Category Archives: Standard of review

Elements of crime, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000736

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There is insufficient evidence proving the defendant burned forest land as that term is defined by section 450(b).

First Holding:

Section 451 provides that a person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned any structure, forest land, or property. Section 451 identifies four types of felonious arson: (1) arson causing great bodily injury; (2) arson causing an inhabited structure or property to burn; (3) arson of a structure or forest land; and (4) arson of property. Section 450(b) defines forest land as any brush covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.

By contrast, property means real property or personal property, other than a structure or forest land. The maximum sentence for arson of a structure or forest land is double that of the maximum sentence for arson of uninhabited property.

Authority:

PEN 451

PEN 450

Second Holding:

At the heart of this case lies a question of statutory interpretation—the meaning of forest land—which we consider de novo. Our primary task in interpreting the statute is to determine the lawmakers’ intent. We begin with the words of the statute and their usual and ordinary meaning, which would typically be their dictionary definition. Their plain meaning controls, unless the words are ambiguous. If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 5-6

People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71

Third Holding:

To the extent we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence of forest land, we consider whether the record discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and we do not reweigh evidence. In the end, the only evidentiary question before us is whether the prosecution—consistent with the theory it advanced regarding what constituted forest land—presented sufficient proof in this case.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 5

People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

Fourth Holding:

It appears undisputed that the site here does not fall within the statutory definition of forest land as cut-over land, forest, or woods. The People argue it constitutes forest land as grasslands or brush covered land. We disagree. Merriam-Webster defines grassland as farmland occupied chiefly by forage plants and especially grasses, or land on which the natural dominant plant forms are grasses and forbs, or an ecological community in which the characteristic plants are grasses. Based on these definitions and the language of sections 450 and 451, we agree with the defendant that the mere presence of grass is insufficient to make an area a grassland.

The statutes distinguish between arson of forest land, including grasslands, and arson of other types of uninhabited property, suggesting that the Legislature intended forest land to mean something other than any land on which grass grows. The definitions suggest a grassland is an open land or prairie, occupied largely by grasses, rather than just any land with grass on it, such as a lawn or park. The 1979 amendment to the statute from “any grass” to “grasslands” suggests the Legislature intended to narrow the types of grassy areas giving rise to heightened punishment for arson.

Authority:

PEN 450

Fifth Holding:

Based on the definitions and the discussion in Costella, we believe the definition of “brush covered land” requires that at least some portion of the land in question be densely populated with brush, even if it is not continuously covered with brush. Here, there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the area affected was forest land or grassland or brush covered land. In sum, there is insufficient evidence that the land at issue constituted forest land under sections 450, subdivision (b), and 451, subdivision (c). Therefore, the arson conviction must be reversed.

Authority:

PEN 450

PEN 451

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 7

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000735

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s true findings on gang enhancements attached to counts 1 and 2, and a gang-murder special circumstance attached to count 1.

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Such evidence must be reasonable, credible and of solid value.

Authority:

People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 970

Second Holding:

To establish a gang enhancement, the prosecution was required to prove the defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang and did so with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. The statute requires proof of a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of qualifying nonreputational benefits include financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting rivals, or witness intimidation.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

Third Holding:

The gang-murder special circumstance required the prosecution to prove that the defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang. Thus, the special-circumstance allegation depended upon the same gang-related findings underlying the section 186.22 enhancements, including the “more than reputational” requirement in section 186.22(g).

Authority:

PEN 190.2

PEN 186.22

People v. Campbell (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 350, 378

Fourth Holding:

Substantial evidence does not support the jury’s true findings on the gang enhancements attached to counts 1 and 2 or the gang-murder special circumstance attached to count 1. In short, the requirements of section 186.22(g) were not met. Consequently, these findings must be stricken. Based on the principle of double jeopardy, retrial is barred.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

Lockhart v. Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 39

People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 526 [a gang enhancement reversed for insufficient evidence may not be retried]

Fifth Holding:

Because these findings formed part of the overall sentencing package, remand for full resentencing is required.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken, a full resentencing is appropriate so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000726

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court ordered appellant participate and complete general education/counseling and mental health counseling at the discretion of and as directed by probation. We find that delegating unfettered discretion to the probation department to determine whether appellant shall participate and complete education and counseling is impermissible and violates the separation of powers doctrine.

