Tag Archives: Sentencing

Case: 000216

Error and/or relief

The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 50 years to life for the murders, plus a determinate sentence of 23 years, 4 months, which included a one-year term for burglary and a 16-month term for attempted robbery. The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654. The judgment is modified to stay the terms imposed for burglary and attempted robbery.

Holding:

The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654, which prohibits punishment for two crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct. This means that if all of the crimes were merely incidental to or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating a single objective, the defendant may receive only one punishment.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129

Case: 000214

Error and/or relief

After the defendant was convicted, but before the judgment became final, AB 333 was enacted, and its application in defendant’s case. We vacate the gang enhancement allegation findings under section 186.22(b), and remand the matter to the trial court to permit the People to elect to retry the gang enhancements or, if the People do not so elect, for the trial court to proceed with resentencing petitioner in conformance with this opinion.

Holding:

AB 333 made substantial changes to the elements of criminal gang activity. These changes apply retroactively to all cases not yet final on the effective date of AB 333, January 1, 2022. A defendant is entitled to relief under AB 333 if an appellate court affirmed the judgment, but sentencing issues were pending upon remand as of its effective date.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

Case: 000213

Error and/or relief

The court sentenced the defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the crime of attempted murder with premeditation. The correct sentence for that offense requires the defendant to serve only seven years before parole eligibility. The sentence imposed on count 2 for attempted murder is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing only.

First Holding:

When the punishment for attempted murder is a life term, the defendant must be confined for at least seven years before parole eligibility.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion does not specify why attempted murder in this case carries a sentence of life. The crime is described in the opinion simply as attempted murder. However, the normal sentence for attempted murder is a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years, unless it is pleaded and proved that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, per Penal Code section 664(a). Given that the trial court imposed an indeterminate term, I must assume that the attempted murder qualified for a life sentence, in which case section 3046 requires a minimum of seven years, not fifteen years, before parole eligibility.]

Authority:

PEN 3046(a)(1)

Second Holding:

We review the length of the defendant’s attempted murder sentence de novo, as it involves an issue of statutory construction.

Authority:

People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94

Case: 000210

Error and/or relief

We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion when declining to fully strike the firearm enhancement or strike it and impose a lesser firearm enhancement. The trial court errantly focused only on the defendant’s past and present danger to public safety, and not whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety in the future. The trial court erred in deciding whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety because, as the record of the sentencing hearing indicates, it focused solely on defendant’s past conduct and the circumstances of the murder. In the context of section 1385, the key question is forward looking—whether striking the enhancement would likely endanger public safety. Thus, even if the trial court struck the enhancement, the defendant would still be serving an indeterminate 15-to-life term with parole eligibility subject to the Parole Board and Governor’s review. The trial court must consider this future-looking issue for purposes of public safety.

First Holding:

A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [reminding that a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion]

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022,Penal Code section 1385 was amended to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. It reads, in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so …. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” Subparagraphs (A) to (I) list nine distinct mitigating circumstances, including, as is relevant here, subparagraph (C) where the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Subparagraph (C) states in this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674

Third Holding:

Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. For a defendant facing a lengthy indeterminate sentence, the inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. This future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public safety.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

 

Case: 000209

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in recalculating the defendant’s custody credits. It stated that he spent four days in custody and earned two days of conduct credit. The court, however, awarded only four days. The matter is remanded for recalculation of presentence custody credits. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Holding:

Under section 4019(e), a defendant begins to earn conduct credits after being committed for a period of four days or longer. Here, the defendant was in custody for four days and was therefore entitled to two days of conduct credit.

Authority:

PEN 4019