Tag Archives: Sentencing

Case: 000167

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the presentence custody credits. He actually served more time than the court calculated. We award him the additional days he is entitled to and direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order to reflect the correct award.

Holding:

Upon conviction, a criminal defendant is entitled to credit for actual time served. This time includes confinement from the date of arrest to the date when the sentence commences. Generally, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody. When a defendant is convicted of a violent felony as defined by section 667.5(c), however, work time is accrued at a rate of no more than 15 percent. Any miscalculation of credits results in an unauthorized sentence, and an unauthorized sentence may be corrected upon discovery.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

PEN 4019(a)(1)

PEN 4019(f)

PEN 2933.1(a)

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

Case: 000166

Error and/or relief

The court imposed separate punishments for an indivisible course of conduct. We conclude that all but one of the offenses was temporally distinct and served an independent objective, separate punishments were appropriate. We agree that the defendant broke down victim’s door as part of the robbery, as he had no separate motive to break it. We direct that the one-year sentence for vandalism of the door be stayed.

First Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Section 654 thus precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. If a single action or course of conduct by a defendant violates multiple laws, the distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and may result in multiple verdicts of guilt, but the trial court may impose sentence for only one offense and must stay the sentence for the others.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673

Second Holding:

The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If a defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. Multiple punishments are also permissible where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken and creating a new risk of harm.

Authority:

People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

People v. Gaynor (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 794, 800, 804

Third Holding:

We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s express or implied findings regarding the defendant’s intent and objective viewing the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presuming the existence of every fact the court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. We will uphold the court’s findings in support of its determination if substantial evidence supports them.

Authority:

People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737

People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730–731

Case: 000165

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in reimposing an unenforceable restitution order and in failing to update the defendant’s custody credits. Though the court did not orally reimpose the fine or recalculate credit for time served, the amended abstract of judgment reflects the fine and the credits he received at the defendant’s original sentencing.

First Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4(b) Must be vacated because it is over 10 years old.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. The defendant is entitled to an updated abstract that accurately reflects the amount of custody credits earned.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

Case: 000164

Error and/or relief

Following the defendant’s conviction by jury trial, the court imposed the upper term based on the defendant’s use of a firearm in the commission of a crime; (2) the manner in which the crime was committed indicates planning, sophistication, and professionalism; and (3) the defendant has refused to accept responsibility for his actions. The only factor submitted to and found true by the jury was that the defendant was armed with or used a firearm.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, a sentencing court may not impose a determinate upper term sentence unless (1) there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify its imposition, and (2) the aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Other than stipulated facts or the fact of a prior conviction, aggravating facts relied upon to justify an upper term must be resolved by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This jury trial right is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction. A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

PEN 1170b)(1)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 755, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

Second Holding:

We decline to apply forfeiture. It being evident that the trial court imposed an upper term sentence on the basis of its own posttrial factfinding, the defendant’s claim that this violated section 1170(b)(2) presents a pure issue of law that implicates the constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 327

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879 [construing defendant’s constitutional challenge to her probation condition as presenting a pure question of law reviewable on appeal despite her failure to object at sentencing]

Third Holding:

The defendant argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the court’s choosing the upper term in reliance on unpleaded and unproven aggravating circumstances. There can be no tactical justification for failing to object to the imposition of the upper term based on plainly unproven aggravating factors that the defendant had no notice of in the operative information. Accordingly, even assuming the issue has been forfeited, we would exercise our discretion to reach the merits to forestall defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [reaching defendant’s sentencing claim notwithstanding forfeiture]

People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [reviewing court may exercise discretion to consider forfeited claims to forestall ineffective assistance of counsel arguments]

Fourth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply Chapman. Such errors are prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. Given this exacting standard, we cannot say that the sentencing error here was harmless.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 332

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Case: 000163

Error and/or relief

Here, the trial court erroneously declined to resentence the defendant under section 1172.75. Because the court never exercised its discretion under the statute, we remand for it to do so in accordance with the mandatory procedures for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a now-invalid prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

Second Holding:

[Gary note: NOT discussed in this opinion, but important to know anyway.  Rhodius dealt solely with prior convictions whose punishment was stayed, deferring the question whether section 1172.75 applies to prior convictions that were stricken. On July 2, 2026, the Supreme Court answered that question in People v. Espino (2026) ___ Cal.5th ___ (S286987). It held that section 1172.75 applies to those prior convictions that were stricken at time of sentencing. This is not discussed in the summary above because the trial court had relied the prior conviction having been stayed, not stricken (why do I think of a secret agent when I write that?), which was directly addressed by Rhodius.]

Authority:

People v. Espino (2026) ___ Cal.5th ___ (S286987)