Tag Archives: Unauthorized sentence

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001004

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal following remand from the defendant’s first appeal, the trial court failed to impose sentence on several counts whose punishment it stayed under section 654. It failed to impose a fine on a fifth count, and it improperly reimposed several other fines.

First Holding:

The court’s failure to pronounce sentence on some of the counts constitutes an unauthorized sentence. When a trial court determines that section 654 applies, the court must impose sentence on every count but stay execution as necessary to implement section 654. This procedure also applies when one of the sentences pertains to a misdemeanor conviction.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380

Second Holding:

The defendant’s conviction under Vehicle Code section 23152(a) (driving under the influence) requires a fine, but the court failed to impose a fine.

Authority:

VEH 23536(a)

VEH 23600

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 [defining an unauthorized sentence as one that cannot lawfully be imposed under any circumstances in a particular case]

Third Holding:

Having concluded that the trial court’s failure to impose sentences and to impose a fine resulted in an unauthorized sentence, we also conclude that remand is required to correct the errors. In other cases, we have exercised our authority under section 1260 to modify judgments in sentencing matters where remand would be futile or unnecessary because the record clearly indicated how the trial court would exercise its sentencing discretion.

Here, however, the trial court did not impose sentences on counts two, four, seven, and nine or the firearm enhancement associated with count two, or impose a fine on count six, either at the original sentencing or at the section 1172.75 resentencing. Given the range of sentencing options for the omitted counts and enhancement and the permissible range of the fine on count six, the record does not clearly indicate what sentences or fine the court would have imposed. Accordingly, remand is required.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473

Fourth Holding:

We disagree with the People that on remand, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing. Section 1260 grants appellate courts the authority to order limited remands for further proceedings that may be appropriate under the circumstances. In resentencing the defendant in 2025, the trial court considered the relevant factors in formulating a sentence it deemed appropriate based on his culpability, criminal history, and his risk of future dangerousness.

The two limited tasks on remand (imposing and staying sentences on the omitted counts that the court had already indicated it intended to stay and imposing a fine on count six) will not alter the overall sentencing scheme the trial court deemed appropriate such that resentencing on all nine counts would be required.

For these reasons, we order a limited remand.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 948-949

People v. Stevens (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1452, 1456 [Correcting a sentencing error by excising only the flawed component of the sentence from the aggregate term may be appropriate in some contexts where the interests of justice and judicial economy do not require a restructuring of the entire sentencing format]

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in reimposing and staying several fees, despite making an implied finding that the defendant did not have an ability to pay. Equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Neither of the applicable statutes nor Kopp allows a trial court to impose then stay the court operations fee or the court facilities fee after it finds a defendant indigent. Once it found the defendant lacked the ability to pay, the court’s option was to not impose the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Sixth Holding:

The statutes authorizing certain other fees that were previously imposed have since been repealed and are now unenforceable and uncollectible. Any portion of a judgment imposing those fees must be vacated.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Fines and fees, Gary Musings, Sentencing

Case 001000

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The sentence on the defendant’s misdemeanor counts should have been stayed under section 654 as part of the same conduct as the felony.

First Holding:

Under rule 4.412(b), a defendant is estopped from challenging his or her sentence based on section 654’s prohibition of double punishment where the defendant agreed to a specified term in prison or county jail and is sentenced to that term or a shorter one. Rule 4.412(b) codifies one of the applications of the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed.

But in this case, the defendant did not expressly agree to any sentencing irregularity in exchange for a benefit. The record shows that it was an open plea, meaning that no promises were made as to his sentence. The defendant agreed that he could be sentenced to up to four years in one case and six years in the other, but those terms represented the maximum permitted for the offenses regardless of any plea agreementg. He faced anything up to and including the maximum term allowed.

Authority:

PEN 654

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b)

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295

People v. Velasquez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 503

People v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 567, 574–575

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 156

People v. Henderson (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 785, 788 [an open plea is one under which there is no promise about the nature or duration of the defendant’s sentence]

Second Holding (and Gary Musings):

In Jones, the defendant agreed to plead no contest to all charges and admit the enhancement allegations in exchange for a lid below the maximum term in sentencing. The lid was not the maximum exposure Jones would otherwise face absent the plea agreement. Rather, it restricted the sentence the trial court could impose but to a term less than Jones’s maximum exposure. It was not an open plea.

In Cole, the defendant pleaded guilty on the condition that his sentence would not exceed 25 years to life, whereas he was exposed to a term of 75 years to life but for the agreed lid. It, too, was not an open plea.

Thus, in Jones and Cole, the estoppel principle described in Hester applied, because the defendants were not permitted to complain on appeal about sentences that were limited by the terms of their pleas to something lower than the maximum that could have been imposed in the absence of their agreements.

That is not the case here, as the agreement did not specify a lid. There was simply a recognition of the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed for each count, regardless of any agreement.

