Tag Archives: Forfeiture

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 000923

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The instructional errors were prejudicial regarding the multiple-murder and lying-in-wait special circumstance findings attached to counts 1, 2 and 3.

We reverse those findings, but the prosecution may retry these special circumstance allegations.

The firearm enhancements found true as to counts 1, 2 and 3 must be reversed due to prejudicial error, including pleading deficiencies and insufficiency of the evidence. Retrial of the firearm enhancements is barred by principles of double jeopardy.

The trial court also erred by denying the defendant’s renewed motion for a transfer hearing in juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as amended by AB 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).

Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under current law.

First Holding:

In setting forth the relevant pertinent facts in an appellate opinion, we view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment.

Authority:

In re Jesus O. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 859, 861

People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578

Second Holding:

In counts 1 through 3, the jury convicted appellant of first degree murder. The jury found true four special circumstance allegations: (1) lying in wait; (2) multiple murders; (3) murder in the commission of robbery; and (4) murder in the commission of burglary. Because of the special circumstance findings, appellant was sentenced to three consecutive LWOP terms.

There were several instructional errors, but many we find to have been harmless error. The instructional errors were prejudicial regarding the multiple-murder and lying-in-wait special circumstance findings attached to counts 1, 2 and 3.

We reverse those findings, but the prosecution may retry these special circumstance allegations. Even if the People do not elect to do so, however, a full resentencing is required.

(Gary note: The opinion concluded that some of the instructions permitted finding guilt on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which has been abolished. Cutting to the chase in this summary, the court stated in its analysis whether the instructional error was harmless, the court stated, that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that appellant acted as a major participant in these crimes and with his own reckless indifference to human life. It was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational juror who convicted appellant of first degree murder would have necessarily found the facts required under section 189(e)(3).

(Also, the jury was erroneously told at times that, if appellant was not an actual killer, the lying-in-wait and the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations could be found true merely if he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. This was legally incorrect. If appellant was not the actual killer, then the prosecution was required to prove that he acted with an intent to kill for each murder in order to establish these special circumstance allegations. The court did not find the error harmless on those instructions, and reversed those special circumstances, allowing the prosecution to retry them.)

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3) [Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime]

PEN 190.2(c) and (d)

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449

People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607 [conviction reversed for instructional error may be retried if supported by sufficient evidence]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, a full resentencing is required so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Third Holding:

We reject the prosecution’s contention that the defendant has forfeited claims of instructional error by failing to object. Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to correctly instruct on the elements of the charged offenses and on special circumstance allegations.

No objection is required to preserve a claim for appellate review when the jury instructions omit an essential element of a charge.

Moreover, a court may review any question of law involved in an instruction which affects the substantial rights of the defendant. As alleged, the instructional errors in this matter altered the mens rea and actus reus elements that the jury was required to find.

Accordingly, we decline to find forfeiture, and we will review this claim on its merits.

Authority:

PEN 1259

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409

People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 91 [declining to rely on forfeiture doctrine where alleged instructional errors would have impacted defendant’s substantial rights].

Fourth Holding:

The instructional errors impacted appellant’s constitutional rights because they permitted the jury to convict him on an invalid legal theory. Accordingly, we must reverse the convictions unless, after examining the entire cause—including the evidence and considering all relevant circumstances—we determine the errors, including the disputed ones, were all harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 602

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13

Fifth Holding:

When a jury is instructed on both a legally valid theory and a legally invalid theory of guilt, harmlessness can be shown if the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces the valid theory or if, based on the evidence, it is impossible to have found what the verdict did find without also finding the facts underlying the valid theory.

To make this assessment, we must rigorously review the evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty based on an invalid theory, and made the factual findings reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily have found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory as well.

We must be convinced that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we must be satisfied that this standard is beyond serious debate.

