before they decided prior conviction allegations, and the defense failed to timely object, double jeopardy did not bar trial of the allegations before a new jury]

Third Holding:

There are cases in which the reviewing court has determined the trial court impliedly found true an enhancement allegation by imposing the enhancement at sentencing. But in such cases, the trial court was at least presented evidence supporting the allegation.

The same is not true here. While the prosecutor at one point represented that he had the certified 969b packet for the prior, there is no indication he presented those documents, or any other evidence, to the court.

And although the minute order of sentencing reflects a true finding by the court on the prior strike, we cannot rely on those entries because there is no oral record of the court making those findings.

Authority:

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 691, fn. 17

People v. Chambers (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1047

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385–386

Fourth Holding:

There is no constitutional or procedural bar precluding the prosecution from retrying a prior strike allegation following appellate reversal for insufficient evidence.

Authority:

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239 [constitutional requirement of fundamental fairness, equitable principles of res judicata and law of the case, and relevant statutory provisions do not bar retrial of prior strike allegation]

People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 829 [state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy do not bar retrial of a prior conviction allegation in a noncapital case]

Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721

Sentencing

Case 000823

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to stay the sentence on the use of firearm enhancement and the prior serious felony in an effort to show leniency. The proper procedure requires the court to strike them, not stay them.

Holding:

The trial court imposed and stayed both the remaining section 12022.53(b) and (c) firearm enhancements as to counts 1 and 2, and the serious felony prior enhancement as to count 2. This was an unauthorized sentence. The record indicates that the trial court did not intend to punish the defendant for these additional enhancements. Because a trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement based on its discretion, the court imposed a legally unauthorized sentence. We exercise our authority under section 1260 to modify the judgment by striking this unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 139 [The trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.]

Sentencing

Case 000787

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant on a count on which the jury acquitted him.

Holding:

The defendant contends, and the People concede, that the 180-day sentence imposed for count 11 must be vacated because the jury acquitted him of that offense. We agree. The sentence imposed on count 11 is therefore unauthorized as it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. We accordingly vacate the sentence on count 11.

Authority:

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000776

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court failed to pronounce sentence on two of the counts. This was error. Also, the court must recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid.

Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifies those persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) to the sentencing court, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. A recall effectively vacates the defendant’s original sentence and commitment.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399, 402

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360

Second Holding:

The resentencing under section 1172.75 shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. In resentencing, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(1)

Third Holding:

In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. If a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed the sentencing judge must pronounce the court’s judgment and sentence, stating the terms thereof and giving reasons for those matters for which reasons are required by law.

At a sentencing hearing, the court must orally pronounce the sentence on the record. Since the court recalled defendant’s sentence under section 1172.75, it effectively vacated his original sentence and thus should have orally pronounced all components of the sentence on the record at the resentencing hearing.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.433(c)(5)

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn 9

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [Rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement]

Fourth Holding:

There was also an error in the sentencing, in that the sentence on one count was a life term, but the count was not a serious felony and should have been sentenced as a determinate term.

It is well established that when the trial court pronounces a sentence that is unauthorized by the Penal Code that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the trial court or the reviewing court. When the mistake is discovered while the defendant’s appeal is pending, the appellate court should remand the case for a proper sentence.

Authority:

People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 102

Fifth Holding:

The trial court should recalculate defendant’s custody credits on remand.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(d)

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.]

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000764

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by not staying punishment for the second count under section 654. Also, the court must recalculate the credit for time served on resentencing. Further, the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that the defendant stands convicted of a count that was reversed in the prior appeal.

(Gary note: This was mentioned only in a footnote, and there was no express direction for correction. But the court did order resentencing “consistent with this opinion,” which most likely implies a direction that the subsequent abstract of judgment accurately reflect the record.)

First Holding:

Section 654(a) states that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654(a)

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.

We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives. At step one, courts examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based upon a single physical act.

When those facts are undisputed the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo. However, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312

People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 795

Third Holding:

A review of the record indicates that there was but one act constituting the crime. Accordingly, the sentence on count 2 should have been stayed.

Authority:

PEN 654

Fourth Holding:

While we do not address the trial court’s failure to recalculate the defendant’s actual days of presentence custody credits because it was not raised by the defendant and we are remanding the matter for resentencing, we note that trial courts are required to do so.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41

Fifth Holding:

(Gary note: the court mentioned in a footnote that the abstract incorrectly lists a conviction of an offense that was reversed in a prior appeal. It made no express direction for correct of the abstract, but there is much authority that would have supported such an order, some of which I set forth below.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000757

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

While affirming the lower court’s finding that section 654 did not apply, it did find that the sentence for the second count was unauthorized, as the trial court purported to impose one-third the middle term to be served concurrently with the other count. It should have imposed a full term to run concurrently, as the one-third the middle term calculation applies only when sentences are to be served consecutively.

