Tag Archives: Juveniles

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000921

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was 16 years old when he committed attempted murder on two people, and he was convicted by plea as an adult in 2015. He subsequently petitioned under section 1172.6 for recall of his sentence in light of changes to the law on liability for murder and attempted murder by those who were not the direct perpetrators. He was resentenced to five years in prison.

On appeal, he contends correctly that the court should have conducted a transfer hearing in light of changes in the statute enacted through Proposition 57.

Holding:

In 2016, voters passed “The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016” to obligate the People to criminally charge a minor in the juvenile court unless the juvenile court determines after a transfer hearing that the minor should be tried and sentenced as an adult.

This part of the act applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. When a court vacates a criminal sentence after a successful petition for resentencing, it reacquires jurisdiction to reimpose punishment and the judgment reverts to being nonfinal for that purpose.

The parties agree that the defendant is entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing, and for these reasons so do we.

But we emphasize: Whatever potential that hearing may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of guilt.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, 304, 305–307

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158, 161-162, 167, 169-170

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000899

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The electronic-data conditions are unreasonable under People v. Lent. We therefore strike them and remand for the juvenile court to consider whether to impose revised conditions. We also agree with the parties that the association condition should be modified to include a knowledge requirement.

First Holding:

When a ward of the juvenile court is placed on probation, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward, including conditions of probation that (1) are individually tailored, developmentally appropriate, and reasonable; (2) impose a burden that is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the conditions; and (3) are determined by the court to be fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. A condition of probation that is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Second Holding:

We review conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. To determine whether a probation condition is reasonable, we apply a three-part test under Lent.

A condition cannot be held invalid under Lent unless it meets all three of the following prongs: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not related to future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118-1119

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Third Holding:

In addition to being reasonable, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, or else it is void for vagueness. And when a probation condition imposes limitations on a probationer’s constitutional rights, it must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition—the person’s reformation and rehabilitation—to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Fourth Holding:

Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

Authority:

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 661

Fifth Holding:

We conclude that the conditions are invalid under Lent. As to the first prong of Lent, there is no question that restricting the use of electronics The minor’s conduct involved asking the victim for her phone number, and asked the victim to put his number in her phone contacts list–which she did, but later deleted it. These acts do not establish the requisite relationship between the challenged probation conditions and the minor’s offense (sexual battery by restraint). Generally, decisions finding a sufficient connection between electronics search conditions and an offense rely on the probationer’s use of electronic devices to facilitate the offense.

In Appleton, the defendant met the minor victim online and later sexually assaulted him. The Court of Appeal held that the nexus between the offense and the probation condition at issue was sufficient even though it was somewhat attenuated. In Flores, the Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the condition at issue and the defendant’s drug offense because the defendant used a website and an online program to arrange drug sales through a disguised phone number. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that electronic devices played any role in facilitating the offense.

Here, in contrast, there is no indication that the minor ever actually contacted the victim through an electronic device. Indeed, he did not even have the ability to do so, as he never obtained her contact information. Nor is there any evidence that the victim attempted to communicate with the minor after the offense. The first two prongs of Lent have been met–the condition has no relation to the criminal conduct, and it restrains otherwise lawful conduct.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720

People v. Flores (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 563, 565-566, 573

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Sixth Holding:

The third prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. Thus, the mere fact that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct is insufficient to justify a broad electronics search condition. The electronic-data conditions burden the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the claimed purposes of ensuring compliance with two of his other probation conditions (a no-contact order and prohibition from possessing sexual materials).

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 and fn 4

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 567-568

Seventh Holding:

The court ordered the following probation condition: “The Minor shall not associate with minors under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless in the presence of a responsible adult, or associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad if it (1) impinges on constitutional rights, and (2) is not tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the probationer’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

The restriction is not unreasonable, but it must be tailored to require the minor’s express knowledge that the minor is under the age of 14. Generally speaking, if a probation condition prohibits a probationer from associating with a certain group of people, the condition is unconstitutionally vague unless it also requires that the probationer know a given person is in that group. Here, the minor may not reasonably know that an individual is under 14 years of age.

Thus, we modify the association condition to read: “The Minor shall not associate with minors whom he knows or reasonably should know are under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless he is in the presence of a responsible adult, or unless the associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

Authority:

People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

People v. Bray (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 494, 503

People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 [modifying condition prohibiting association with people under age 18].

Discretion, Jurisdiction, Juveniles, Standard of review

Case 000881

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court abused its discretion because its decision to transfer the minor to adult criminal court was not supported by substantial evidence. We vacate the transfer order and remand.

First Holding:

In California, a juvenile court is a superior court that exercises limited jurisdiction arising under juvenile law. The initial jurisdiction of a juvenile court is based on the age of the person when he violates a criminal law or ordinance, it is not based on the age when he is actually apprehended.