As such, we strike this probation condition and remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether or not appellant shall participate in and complete education and counseling as a condition of his probation, consistent with this opinion.

First Holding:

The People argue that appellant forfeited his probation-condition challenge by failing to object to it at the sentencing hearing. The forfeiture doctrine is a well-established principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court.

Strong policy reasons support this rule: It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.

The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881

Second Holding:

One exception to the forfeiture doctrine includes a facial constitutional challenge—one that does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role of an appellate court.

Appellant presents a facial challenge: the issue is whether the trial court may, under the separation of powers doctrine, delegate to the probation officer the determination of whether appellant must participate and complete education/counseling and mental health counseling.

Such a claim is not predicated on the factual details about the specific education and counseling ordered, appellant’s specific rehabilitative needs, or on the details of the programming the probation officer could determine under this condition. The forfeiture doctrine does not apply in this circumstance.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885, 887-888

Third Holding:

The California Constitution separates the state government’s power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches and prohibits persons charged with the exercise of one power to exercise either of the others except as permitted by the California Constitution. The separation of powers doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Fourth Holding:

A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to promote rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. The court also has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions.

The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

PEN 1202.7

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Fifth Holding:

We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.

Authority:

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Sixth Holding:

Imposing a probation condition that subjects the defendant to the approval or direction of the probation officer is a permissible delegation. But delegating to a probation officer the decision of whether a defendant will participate in a specific form of treatment is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–309

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901, 903 [probation condition violates separation of powers doctrine by delegating to probation officer whether the defendant would be required to attend residential treatment/therapy/counseling program]

Seventh Holding:

Here, the court’s order for appellant to submit to education and counseling was much broader than simply leaving the details of that programming to the probation department, it gave the probation department the unlimited discretion to decide whether appellant is required to participate and complete general education and counseling at all.

Specifically, the court ordered appellant to participate and complete education/counseling and mental health counseling at the discretion of and as directed by the probation department.

This is an invalid delegation of judicial authority: although the court may delegate to probation the determinations of when and where a condition will be satisfied, the court may not delegate the decision of whether counseling or education shall be completed.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901, 903

Amelioration, Gary Musings, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000723

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court was required to revisit whether the gang enhancement attached to the felony assault charge was still valid in light of changes to the gang criminal activity statutes under AB 333. When asked to strike the enhancement, the trial court stated that it did not have discretion to relitigate the facts underlying the gang enhancement. This was error.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 rendered legally invalid any prior prison term enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020 (unless the enhancement was imposed for a prior sexually violent conviction), and it created a resentencing procedure for defendants who are currently serving sentences that include such an enhancement. Section 1172.75(c) requires a court to strike any now-invalid prior prison term enhancement and recall the defendant’s sentence.

Section 1172.75(d) provides instructions for resentencing. Among other things, the provision requires the court to resentence the defendant under current law, including any changes in law that reduce sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matters, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion such that it does not exercise its discretion at all. We independently review questions of statutory interpretation implicated by the trial court’s decisions.

Authority:

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 made several changes to the law governing the gang enhancement.

First, AB 333 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, it changed the requirement that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity to now require that any such pattern be collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, it narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date of the currently charged offense; (2) the pattern offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the pattern offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) none of the pattern offenses is the same as the currently charged offense.

Finally, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational, under the amended provision, include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

Fourth Holding:

AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively to the defendant’s case because they are ameliorative changes and the defendant’s case became nonfinal when the court vacated and recalled his sentence under section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396–400

Fifth Holding:

In Stamps, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not modify a plea agreement because a plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound. But, as the Supreme Court explained in Doe v. Harris, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law. By implementing such changes, the trial court is not altering the terms of the plea bargain.