First Holding:

A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. An appellate court can correct an unauthorized sentence on appeal when such error is clear and correctable independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156, fn. 3 [vacating and correcting the unauthorized sentence rather than remanding for resentencing because the record clearly reflects the trial judge’s intention to run the unauthorized sentence concurrently and not impose any additional consecutive time]

Second Holding:

The imposition of one-third the middle term for subordinate offenses applies in case of consecutive, but not concurrent, sentences. Because concurrent terms are not part of the principal and subordinate term computation under section 1170.1(a), they are imposed at the full base term, not according to the one-third middle term formula, even though they are served at the same time.

As such, imposition of one-third the midterm sentence on a concurrent term is an unauthorized sentence. However, remand for resentencing is unnecessary because the record clearly indicates that the trial court intended to run the sentence on his possession of a firearm conviction concurrently and not impose any additional consecutive time.

Authority:

People v. Matthews (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 169, fn. 4

People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156, fn. 3

Third Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. The statute therefore precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. Multiple punishment includes the imposition of both concurrent and consecutive sentences because the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served simultaneously.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353, 358

Fourth Holding:

The proscription against double punishment in section 654 is applicable where there is a course of conduct which … comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute.… The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.

Authority:

People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376

Fifth Holding:

If the defendant had multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. In the context of a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, where the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and separate from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes has been approved.

Authority:

People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 267-268

People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 22

Sixth Holding:

Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. We review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. The evidence in this case indicates that the defendant bought the firearm and possessed it for a substantial period before the shooting, not simply during the shooting.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143

People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217 [courts have determined that section 654 applies where the defendant obtained the prohibited weapon during the assault in which he used the weapon]

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000753

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Three of the protective orders issued by the trial court under section 136.2 exceeded the court’s authority and should be vacated. There is a clerical error in the defendant’s abstract of judgment that requires correction.

First Holding:

Restraining orders under section 136.2 are authorized only for victims of certain specified offenses including certain domestic violence crimes, sexual offenses like rape, gang-related crimes, or crimes requiring registration as a sex offender. Three of the people for whom a protective order was issued were not victims of the defendant’s crimes, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue those orders.

Authority:

People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 996

Second Holding:

Issuance of a restraining order in excess of jurisdiction can be corrected at any time.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381–382

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment erroneously states that the punishment on the special circumstance was stayed. It was not stayed and the abstract of judgment must be corrected.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–188

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000748

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court imposed a two-year sentence on each of two felony counts, stayed one of those sentences under section 654, and pronounced sentences of concurrent time on the three misdemeanor counts. The failed, however, to pronounce the sentence for those three misdemeanors, and the case is remanded for it to do so.

First Holding:

Section 12 requires courts to pass sentence on the defendant and impose the punishment prescribed upon conviction for a crime. And the trial court generally must include all aspects of a judgment in its oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

PEN 12

In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412, 415

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

Second Holding:

Therefore, a trial court must pronounce a sentence on every felony and misdemeanor conviction. The failure to do so results in an unauthorized sentence. When the mistake in failing to pronounce sentence on a count is discovered while the defendant’s appeal is pending, the appellate court should remand the case for a proper sentence.

Authority:

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1121–1122

People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 638, 641–642

People v. Morrow (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 507, 514

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411, fn. 6

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000742

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The crime that the defendant pleaded guilty to is not one to which Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 applies to, so the $50 fee must be stricken.

First Holding:

Health and Safety Code section 11372.5(a) states that every person who is convicted of enumerated offenses must pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee of $50 for each separate offense. The fee only applies to the offenses listed or enumerated in section 11372.5(a).

Authority:

HSC 11372.5

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

Second Holding:

Defendant pleaded no contest to an offense not listed in section 11372.5(a). Thus the trial court could not legally impose the $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee as a probation condition and the fee is, therefore, unauthorized. We therefore strike the fee.

Authority:

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 [claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal and corrected whenever error comes to the attention of the reviewing court]

People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231-1233 [striking unauthorized fee on appeal]

Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000722

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A jury found the defendant guilty of selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine base for sale. Under section 654, it was error to sentence the defendant on each, to run concurrently. The sentence on one of the counts must be stayed.

First Holding:

Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or indivisible course of conduct. Before 2022, when a single act or omission was punishable under multiple provisions, the court was required to impose sentence under the provision carrying the longest potential term. Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654 to afford trial courts discretion to impose punishment under either applicable provision.

Authority:

PEN 654(a)

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294

Second Holding:

Multiple punishments violate section 654 because the defendant’s possession of cocaine base for sale and the sale of cocaine base arose from an indivisible course of conduct with a single objective. Under the amended statute, the trial court has discretion to impose the sentence on either count 1 or count 2, including the option of selecting the shorter term.

Authority:

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379