After a juvenile court has initial jurisdiction over a minor, the juvenile court generally retains jurisdiction until he turns 21 years old. However, if a person is alleged to have committed one of 30 serious offenses under section 707(b), then the juvenile court may continue to exercise jurisdiction over that person for a limited period after he turns 21.

Relevant to this case, a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of disposition if the person is found to be a person described in section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in section 707(b). The court shall exercise jurisdiction in conformance with the objectives of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 607(a), (d)

WIC 707(b)

In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200

M.E. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1205 [explaining initial jurisdiction and noting that it is theoretically possible for a person to commit a crime at the age of 17, be arrested 50 years later, and be subject to the initial jurisdiction of the juvenile court at age 67]

In re Keith C. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 151, 155

Second Holding:

If a minor was 16 years or older when he committed a felony or one of 30 serious offenses under section 707(b), the district attorney may file a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In order to transfer a minor to a criminal court, the prosecutor must show by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

To resolve a transfer motion, section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider five factors: (1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited; (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (3) prior delinquent history; (4) the success of prior attempts by a juvenile court at rehabilitation; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged.

While the juvenile court must consider these five factors, the weight each factor receives is within the juvenile court’s discretion.

Thus, the juvenile court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. If a juvenile court grants a transfer motion, section 707(a)(3) requires the juvenile court to recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section 707 also provides additional nonexhaustive considerations for assessing each of the five factors.

As relevant to this case, with respect to the second factor, section 707 directs the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature. The second factor is not the same as the ultimate determination of whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Rather, the focus of the second factor is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor while he is still eligible to remain under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

Therefore, the prosecution should produce evidence that the juvenile court will have insufficient time to rehabilitate the minor.

Authority:

WIC 707

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 158-160

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164, 166-167

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417

Third Holding:

A juvenile court’s decision to transfer a minor to the jurisdiction of a criminal court is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. A court abuses its discretion by issuing an order that exceeds the bounds of reason. A court may also abuse its discretion if its understanding of the applicable law is incorrect, it is unaware of the full scope of its discretion, or it relies on impermissible criteria.

The juvenile court’s findings on the five section 707(a)(3) factors, as well as its ultimate finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction, are reviewed for substantial evidence. Because the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to a motion to transfer, we determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by that standard.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 160

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 18

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165

Fourth Holding:

It is clear from the record that the court was not aware that it had jurisdiction for at least two years from the date the disposition was ordered, regardless of the person’s age (which, in this case was the mid 30s). Because the juvenile court found that it had lost jurisdiction based on the minor’s age alone, its finding is contrary to section 607(d) and thus, rests on an incorrect understanding of the law. Therefore, the court abused its discretion in its assessment of the second factor of section 707(a)(3).

Authority:

Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540 [An order that implicitly or explicitly rests on an erroneous reading of the law necessarily is an abuse of discretion.]

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 18-19

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187

Fifth Holding:

All defendants are entitled to decisions made in the exercise of the trial court’s informed discretion. A court does not exercise informed discretion when its decision is based on a misunderstanding of applicable law.

Because there has been a misunderstanding of applicable law by the juvenile court, we must determine whether the record clearly indicates that the juvenile court still would have ordered the minor transferred to the criminal court if it had correctly understood the applicability of section 607(d).

Given the apparent importance of the second factor, and that the record does not clearly indicate how the juvenile court would have assessed the second factor under the applicable law, we must remand this matter for the court to make further findings.

Authority:

People v. Murphy (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 249, 256

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000875

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse four of the five counts of evading the police under Vehicle Code section 2800.3 and remand for a new disposition order.

The minor’s constitutional challenges to the dispositional order are forfeited on appeal, and we will not consider them.

First Holding:

Dispositional orders in juvenile matters are entrusted to the discretion of the juvenile court. Failure to object to a discretionary dispositional choice forfeits the claim on appeal.

But the forfeiture rule does not apply if the disposition is unauthorized; that is, if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. In those situations, the unauthorized disposition presents a pure question of law.

The unauthorized sentence concept is a narrow exception to the general requirement that only preserved claims are reviewable on appeal. And while reviewing courts have the discretion to consider forfeited claims on appeal, they should do so rarely, keeping in mind that the forfeiture rule exists to encourage prompt detection and correction of error and to promote the state’s interest in finality of judgments.

Authority:

In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130-1131

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351, 354

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885

People v. Fisher (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 745, 751-752

In re H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 817-818

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 [the unauthorized sentence exception is designed to provide relief from forfeiture for obvious legal errors at sentencing such as a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum]

Second Holding:

Further, we disagree with the minor’s contention that his constitutional challenges to the disposition present pure legal questions. His challenges ask us to consider his self-evident lesser culpability relative to an older juvenile. But culpability determinations are for the trier of fact, not an appellate court.