(Gary note: In Jones and Cole, as stated in Jones, had they a problem with their sentences, they should have attempted to withdraw their pleas in the trial court when the sentences were imposed. Though not expressed, implicit in the court’s reliance on Cole and Jones as examples where estoppel applies is the recognition that an appeal from a denied motion to withdraw a plea requires a certificate of probable cause. For a pretty good discussion of certificates of probable cause, I have included Buttram in the Authority listed below, but it was not cited by or discussed in the opinion.

(If your client wishes to appeal after entering a plea agreement of any sort, you need to research whether a certificate of probable cause is required. If there is any chance at all that the appeal would undermine any of the terms of the plea agreement, a certificate is likely required. A common myth is that a certificate is not required to appeal any errors alleged to have occurred after the plea. Don’t fall for it. Instead, the focus is on the plea agreement itself. And the requirement of a certificate of probable cause is separate from the doctrine of estoppel addressed in this opinion. In Jones, there was no disagreement that omission of the application of section 654 created an unauthorized sentence. The obstacle was that the defendant was estopped from raising the issue because of his agreement.

(Although they’re all important, one must-read case is People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, which I’ve listed below but was not cited by the court here. The defendant pleaded guilty with an agreement on the sentence. Unbeknownst to him at the time of his own sentencing, his co-defendants apparently received significantly lower sentences. He appealed, claiming his sentence was disproportionate. Because he had not sought and been issued a certificate of probable cause, the Supreme Court concluded his appeal should have been dismissed. His challenge to his sentence, even on constitutional grounds, was a challenge to his plea, and thus a certificate was required.

(Also note that, under section 1237.5(a), a certificate of probable cause can be issued only where the application for a certificate shows “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.”

(Although it is described as a certificate of probable cause, “it is not the trial court’s responsibility to determine if there was error in the proceedings. The trial court’s sole objective is to eliminate those appeals having no possible legal basis by refusing to issue a certificate of probable cause. See People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84, quoting People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 819. Holland also reminds us (in footnote 6) that a petition for writ of mandate is the means by which one may challenge a denial of an application for certificate of probable cause. Neither Holland nor Warburton were cited in the opinion, because a certificate of probable cause was not even an issue in the case.

(Until 2022, if it appeared to the clerk of the superior court that a notice of appeal from a guilty plea required a certificate of probable cause, the clerk would mark the notice received but inoperable. To get past that hurdle, the notice would have to reflect that it is a challenge to the sentence and was not a challenge to the plea (or that it was an appeal from a guilty plea after a denial of a motion to suppress evidence on search and seizure grounds under section 1538.5. Rule 8.304(b) was amended effective 1/1/22, and now provides that “If the defendant does not file the written statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 or the superior court denies a certificate of probable cause, the appeal will be limited to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.” That was a vast improvement, from our defense perspective, because at least the notice of appeal initiated an appeal, albeit only on grounds not requiring a certificate.

(All of this Gary note is triggered by the court’s comment in Jones, cited by this court as distinguishable, that a defendant facing a 654 problem on an agreed-upon sentence must deal with it at the trial court level by moving to withdraw his or her plea timely. So this Gary note is really dealing with sub-sub-nonissues that I think you should nonetheless be aware of. Think of this lengthy aside as getting more for your money. Money? We ain’t got no money! We don’t need no money. You don’t have to show me any stinking money. Oops, sorry, got carried away a bit there.)

Authority:

People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735, 739

People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 856-858

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,

People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773,

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68

People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84

People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 819

Third Holding:

Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. If, on the other hand, defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, “even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 200

People v. Rodriguez (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005

Fourth Holding:

As there was no discussion at sentencing of section 654, we must affirm the sentence if an implied finding that section 654 does not apply is supported by substantial evidence. The record demonstrate that the defendant committed the offenses the misdemeanor cases with the objective to steal the contents of his victims’ vehicles. There is no evidence to support a finding that he formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced. Accordingly, the sentences on the misdemeanor counts must be stayed.

Authority:

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730–731

People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162

Fifth Holding:

Separate restitution fines may be imposed for each case that are not consolidated, even if resolved jointly by plea bargain. Defendants who commit multiple crimes, and are consequently before the court in multiple cases when their pleas are taken, are properly subject to multiple fines. This straightforward application of the requirement that fines be imposed in every case serves the purpose of the state Restitution Fund, as well as the rehabilitative and deterrent functions of restitution fines.

