Tag Archives: Juveniles

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000862

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed an incorrect maximum term for the juvenile, and one of the probation conditions was overbroad.

First Holding:

The court declared that the maximum confinement time for the minor was 16 years, when it fact the maximum was 10 years.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 726(d)(1) provides that if the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

Second Holding:

Section 726 defines the maximum term of imprisonment as the middle of the three time periods set forth in section 1170(a)(3) of the Penal Code, plus enhancements.

To the extent section 726 is ambiguous, we think it logical that the method for selecting the term for the underlying offense should apply in selecting the term for an enhancement.

Here, the middle term for the underlying offense is six years, and the middle term for the enhancement is four years, for a total of ten years.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(2)

In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 [interpreting prior version of section 726]

Third Holding:

The juvenile court ordered a total commitment of in terms of a number of days that exceed even the 16-year maximum confinement time in the court’s minute order. Rather than expressing the commitment in days, we will modify the disposition order such that appellant’s total commitment is for the maximum confinement period of 10 years.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15 [remand unnecessary where maximum sentence had been imposed]

Fourth Holding:

Appellant’s probation conditions included the following: (1) “You shall not possess, nor shall you knowingly associate with anyone who possesses, any weapon, including, but not limited to firearms, pellet or BB guns, chemical weapons, a replica of any weapon, ammunition, or C02 canisters. You shall not remain in any vehicle where you know anyone has such a weapon or ammunition”; and (2) “You shall not associate with any person who is using or trafficking in any controlled substance, including marijuana.”

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions, but a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. While we generally review the imposition of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.

The two conditions at issue are overbroad because they encompass people who legally possess weapons and use controlled substances. We will modify these conditions to specify that they apply only to illegal possession or use. While the word “trafficking” seems to imply illegal conduct, to remove any doubt, we will also specify that the trafficking must be illegal. The condition prohibiting association with those using or trafficking in controlled substances lacks a knowledge requirement. Modification to impose an explicit knowledge requirement is necessary to render the condition constitutional.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892

People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-102

Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity

Case 000861

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court did not declare on the record that either of the minor’s two aggravated assault offenses was a felony or a misdemeanor, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702

Section 730.6 requires that the restitution fines imposed must be stricken.

The precommitment credits must be corrected.

First Holding:

Section 702 provides, in part, that when a minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.

Section 702 requires the juvenile court to declare on the record at a hearing ‘before or at the time of disposition its choice whether to treat an alleged wobbler as a misdemeanor or as a felony. Neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of confinement may substitute for the required declaration.

Authority:

WIC 702

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712

Second Holding:

A section 702 error is not harmless unless the record shows that the juvenile court was aware of, and exercised its discretion as to each wobbler alleged against the minor. The key issue under this standard is whether the juvenile court was aware of its discretion under section 702.

Authority:

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712, 717

Third Holding:

This section 702 error was not harmless. Signed minute orders in the two assault cases stated, “Pursuant to Juvenile Court Rule 5.795(a), the court finds the offense to be a Felony as to count 1.”

This language tracks recommendations in a memorandum probation filed for disposition. However, rule 5.795(a) states that for any wobbler, the court must consider which description applies and expressly declare on the record that it has made such consideration and must state its determination as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.

The court’s failure to comply with the very rule cited undermines any inference that it was aware of its discretion.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.795(a)

Fourth Holding:

The juvenile court imposed three $200 restitution fines. Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) amended section 730.6 to remove the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine.  The relevant portion of the statute now provides: “The court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in section 602.”

Appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-746

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in calculating the credit for time served, awarding the minor less than half the more than 450 days the minor was entitled to. A minor is entitled to credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody before the disposition hearing.

When a juvenile court elects to aggregate a minor’s period of physical confinement on multiple petitions the court must also aggregate the predisposition custody credits attributable to those multiple petitions.

Authority:

In re A.M. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085-1086

Sixth Holding:

Section 628.2(c) provides that a minor shall be entitled to have one day credited against the minor’s maximum term of confinement for each day, or fraction thereof, that the minor serves on electronic monitoring. The provision of custody credits pursuant to this subdivision shall apply to custody credits earned beginning January 1, 2023.