Thus, under Doe, the defendant’s 2016 plea agreement is deemed to incorporate the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of AB 333. Consequently, requiring the parties compliance with changes to section 186.22 made retroactive to the defendant does not violate the terms of the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that the gang-related enhancement findings must be vacated and the matter remanded to give the People the opportunity to prove the applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701

Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 73-74

People v. Harrell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 161, 168

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346

Extensive Gary Note, NOT In The Opinion:

Gary note: I think I first noted this in my summary for Case 000532. But effective 1/1/2025, section 1171 provides that a resentencing under any ameliorative provisions cannot result in an order to set aside a plea bargain in which the sentence was specified. In other words, section 1171 appears to have overturned the Stamps decision with respect to allowing the lower court or the prosecution to set aside a plea bargain if the ameliorative provisions apply to change the sentence in a way that the prosecutor or court do not like.

This question was granted review in a case that originally issued a published opinion in 2024 (100 Cal.App.5th 768), where it defined the issue as “Is the prosecution entitled to rescind a plea agreement when a defendant receives a full resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) and the trial court intends to reduce the sentence beyond eliminating the prior prison term enhancements?”

On 12/18/2024, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal on the People’s motion for the Court of Appeal to vacate its earlier decision [which, in fact, concluded that the prosecutor could NOT rescind the agreement] and reconsider its opinion in light of the passage of AB 2483, which enacted section 1171. It also ordered the Court of Appeal’s original opinion to be depublished.

On remand, the Court of Appeal set aside its earlier opinion and issued a new opinion in which it said, “At the hearing, Montgomery may seek relief under any provision of section 1172.75, and neither the prosecutor nor the court may rescind the plea agreement due to a resulting sentence reduction.”

The original Court of Appeal opinion was published, and it provides an analysis of why a review of the legislative history of AB 483 (which enacted section 1172.75)–including uncodified portions of AB 483– compelled it to conclude that Stamps did not apply. But the subsequent opinion following the Supreme Court’s transfer relied solely on section 1171, and the opinion was not published.  As I stated, the “published” opinion also was wiped off the books when the Supreme Court ordered it depublished.

In the recent decision People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, the Supreme Court indicated its awareness of section 1171–as it obviously did when it transferred the Montgomery case–but declined to apply it where the case was a direct appeal from the judgment itself, in which the appellant challenged the stipulated sentence–in which he agreed to and received an upper term before section 1170 was amended to require jury findings for upper terms.

See Mitchell’s footnote 9. Keep in mind that section 1171 was created to guide courts in the handling of newly enacted ameliorative legislation. The Supreme Court in Mitchell seems to have left open the question where the appeal is from the original judgment itself, rather than an appeal from an attempt at securing relief from ameliorative statutes. Its footnote 9 ends, “We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.”

And for the rest of the story, the Court of Appeal has since, in an unpublished sentence, remanded the matter to the trial court to permit the defendant to seek relief under the ameliorative provisions.  At that time, the defendant may present the argument that section 1171 bars the prosecution or the court from seeking that the plea agreement be set aside if either the prosecutor or the court is not satisfied with any resulting modification of the sentence.

Authority:

Gary has no authority, just musings.

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review

Case 000720

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s petition for writ of mandate is granted. Filed as a habeas corpus petition, the People aver that the instant petition should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s discovery motion and concede that the defendant established a plausible factual foundation for discovery.

The People assert, and the defendant agrees, the matter should be remanded for development of the record on the relevant factors governing Racial Justice Act [RJA] discovery and for the trial court to consider those factors in the first instance.

We conclude the trial court misapplied the applicable legal standards and erred by denying the defendant’s motion. We therefore grant the petition, direct the trial court to vacate its denial of the defendant’s discovery motion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Holding:

We have the discretion to treat a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate. Writ review is appropriate where a petition raises novel legal issues of widespread interest. The RJA remains fairly new legislation and has been amended several times since its inception. Though laudable in its purposes, the Act has proven challenging to the courts in its implementation. Given there are few appellate decisions interpreting the Act thus far, several appellate courts have found writ review appropriate in addressing issues raised under the RJA.

