Daily Archives: November 20, 2026

Case 001216

Error and/or relief

On its own motion, the trial court recalled the defendant’s sentence after reviewing the defendant’s invitation to which he had attached a social history/mitigation report.

The court did reduce the sentence, but with respect to the 20-year firearm enhancement, the trial court expressly stated that it did not believe it could impose a lesser included offense under 1172.1(a)(4), because defendant’s conviction was the result of a plea bargain and the People were not consenting to any modification of the firearm allegation. The court expressed that it could either impose the enhancement or strike it completely, and that striking the enhancement would endanger public safety.

The court misunderstood the scope of its discretion. We remand for resentencing.

First Holding:

When being sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.

Authority:

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694

Second Holding:

The question of whether the trial court here abused its discretion depends on the scope of its statutory discretion under section 1172.1, and we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.

Authority:

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694

Third Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(1), provides (in relevant part) that when a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the court may, on its own motion at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(1)

Fourth Holding:

After the defendant’s original sentencing, section 12022.53 was amended to permit the court to strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to by imposed by that section if in the interest of justice under section 1385. The amendment expressly applies to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law.

Under Tirado, the amendments to section 12022.53 permitted trial courts to not only strike an enhancement in its entirety, but also impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement in place of the stricken enhancement. Tirado was an affirmance of the general rule that when an adjudicated enhancement has been dismissed, imposition of an uncharged enhancement is permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are alleged and found true.

Not only does a trial court have discretion to impose one of the lesser included, uncharged enhancements set forth in section 12022.53 in the interest of justice as provided in Tirado, but the trial court may also impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement found elsewhere in the Penal Code.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(h)

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692, 695-696

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020-1021, 1025

Fifth Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(4) does not apply here. It provides that if the court has recalled the sentence on its own motion, the court shall not impose a judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense if the conviction was a result of a plea bargain without the concurrence of both the defendant and the prosecution.

But those restrictions apply only to lesser included offenses. Section 12022.53 provides for a sentence enhancement, not an offense. In our statutory scheme sentence enhancements are not equivalent to, nor do they function as, substantive offenses.

Authority:

People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307, fn. omitted, limited on other grounds in People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326

Sixth Holding:

Where the statutory language has unambiguously stated that it applies to lesser included offenses, rather than lesser included enhancements, and in the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature knew what it was saying and meant what it said. There is no language elsewhere in section 1172.1 suggesting an intent by the Legislature to restrict the trial court’s ability to impose a lesser included enhancement resulting from a plea agreement.

To the contrary, section 1172.1(a)(3), provides in relevant part that the resentencing court may, in the interest of justice and regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea agreement, reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence. This subdivision unambiguously reflects a legislative intent in section 1172.1 to grant trial courts the broad ability to unilaterally modify existing plea agreements.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(3)

Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764

Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991 [statute passed by voter initiative reflected a clear intent to apply the change in the law to plea agreements, as subdivision states that it governs a person serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea]

Seventh Holding:

Because section 1172.1(a)(4) provides an express and specific limitation on the trial court’s ability to resentence a defendant whose conviction was the result of a plea bargain, we may not read into the statute a further or alternative limitation. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed. he expression of a limitation on the trial court when imposing a lesser included offense necessarily excludes other types of limitations that were not expressed.

Authority:

Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852

Case 001215

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court failed to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served. We remand to the trial court for recalculation of the custody credits.

Holding:

The trial court failed to award the custody credits he earned since the time of his original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1 [Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.]

Case 001214

Error and/or relief:

The court erred in advising the defendant that he was not entitled to a jury trial on several of the alleged aggravating factors. Therefore the waiver of a jury on the aggravating factors was not valid. Remanded for jury trial on the aggravating circumstances or a proper waiver or stipulation.

First Holding:

A criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution under section 1170(b).

Section 1170(b) provides that a trial court may not impose the upper term when a criminal statute specifies three possible terms of confinement unless circumstances in aggravation justify doing so and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

U.S. Const., 6th Amend.

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Second Holding:

An aggravating circumstance is a fact that makes the offense ‘distinctively worse than the ordinary. A fact constituting an element of the offense cannot be relied upon by a trial court to aggravate or enhance a sentence on that offense. Notwithstanding the right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors relied on to impose the upper term, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. However, the court’s consideration is limited to the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements.

Pursuant to Apprendi, “ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, except for the fact of a prior conviction.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.420(h)

People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817, overruled on other grounds in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1084–1085

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

People v. Marshall (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1259

People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 952–953, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751, 768–769

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

Third Holding:

In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court imposed new limits on the factors that a sentencing judge may rely upon to increase a sentence in the absence of a jury finding or a defendant’s stipulation. Whether offenses occurred on separate occasions can require an examination of a range of facts, including whether the defendant’s past offenses were committed close in time, whether they were committed near to or far from one another, and whether the offenses were similar or intertwined in purpose and character. The question of whether the offenses occurred on separate occasions must be submitted to a jury, not determined by a judge.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 825, 828

Fourth Holding:

In Wiley, the trial court imposed the upper term sentence based on the defendant’s prior convictions, poor performance on probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more serious. However, the Wiley court, relying on Erlinger, found that the trial court erred because the federal Constitution’s jury trial right requires that a jury determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history establish an unsatisfactory probation performance or demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness, before a trial court can rely on those facts to justify an upper term sentence.