Authority:

People v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 915-916

Third Holding:

Finally, the minor contends we should consider his forfeited claims because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise them. But trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise novel claims like the ones here.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [to forestall a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts can exercise their discretion to reach the merits of the claim].

In re Grinder (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 845, 871-872

People v. Foster (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 379, 385.

Fourth Holding:

We decline to exercise any discretion we might have to consider these forfeited claims because doing so (1) would be unfair to the People and the juvenile court, which had no opportunity to address the claims below, and (2) would undermine both the state’s interest in finality of judgments and litigants’ incentive to seek correction of error in the first instance.

Further, we should not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us. Accordingly, the minor’s constitutional challenges to the dispositional order are forfeited on appeal, and we will not consider them.

Authority:

In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713-714

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130-1131

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351,

Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hunter) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245, 1275, fn. 31

Fifth Holding:

Penal Code section 26 provides, in relevant part, that all persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. ….

Authority:

PEN 26

Sixth Holding:

Clear proof means clear and convincing evidence. The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact.

We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the juvenile court’s findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. In determining capacity the juvenile court must consider the child’s age, experience, and understanding.

A minor’s knowledge of his act’s wrongfulness may be inferred from the circumstances, such as the method of its commission or its concealment.

Authority:

In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 538-539

Seventh Holding:

While the language of the statute refers to knowledge of wrongfulness, the question is whether a minor appreciates the wrongfulness of their conduct. As minors approach the age of 14, they are increasingly likely to appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts.

Authority:

In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232

People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 281

In re J.E. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 309, 314

Eighth Holding:

Cases are not authority for propositions not considered.

Authority:

B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11

Ninth Holding:

Four of the five Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings must be stricken. A charge of multiple counts of violating a statute is appropriate only where the actus reus prohibited by the statute—the gravamen of the offense—has been committed more than once. A defendant may properly be convicted of multiple counts for multiple victims of a single criminal act only where the act prohibited by the statute is centrally an act of violence against the person.

Authority:

Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 349

People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159

Tenth Holding:

Vehicle Code section 2800.3 provides that whenever willful flight or attempt to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of section 2800.1 proximately causes serious bodily injury or death, the person driving the pursued vehicle shall be punished. Felony evading, as defined by the Legislature, in Vehicle Code section 2800.3, is not a crime of violence.

Under Wilkoff and Garcia there can be only one Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true finding here. Thus, four of the five Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings must be stricken.

Authority:

VEH 2800.3

Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 349

People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1163

People v. Sanchez (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 970, 973-974 [Because dispositive elements of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 can be satisfied by conduct that does not necessarily pose a high probability of death, it is not a felony inherently dangerous to human life.]

Eleventh Holding:

It is improper to raise new contentions in a reply brief. Further, appellate arguments may be deemed forfeited when they do not contain meaningful analysis and citation to supporting authority.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642-643

People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793

Twelfth Holding:

In criminal court, when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. The same principle applies in juvenile court. Since we strike four of the juvenile court’s Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings, a new disposition is required.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1140 [every time a ward appears for disposition, the court may consider the minor’s entire history and the order must be all encompassing]

Discretion, Duty of counsel, Duty of the court, Juveniles

Case 000866

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor received insufficient notice of his eligibility for a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ), and the trial court failed to conduct a DEJ suitability hearing. We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

First Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 790(a) provides that whenever a case is before the juvenile court for a determination of whether a minor is a person described in section 602 because of the commission of a felony offense, the minor may be eligible for DEJ when the following conditions are met: (1) The minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense. (2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707. (3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. (4) The minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without being completed. (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing. (6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code. (7) The offense charged is not [one of several listed sexual offenses].

Authority:

WIC 790(a)

Second Holding:

Under section 790(b), the prosecuting attorney must review the file to determine whether or not paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a) apply.

If the minor is found eligible for deferred entry of judgment, the prosecuting attorney must file a declaration in writing with the court or state for the record the grounds upon which the determination is based, and must make this information available to the minor and their attorney.

Authority:

WIC 790(b)

In re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 654, 659 (C.W.)

Third Holding:

The Rules of Court require the court to notify the minor’s custodial parent, guardian, or foster parent at least 24 hours before the appearance hearing.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(c)

In re Trenton D. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [finding no indication that a proper notice was properly served and noting rule 5.800(c)’s service requirements]

Fourth Holding:

While a juvenile court retains discretion to deny DEJ to an eligible minor, the duty of the prosecuting attorney to assess the eligibility of the minor for DEJ and furnish notice with the petition is mandatory, as is the duty of the juvenile court to either summarily grant DEJ or examine the record, conduct a hearing, and make the final determination regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation.

The court is not required to ultimately grant DEJ, but is required to at least follow specified procedures and exercise discretion to reach a final determination once the mandatory threshold eligibility determination is made.

Authority:

In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123

In re D.L. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1243–1244