Error and/or relief
On its own motion, the trial court recalled the defendant’s sentence after reviewing the defendant’s invitation to which he had attached a social history/mitigation report.
The court did reduce the sentence, but with respect to the 20-year firearm enhancement, the trial court expressly stated that it did not believe it could impose a lesser included offense under 1172.1(a)(4), because defendant’s conviction was the result of a plea bargain and the People were not consenting to any modification of the firearm allegation. The court expressed that it could either impose the enhancement or strike it completely, and that striking the enhancement would endanger public safety.
The court misunderstood the scope of its discretion. We remand for resentencing.
First Holding:
When being sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.
Authority:
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694
Second Holding:
The question of whether the trial court here abused its discretion depends on the scope of its statutory discretion under section 1172.1, and we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Authority:
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694
Third Holding:
Section 1172.1(a)(1), provides (in relevant part) that when a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the court may, on its own motion at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.
Authority:
PEN 1172.1(a)(1)
Fourth Holding:
After the defendant’s original sentencing, section 12022.53 was amended to permit the court to strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to by imposed by that section if in the interest of justice under section 1385. The amendment expressly applies to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law.
Under Tirado, the amendments to section 12022.53 permitted trial courts to not only strike an enhancement in its entirety, but also impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement in place of the stricken enhancement. Tirado was an affirmance of the general rule that when an adjudicated enhancement has been dismissed, imposition of an uncharged enhancement is permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are alleged and found true.
Not only does a trial court have discretion to impose one of the lesser included, uncharged enhancements set forth in section 12022.53 in the interest of justice as provided in Tirado, but the trial court may also impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement found elsewhere in the Penal Code.
Authority:
PEN 12022.53(h)
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692, 695-696
People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020-1021, 1025
Fifth Holding:
Section 1172.1(a)(4) does not apply here. It provides that if the court has recalled the sentence on its own motion, the court shall not impose a judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense if the conviction was a result of a plea bargain without the concurrence of both the defendant and the prosecution.
But those restrictions apply only to lesser included offenses. Section 12022.53 provides for a sentence enhancement, not an offense. In our statutory scheme sentence enhancements are not equivalent to, nor do they function as, substantive offenses.
Authority:
People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307, fn. omitted, limited on other grounds in People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326
Sixth Holding:
Where the statutory language has unambiguously stated that it applies to lesser included offenses, rather than lesser included enhancements, and in the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature knew what it was saying and meant what it said. There is no language elsewhere in section 1172.1 suggesting an intent by the Legislature to restrict the trial court’s ability to impose a lesser included enhancement resulting from a plea agreement.
To the contrary, section 1172.1(a)(3), provides in relevant part that the resentencing court may, in the interest of justice and regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea agreement, reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence. This subdivision unambiguously reflects a legislative intent in section 1172.1 to grant trial courts the broad ability to unilaterally modify existing plea agreements.
Authority:
PEN 1172.1(a)(3)
Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764
Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991 [statute passed by voter initiative reflected a clear intent to apply the change in the law to plea agreements, as subdivision states that it governs a person serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea]
Seventh Holding:
Because section 1172.1(a)(4) provides an express and specific limitation on the trial court’s ability to resentence a defendant whose conviction was the result of a plea bargain, we may not read into the statute a further or alternative limitation. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed. he expression of a limitation on the trial court when imposing a lesser included offense necessarily excludes other types of limitations that were not expressed.
Authority:
Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852

