Error and/or relief
The court ordered appellant participate and complete general education/counseling and mental health counseling at the discretion of and as directed by probation. We find that delegating unfettered discretion to the probation department to determine whether appellant shall participate and complete education and counseling is impermissible and violates the separation of powers doctrine.
As such, we strike this probation condition and remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether or not appellant shall participate in and complete education and counseling as a condition of his probation, consistent with this opinion.
First Holding:
The People argue that appellant forfeited his probation-condition challenge by failing to object to it at the sentencing hearing. The forfeiture doctrine is a well-established principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court.
Strong policy reasons support this rule: It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.
The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.
Authority:
People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881
Second Holding:
One exception to the forfeiture doctrine includes a facial constitutional challenge—one that does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role of an appellate court.
Appellant presents a facial challenge: the issue is whether the trial court may, under the separation of powers doctrine, delegate to the probation officer the determination of whether appellant must participate and complete education/counseling and mental health counseling.
Such a claim is not predicated on the factual details about the specific education and counseling ordered, appellant’s specific rehabilitative needs, or on the details of the programming the probation officer could determine under this condition. The forfeiture doctrine does not apply in this circumstance.
Authority:
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885, 887-888
Third Holding:
The California Constitution separates the state government’s power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches and prohibits persons charged with the exercise of one power to exercise either of the others except as permitted by the California Constitution. The separation of powers doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.
Authority:
Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3
In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902
Fourth Holding:
A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to promote rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. The court also has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions.
The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.
Authority:
PEN 1203.1(j)
PEN 1202.7
People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120
People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240
People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902
Fifth Holding:
We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.
Authority:
In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143
People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723
Sixth Holding:
Imposing a probation condition that subjects the defendant to the approval or direction of the probation officer is a permissible delegation. But delegating to a probation officer the decision of whether a defendant will participate in a specific form of treatment is an improper delegation of judicial authority.
Authority:
People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–309
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901, 903 [probation condition violates separation of powers doctrine by delegating to probation officer whether the defendant would be required to attend residential treatment/therapy/counseling program]
Seventh Holding:
Here, the court’s order for appellant to submit to education and counseling was much broader than simply leaving the details of that programming to the probation department, it gave the probation department the unlimited discretion to decide whether appellant is required to participate and complete general education and counseling at all.
Specifically, the court ordered appellant to participate and complete education/counseling and mental health counseling at the discretion of and as directed by the probation department.
This is an invalid delegation of judicial authority: although the court may delegate to probation the determinations of when and where a condition will be satisfied, the court may not delegate the decision of whether counseling or education shall be completed.
Authority:
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901, 903