Tag Archives: Juveniles

Case 000788

Error and/or relief

The minor was found to have committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, carrying a concealed, loaded firearm, evading an officer, and resisting an officer. The juvenile court committed appellant to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility. The juvenile court lacked authority to do so. Remanded for a new disposition hearing.

First Holding:

the juvenile court lacked authority to commit him to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) because the most recent offense for which he was adjudicated was not a qualifying offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b).

Authority:

WIC 875(a)(1)-(2)

Second Holding:

Before the enactment of section 875, our Supreme Court interpreted similar language in section 733(c). Section 733(c) prohibits a ward’s commitment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities [known also as DJJ and DJF] if the ward’s most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described in section 707(b) or Penal Code section 290.008(c).

The court held this language is clear and lends itself to only one reasonable interpretation. The phrase “most recent” describes when the minor committed the offense, not when the petition is adjudicated.

Authority:

In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 947

In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 648

Third Holding:

The Legislature used language in section 875 substantially similar to language the Supreme Court had already interpreted in section 733(c). We presume, therefore, that the Legislature intended the same construction. Now, instead of DJJ, eligible youth can be committed to a SYTF if their most recent offense is described in section 707(b).

The court did not have authority to impose a SYTF commitment because appellant’s most recently committed offenses occurred four months after the only offense that comes with section 707(b), and are not qualifying offenses. Remand is necessary to allow the court to conduct a new disposition hearing.

Authority:

WIC 875

Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785

Case 000774

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court erred by holding the minor jointly and severally liable for victim restitution.

First Holding:

Restitution orders are subject to review on appeal for an abuse of discretion. The ‘court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law.

Authority:

In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 202

Second Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. Under this statute, a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.

For the purposes of victim restitution, each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount of apportioned liability for all minors involved shall not exceed 100 percent in total.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

WIC 602

In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4

Third Holding:

The error has not been waived, as the failure to object to a restitution order that exceeds the court’s statutory authority does not waive the claim of error.

Authority:

In re Paul R. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1590

Case 000768

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that the minor received stolen property in violation of section 496d(a) (pertaining to the vehicle in which he was a passenger).

First Holding:

The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of the evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases. We examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

While substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, such inferences may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, or speculation.

Authority:

In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545-546

In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540

People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330

Second Holding:

To sustain the petition on the receiving a stolen vehicle count, the People had to prove: (1) the motor vehicle was stolen; (2) the minor knew it was stolen; and (3) the minor received, concealed, or withheld the stolen vehicle from its owner.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224

In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728

Third Holding:

Receipt, or possession of stolen property, may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. Physical possession is also not a requirement. It is sufficient if the defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property.

Constructive possession occurs when the defendant maintains control or a right to control the property; possession may be imputed when the property is found in a place that is immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his or her dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the defendant and another.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224 [construing similar language in context of sec. 496, general receiving stolen property statute]

People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 621-622

Fourth Holding:

Possession may be established through circumstantial evidence and resulting reasonable inferences. However, mere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. Something more must be shown to support inferring of dominion and control. The necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 224

People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 429 [evidence the defendant was passenger in car and found standing close to car trunk containing stolen goods insufficient to infer possession for conviction of receiving stolen property]

People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [evidence defendant was passenger in car with stolen chain saw in rear seat insufficient evidence to infer his possession of stolen item]

Fifth Holding:

The car was stolen and the minor knew the car was stolen, but there is no substantial evidence that the minor possessed or aided in withholding the car from its owner.

While it is true that conscious possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen, the issue here is whether, as a mere passenger, he actually or constructively possessed the stolen car as a section 496d conviction requires.

Aiding and abetting the commission of a crime requires some affirmative action. Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.

There was no evidence to show the minor directed the driver to speed away from the pursuing officers or otherwise directed any movement of the Infiniti as a passenger. There was no evidence that the minor had an opportunity to get out of the car before the traffic stop, or once the driver sped away from the officers.

The record is also devoid of any evidence regarding the minor’s relationship to any of the other occupants of the car, and the gang expert conceded the minor had no documented gang-related contacts apart from this one incident.

Absent evidence showing the nature and extent of the relationship between the minor and the other occupants, or the circumstances of the minor’s affirmative actions beyond simply running from the Infiniti, we conclude the evidence established nothing more than that the minor was a passenger in the stolen car, but not that he aided and abetted in the vehicle theft or in withholding the stolen vehicle from its rightful owner.

Authority:

People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574

People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 420-421

People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868

People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 57

People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1039 [presence at crime scene, by itself, is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting; relevant factors for determining aider and abettor liability may include presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense]

Case 000755

Error and/or relief

Because of a change in the law while the minor’s case has been pending, the restitution fine ordered by the court must be stricken.

First Holding:

Here, the juvenile court imposed a restitution fine as a condition of probation. At the time of the minor’s disposition, the restitution fine was mandatory. Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature passed AB 1186 which amended Welfare and Instituitons Code section 730.6 to prohibit a court from imposing a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

Second Holding:

An adult or juvenile offender is generally entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while their case is on appeal and not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [applying a revised version of the statute in setting a restitution fine]

In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [rule of retroactivity applies to juvenile delinquency judgments]

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [Where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.

Third Holding:

Because imposing a restitution fine constitutes “punishment” and the minor’s case was not yet final when section 730.6 became effective, we conclude section 730.6 operates retroactively and precludes imposition of a restitution fine. Therefore, the restitution fine should be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 321

Case 000734

Error and/or relief

The court imposed as a condition of probation: “Do not associate or communicate with your co-participant and anyone you know who is on probation, parole, or a gang member” The defendant objects to the inclusion of the phrase “or a gang member.” The condition must be modified.

First Holding:

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Although courts have broad discretion to set conditions of probation, the trial court’s discretion in setting the conditions of probation is not unbounded.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624

Second Holding:

A term of probation is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality Conversely, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct that is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the minor was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 48

Third Holding:

When a gang condition imposed by the juvenile court involves non-criminal conduct and prohibits a minor from engaging in otherwise legal conduct, we can uphold it only if there is a reasonable connection between the condition and the offense or between the condition and future criminality. Gang-related probation conditions are reasonably related to preventing future criminality when there is evidence of the minor’s affiliation with criminal street gangs.

In the absence of evidence of gang affiliation or association with gang members or risk of gang involvement on the minor’s part, the gang condition is not tailored to his future criminality. In this case, any connection between the minor’s offense and gang activity is speculative.

Accordingly, the condition is modified to “Do not associate or communicate with your co-participant and anyone you know who is on probation or parole.”

Authority:

In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1236

People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574