Tag Archives: Sentencing

Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000194

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant appeals the trial court’s written order vacating its prior order appointing counsel and scheduling a Franklin hearing to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful offender parole hearing. Defendant asks this court to remand the matter so he may present additional argument to the trial court. The People do not oppose giving defendant an opportunity to establish his eligibility for a Franklin hearing. We accept the People’s concession and will reverse and remand the matter.

First Holding:

As of January 1, 2020, defendants who committed crimes when they were 25 years old or younger are generally eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after specified periods, depending on their sentence. However, the statute excludes those defendants who, like defendant here, were sentenced to LWOP for crimes they committed when they were 18 to 25 years old.

[GARY NOTE: A defendant who is eligible for future consideration of parole as a youthful offender may make a record in the superior court to preserve facts that may be persuasive in a future hearing on whether to grant parole.]

Authority:

PEN 3051

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

Although Hardin rejected an equal protection challenge to section 3051 by an offender sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder, it did not foreclose other as-applied challenges to the statute based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484-495 [the defendant successfully raised an as-applied challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder under section 190.2(d)]

Third Holding:

There are cases with possibly similar crimes by possibly equally culpable offenders who would now be eligible for parole while the defendant is not. Although these authorities do not conclusively establish any violation of defendant’s right to equal protection, they do allow for the possibility that he might be able to develop such an argument under Harden.

Authority:

People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831

People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532

People v. Fortman (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 45

Fourth Holding:

Some states have constitutions that prohibit imposing an LWOP sentence on youthful offenders. While these authorities do not conclusively establish that section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution, they allow for the possibility that defendant might be able to develop such an argument.

Authority:

Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024) 493 Mass. 216, 234-235

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000190

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the court reduced his mandatory assessments due to his inability to pay. We direct the trial court to correct its resentencing minute order and to amend the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

A trial court must accurately set forth all fines and fees in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 [If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency]

Second Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. We have the inherent power to correct clerical errors so as to make records such as abstracts of judgment or minute orders conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement. Thus, we are directing the court to amend the abstract of judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Discretion, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000189

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by reimposing the upper term sentences based on aggravating factors that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury as required under section 1170(b)(2). This error violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court failed to exercise its discretion under AB 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (regarding the choice of sentences to impose when section 654 permits sentencing on only one of the counts it applies to) at the resentencing hearing. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct sentencing date and number of custody credits.

First Holding:

Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 1170(b)(2) similarly provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt’ at a jury or court trial. This jury trial right is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

Second Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Third Holding:

Section 654 prohibits a court from punishing a defendant more than once for the same act or course of conduct. Prior to 2022, the statute required that an act or omission punishable in different ways by different statutes be punished under the provision that provided the longest potential term of imprisonment. (Former sec. 654(a).) AB 518 amended section 654 effective January 1, 2022, to grant a court discretion to punish such an act under either of such provisions. The trial court erroneously failed to exercise its discretion under Assembly Bill 518 at the resentencing hearing. Since we are again remanding this matter for resentencing under Senate Bill 567, the trial court should conduct a full resentencing as to all counts based on the law and circumstances that apply when resentencing occurs, including the amendments to section 654 under AB 518.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment will need to be corrected to reflect the correct sentencing date and number of custody credits.

[Gary note: The court did not cite authority for this obviously required order. There are many cases it could have cited. I have listed some of them below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Equal protection, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000187

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends on this appeal that the trial court erroneously found he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and erred in denying his Franklin motion as successive. In 2018, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a Franklin hearing.

(The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing.)

That court (in 2018) denied that petition on the basis that he was not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he would already be released before reaching the 15 years’ threshold for youth offender parole. In 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that it was a successive motion. The People agree with defendant that the court erred when it denied his motion as successive. We conclude the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing as successive. We reverse the court’s order and remand for the court to consider defendant’s motion under Penal Code section 1203.01.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2014, SB 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) enacted sections 3051, 3046(c), and 4801(c) to provide a parole eligibility mechanism for youthful offenders. Defendants who were 25 years old or younger at the time they committed the offense and were convicted of a determinate term are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 15th year of incarceration. The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. For defendants whose judgments were final, the proper procedure to obtain a Franklin hearing is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and the Cook decision.

Authority:

PEN 1203.01

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261,283-284

People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

There is no express bar to successive motions or requests for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The defendant’s section 1203.01 motion should not have been denied as successive.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Third Holding:

The trial court’s order denying a defendant’s Franklin motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. In deciding whether the court abused its discretion we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Critical to the resolution of this case, we note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459

People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749

People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746

Fourth Holding:

Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. As such, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the sole basis he had already sought a Franklin hearing by filing a habeas petition. Therefore, the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion as successive.

Authority:

ADIn re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 457-458

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000186

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant—whom a jury convicted of first degree murder in 1992—appeals the trial court’s order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage. He contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition because the jury might have convicted him as a mere participant—rather than as the actual killer—under a felony murder theory of liability. The record of conviction, however, reveals no path permitting the jury to convict him as anything other than the actual killer. And he puts forth no specific facts that identify someone else as the direct perpetrator. Nor does he challenge any other elements of his conviction. We therefore conclude the court properly denied the petition, but we remand to give the defendant the opportunity to file an amended petition to address its current deficiencies.

Holding:

The record of conviction reveals no path permitting the jury to convict the defendant as anything but the actual killer. Out of an abundance of caution, however, we grant his request for an opportunity on remand to plead additional relevant facts in support of his petition. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 925