Authority:

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340

Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 509

Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612

Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 816

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147, 156 [the RJA’s command is simple, but the implementation is somewhat complex; writ review appropriate to address questions of first impression including how to interpret the RJA’s discovery provision]]

Jackson v. Superior Court (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 372, 382

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 46 [writ of mandate issued and matter remanded for the trial court to determine if the defendant was entitled to the appointment of counsel]

Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 133 [writ of mandate issued, and the trial court’s order denying the petitioner a hearing vacated after the appellate court determined the petitioner met his burden and could proceed to an evidentiary hearing]

Second Holding:

Here, the parties agree without objection that the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate. We therefore exercise our discretion to construe the petition as a petition for writ of mandate of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s RJA discovery motion and address the court’s order on the merits.

Authority:

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335

People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937 [appeal from nonappealable order treated as application for writ of mandate and addressed on the merits]

Third Holding:

Two courts of appeal have concluded, albeit with different reasoning, that a trial court’s order denying a request for discovery under the RJA is not appealable. Both courts recognized, however, that such an order may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071–1072, 1076 review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S287339

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292, 293, review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S288202

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692 [denial of a sec. 1054.9 discovery motion may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate]

Fourth Holding:

A discovery order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. We review the factual underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.

The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156

City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 55

Sargon Enterprises Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773

Fifth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA (Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system; to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing; and to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences. To achieve these objectives, the RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7.

Authority:

AB 2542

PEN 745

PEN 1473

PEN 1473.7

Sixth Holding:

Section 745(a) proclaims that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. It specifies four categories which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, constitute a violation of the RJA.

As relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745 (a)(3) where the defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

Also relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745(a)(4)(A) where a longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.

Authority:

PEN 745

Seventh Holding:

A defendant in custody may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of the RJA. Specifically, section 745(b) provides that a defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). The RJA also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945

Eighth Holding:

If a habeas petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the RJA, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. If, after a hearing, the court finds a violation of section 745(a) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation pursuant to section 745(e).

Authority:

PEN 1473(e)

Ninth Holding:

If a court finds after judgment has been entered that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with section 745(a). If the court finds that the only violation of section 745(a) that occurred is based on paragraph (3) of section 745(a), the court may modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related offense.

If a court finds after judgment has been entered that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

Authority:

PEN 745(e)

Tenth Holding:

The RJA contains a discovery provision in section 745(d). If a defendant believes a violation of the RJA has occurred, he or she may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

Eleventh Holding:

In Young, the Court of Appeal addressed what constitutes good cause for purposes of discovery under section 745(d). The court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the RJA’s enactment, as well as general provisions governing discovery in criminal cases.

Drawing on the Pitchess standard for discovery of law enforcement personnel records, the Young court held that in order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.

This standard for discovery under section 745(d) is even more relaxed than the Pitchess standard in two respects. First, while a Pitchess motion must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth a reasonable belief that the requested discovery is material to the subject matter of the case, there is no comparable affidavit requirement for discovery under the RJA. Second, unlike in a Pitchess motion, an RJA discovery motion has no materiality requirement, at least not in the sense that the defendant must show a logical link between some defense and a pending charge.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 149-160

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

Twelfth Holding:

The RJA’s counterpart to Pitchess materiality is relevance to a potential violation of section 745(a). Since a section 745(a) violation may be proved up in several different ways based on a variety of direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination under subdivision (a)(1)–(4), the threshold showing for good cause must be commensurately broad and flexible.

The limiting factor is relevance in the discovery sense—that is, each request for disclosure must be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745(a) violation. This subject matter limitation on the scope of discoverable material creates an outer boundary that, if crossed, may justify an order narrowing or otherwise limiting the obligation to respond. And as always in the context of discovery, the trial court has ample discretion to manage where the discovery-relevance boundary lies.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160

Thirteenth Holding:

The Young court found support for its articulated good cause standard for discovery in the escalating burdens of proof within section 745. The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

As the least onerous of the statute’s burdens of proof, the plausible justification standard should not be difficult to meet. Accordingly, where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the RJA, thus triggering access to all relevant evidence concerning a potential violation of section 745(a), it will likely be an abuse of discretion to totally foreclose discovery.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160-161, 168-169

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61