Authority:

People v. Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58, 64-66

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000990

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court did not orally pronounce any fines or fees at sentencing, but the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect the imposition of a restitution fine, a stayed parole revocation fine, a court operations assessment, and a criminal conviction assessment. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral imposition of sentence on the one hand and the minutes and abstract of judgment on the other, the oral judgment controls. An abstract of judgment must be corrected if it does not reflect the oral judgment accurately.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 387-389

Second Holding:

The court did not orally pronounce any fines or fees at sentencing, but the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect the imposition of a $300 restitution fine, a $300 stayed parole revocation fine, a $40 court operations assessment, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

PEN 1202.45

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373

Third Holding:

We decline to remand the matter because no party objected to the trial court’s failure to impose fines and fees at sentencing. All claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to review. Appellate courts may not correct a discretionary sentencing choice if the People failed to object at sentencing.

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 is a discretionary sentencing choice. And by waiving any objection to the restitution fine, the People also effectively waive any objection to the parole revocation fine, because the parole revocation fine must match the restitution fine as a matter of law.

As to the court operations assessment and the criminal conviction assessment, neither party asserts that the trial court’s failure to impose these fees was unauthorized or reflects an obvious legal error at sentencing that is correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings.

Absent such an argument, we decline to disturb the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853

People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [sentence is unauthorized if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case]

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 [equal protection principles permit trial courts to waive fees under sec. 1465.8 and Gov. Code, sec. 70373, upon request, where defendant lacks ability to pay]

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000978

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose the normal base term for several of his offenses in addition to the life terms under the Three Strikes law for those same offenses. The court failed to update the credit for time served. And the abstract of judgment misidentifies a second degree robbery as in the first degree, and must be corrected.

First Holding:

Where, as here, a defendant’s current sentence includes prison prior term enhancements rendered invalid under section 1172.75(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely the striking of newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a penalty provision, not an enhancement. It is not an enhancement because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the base term. Instead, it provides for an alternate sentence (25 years to life) when it is proven that the defendant has suffered the requisite number of convictions, prior and present. (At least two prior serious felony convictions, and the current offense being a qualifying offense for invocation of Third Strike sentencing.)

Authority:

People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744

Third Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court pronounces an unauthorized sentence, the sentence may be set aside and is no bar to the imposition of a proper judgment thereafter, even though it is more severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–432

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1036, fn. 21

Fifth Holding:

The trial court erred in failing to update his presentence credits at the time of resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Sixth Holding:

The amended abstract of judgment incorrectly lists the defendant’s conviction in count 3 as one for first degree robbery, when in fact the conviction should be identified as one for second degree robbery. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

(Gary note: Though the court discussed the need for amending the abstract of judgment for various reasons through the opinion, it did not cite authority for its order that it be corrected. There is plenty of authority available, of course. I have set out some cases the court could have drawn from, but there are undoubtedly many others.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000977

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the no-contact and stay-away orders imposed by the trial court as part of his prison sentence and as a condition of his parole following his conviction for petty theft and making criminal threats.

The Attorney General argues the defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to the orders in the trial court.

We disagree and strike the no-contact and stay-away orders because the trial court lacked authority to issue them and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

Normally, only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. In the sentencing context, we have applied the rule to claims of error asserted by both the People and the defendant.

We have, however, created a narrow exception to the waiver rule for unauthorized sentences or sentences entered in excess of jurisdiction.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

Second Holding:

A claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court. A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Such error is clear and correctable independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Third Holding:

The trial court did not have statutory authority to impose no-contact or stay-away orders in these circumstances. While there are statutory provisions that allow a trial court to impose no-contact and stay-away orders in other circumstances, for example, domestic violence cases, cases involving sexual assault of a minor, stalking cases, as a condition of probation, or during active criminal proceedings, there are no statutes specifically authorizing the trial court here to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as part of the defendant’s prison sentence or as a condition of his parole.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

PEN 1202.05(a)

PEN 646.9(k)

PEN 1203.1(j)

PEN 136.2

Fourth Holding:

Ponce rejected the argument that that trial courts, independent of statutes, have inherent authority to protect trial participants, citing both California and federal cases. It held that even if the trial court had relied on inherent judicial authority to issue its order, the result would not change.

An existing body of statutory law regulates restraining orders. Inherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation. Where the Legislature authorizes a specific variety of available procedures, the courts should use them and should normally refrain from exercising their inherent powers to invent alternatives.

The trial court here should have refrained from acting because there is an existing body of statutory law regulating no-contact and stay-away orders.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384

Fifth Holding:

The Legislature has adopted specific statutory provisions authorizing parole boards to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of parole. Under this statutory scheme, the victims here can request the parole board to include no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of the defendant’s parole.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(a) authorizes trial courts to issue orders to protect against any threats or harassment after notice and hearing.

Therefore, because the Legislature already authorizes available procedures for no-contact and stay-away orders for the victims in this case, the trial court was not authorized to impose them under its inherent authority.

Authority:

PEN 3053.2(a) [the parole board must impose a no-contact order as a condition of parole if requested by the victim]

PEN 3053(a) [the parole board may also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper]

CCP 527.6(a)