Wiley stated that the trial court’s findings also exceeded the scope of the statutory exception to the jury trial right for prior convictions that appears in section 1170(b)(3)

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1077-1078, 1085

Fifth Holding:

The failure to afford the defendant a jury trial on the aggravating factors was prejudicial and a federal constitutional error subject to review under Chapman.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

The Sixth Amendment is violated when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Seventh Holding:

A defendant must express the right to a jury trial in words. Waiver must be expressed in words and will not be implied from a defendant’s conduct. Moreover, a court may not accept a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial unless the waiver is knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, as well as voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.

The record reflects that the court incorrectly informed the defendant that he was entitled to a jury trial on only one of the aggravating factors alleged, and that the remaining three must be decided by the judge. In light of this incorrect statement, the defendant’s waiver of a jury cannot be said to have been with full awareness of the right being abandoned.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 990

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47 [“When the constitutional right to jury trial is involved, we have required an express waiver even in cases in which the circumstances make it apparent that all involved—the trial court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant—assumed that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right.

Eighth Holding:

Constitutional issues, even in cases involving mixed questions of law and fact, are reviewed de novo on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894.

Ninth Holding:

Whether a defendant’s convictions were numerous is a matter of fact for the jury to decide, as making that determination involves more than simply counting the convictions, which cannot be established by the bare fact of a defendant’s prior convictions.

Authority:

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 847–848

Case 001213

Error and/or relief

Remand is required because the record does not demonstrate that the defendant’s gang-related strike conviction in 2009 is valid under amended Penal Code section 186.22.

The true finding that the defendant sustained a prior strike conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang under section 186.22 is vacated. The sentence is vacated in its entirety, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The prosecution may elect to retry the prior strike allegation for purposes of resentencing. Whether or not the prior strike allegation is proven on remand, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing under current law.

First Holding:

The purpose of the Three Strikes law is to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses. Section 667.5(c) and section 1192.7(c) specify the serious or violent felonies that qualify as strikes under this sentencing scheme. This list includes any felony offense, that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(c)

PEN 1192.7(c)

In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 909

Second Holding:

AB 333 was enacted effective January 1, 2022. It made several changes to the gang-related offenses specified in section 186.22. First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Third Holding:

Fletcher held that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The Supreme Court further concluded that AB 333 applied to the case before it because the defendants’ judgments were not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Fourth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Fifth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Sixth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Case 001212

Error and/or relief

It was improper for the defendant to be convicted of both the specific sexual offenses and continuous sexual abuse of a child. The court miscalculated credit for time served. We reverse the defendant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and correct the error in the calculation of custody credits.

First Holding:

Because the time periods for each specific sexual offense charge overlapped with the time period of the continuous sexual abuse of a child charge, the defendant cannot be convicted of both the specific sexual offenses and continuous sexual abuse of a child.

Section 288.5(a) describes the crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child. In essence, if a person resides in the same home as a minor child under the age of 14, or has regular access to the child, and commits at least three specified acts of sexual conduct within a three-month period, the crime can be charged under section 288.5(a).

However, section 288.5(c) states that no other charges may be brought for that misconduct unless the events occurred outside the time frame that qualified for sectition 288.5(a). This subdivision precludes a defendant from being convicted of both a specific sexual offense charge and a continuous sexual abuse of a child charge when the charges pertain to the same victim over the same time period.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 248

People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1308 [continuous sexual abuse in violation of section 288.5(a) and any discrete sexual offense committed against the same victim within the same time period must be charged in the alternative. A defendant may be convicted of either offense, but not both.]

Second Holding:

he question remains, which count or counts should be dismissed and which should remain. The defendant argues for retaining the conviction under section 288.5(a). The People argue for reversing that conviction and sentencing under the individual counts.

We agree with the reasoning and holdings in Patton and Torres. Accordingly, we will reverse the conviction with the lesser punishment, continuous sexual abuse of a child.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 922, 931 [The proper remedy is to leave a defendant standing convicted of the alternative offenses that are most commensurate with his culpability, which ordinarily means vacating the conviction(s) with the lesser punishment.]

People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 [where a conviction must be vacated for violating section 288.5(c), the defendant shall be left standing convicted of the alternative offenses that are most commensurate with his culpability]

People v. Martinez (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 178, 188 [remanding the matter for the trial court to determine which conviction(s) should be reversed]

Third Holding:

The court miscalculated the defendant’s credit for time served. We direct the court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the additional credit.

(Gary note: The court did not cite authority, but I have listed section 2900.5. This apparently was simply a miscalculation, and there was no issue over whether the defendant was entitled to credit.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5