Because the minor was on electronic monitoring after January 1, 2023, he is entitled to credits for that time.

Authority:

WIC 628.2(c)

Discretion, Juveniles, Standard of review

Case 000860

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the juvenile court’s transfer order and remand for a new hearing and ruling on the district attorney’s transfer motion.

First Holding:

The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer petition is whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. To order a minor’s transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 707(a)(3)

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a), (b)

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416

Second Holding:

In making that determination, the juvenile court must consider five specific criteria: (1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history; (4) success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(a)(3) also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria.

Authority:

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212

Third Holding:

The allegation that a minor committed a serious offense, including murder, does not automatically require a finding of unfitness. Rather, in evaluating this criterion, a juvenile court may rely on evidence that, while not justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude.

Authority:

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189

Fourth Holding:

A juvenile court can retain jurisdiction over a minor as described in section 602 for the offense of murder until he or she attains 25 years of age, or upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, whichever occurs later.

In determining whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, ‘the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.

Expert witnesses may testify on the issue of the availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court system and the amenability of the minor to those programs.

Authority:

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 213

Fifth Holding:

A minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is the central and dispositive question in proceedings under section 707, and the juvenile court’s analysis of the section 707 criteria must be focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 161–162

In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re J.M. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745, 751–753

Sixth Holding:

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. The lower court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.

The court’s ultimate finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction is also reviewed for substantial evidence. In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings.

Moreover, a trial court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 160

People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433

Seventh Holding:

When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.

The clear and convincing evidence standard requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 160–161

Eighth Holding:

The court’s reliance on uncertainty born out of the district attorney’s limited proof about why the minor would not accept or respond to the available treatment that the probation department believed would prepare the minor for re-entry into the community resulted in an improper shift of the burden from the district attorney to show the minor’s unamenability to the minor to show his amenability to rehabilitation.

This shift amounts to an abuse of discretion based on the application of an incorrect legal standard. Given that the juvenile court improperly applied the burden of proof in deciding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the court’s jurisdiction, we agree with the minor that the court’s order granting the transfer motion must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new transfer hearing.

Authority:

J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 722 [holding there was an abuse of discretion where there was no evidence that demonstrated existing programs were unlikely to result in the minor’s rehabilitation, why they were unlikely to work in this case, or that they would take more than three years to accomplish the task of rehabilitating minor]

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 673 [The prosecution cannot suggest that deficiencies in the defense case can make up for shortcomings in its own]

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000816

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Given that the minor was not removed from his home, it was error for the court to set the maximum term of confinement.

Holding:

When a minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian, a juvenile court must specify the maximum term of confinement. But the statute authorizes the juvenile court to specify the maximum confinement term only when a minor is removed from parental custody. Because the juvenile court did not remove the minor from his mother’s custody, the maximum confinement term should be stricken.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541

 

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000788

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor was found to have committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, carrying a concealed, loaded firearm, evading an officer, and resisting an officer. The juvenile court committed appellant to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility. The juvenile court lacked authority to do so. Remanded for a new disposition hearing.

First Holding:

the juvenile court lacked authority to commit him to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) because the most recent offense for which he was adjudicated was not a qualifying offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b).

Authority:

WIC 875(a)(1)-(2)

Second Holding:

Before the enactment of section 875, our Supreme Court interpreted similar language in section 733(c). Section 733(c) prohibits a ward’s commitment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities [known also as DJJ and DJF] if the ward’s most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described in section 707(b) or Penal Code section 290.008(c).

The court held this language is clear and lends itself to only one reasonable interpretation. The phrase “most recent” describes when the minor committed the offense, not when the petition is adjudicated.

Authority:

In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 947

In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 648

Third Holding:

The Legislature used language in section 875 substantially similar to language the Supreme Court had already interpreted in section 733(c). We presume, therefore, that the Legislature intended the same construction. Now, instead of DJJ, eligible youth can be committed to a SYTF if their most recent offense is described in section 707(b).

The court did not have authority to impose a SYTF commitment because appellant’s most recently committed offenses occurred four months after the only offense that comes with section 707(b), and are not qualifying offenses. Remand is necessary to allow the court to conduct a new disposition hearing.

Authority:

WIC 875

Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785