We have rigorously reviewed the totality of the record to determine whether, based on the evidence, it is impossible for a rational juror to have found what the verdicts did find without also finding the facts underlying a valid theory.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 443-444

In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 568

In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 602

Sixth Holding:

Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852

Seventh Holding:

Section 12022.53(d) requires personal discharge by the defendant; it does not impose vicarious liability for another principal’s firearm discharge. Vicarious firearm liability is available only when a gang enhancement is proven. Once the gang allegations were dismissed on motion of the prosecution, the vicarious theory was unavailable.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(d) and (e)

PEN 186.22(b)(1)

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 746

Eighth Holding:

Because personal discharge by appellant was neither charged nor expressly found true by the jury in the verdict forms, the court could not supply that missing fact at sentencing. Any fact increasing punishment must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court lacked authority to stay the count 1 enhancement merely as an exercise of sentencing discretion. The court was only authorized to strike or dismiss the enhancement, not to stay it even based on its own discretionary sense of justice. Based on principles of double jeopardy, retrial is barred.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(j)

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 132–133 [“Because the prosecution had a full opportunity to prove the facts necessary for a conviction but failed to do so, double jeopardy bars a second bite at the apple”]

Curry v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 712 [jeopardy attaches when a defendant is placed on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction on a valid accusatory pleading]

Ninth Holding:

In January 2011, appellant was 16 years old when he committed the present crimes. In 2012, he was charged directly in adult court. In 2016, appellant filed a motion for remand to the juvenile court and a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). Proposition 57 was passed in November 2016, and it prohibited prosecutors from charging crimes against juveniles directly in adult court.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303

Tenth Holding:

Before sentencing occurred in this matter, AB 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. These changes were effective January 1, 2023.

AB 2361 increased the burden of proof the prosecution was required to establish in order for a juvenile to be prosecuted in adult criminal court.

Under the newer heightened standard, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile should be transferred to adult criminal court.

These developments materially changed the requirements for transfer in effect when the defendant originally waived his right to a transfer hearing. AB 2361 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases.

Authority:

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416

In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284

Eleventh Holding:

A person who is eligible to have his case proceed in juvenile court may knowingly waive this statutory right. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

A criminal defendant cannot be deemed to have waived or forfeited a legal argument that was not recognized at the time of his trial. Even where a right may be waived, a waiver generally does not include protections that were not reasonably available or contemplated at the time.

The matter must be remanded to the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1620

People v. Johnson (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 123, 132 [legal counsel may waive the right to a juvenile fitness hearing for an accused who has reached adulthood]

Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464

People v. Cardenas (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1479

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48 [in a negotiated plea, waiver of right to jury trial on charged offenses does not extend to proof of aggravating circumstances when no such jury right was recognized at time of plea]

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 85 [general waiver of right to appeal from a negotiated plea agreement will not bar the appeal of sentencing errors occurring subsequent to the plea]
People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 188 [defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive right to appeal an issue not contemplated at time of waiver].

 

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000906

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court struck the one-year prior but otherwise declined to reduce the defendant’s sentence. The trial court did not apply the correct standard of law and therefore abused its discretion. We reverse the order.

First Holding:

SB 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess. amended section 667.5b) to allow courts to impose one-year prior prison term enhancements only for specified sexually violent offenses. Thereafter, SB 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made the amendment retroactive to final cases and added what is now section 1172.75.

Section 1172.75 sets forth the process for recalling sentences and resentencing. If a judgment includes a qualifying enhancement, the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed inclusive of the enhancements unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

At resentencing, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

At a hearing under section 1172.75, the resentencing court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

Third Holding:

As relevant here, SB 81 (2021–2022) effected a change in law by adding subdivision (c) to section 1385. That subdivision provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.

Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

Fourth Holding:

Section 1385(c) sets forth several mitigating circumstances for consideration. Two of them are relevant in this case. Under section 1385(c), absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice.

This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1038

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decision under section 1172.75 for abuse of discretion and ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

We similarly review a trial court’s decision not to dismiss a sentencing enhancement for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857

Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Sixth Holding:

We reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant forfeited this contention because he failed to raise it below. The defendant did not have to ask the trial court to apply the correct standard of law to preserve a claim on appeal that the trial court applied an incorrect one. Rather, a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions based on the sentencing court’s informed discretion, including one informed by the correct law. In any event, we may review any question of law involved in any ruling or order that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, even if the defendant did not object below.

(Gary note: The court proceeded to analyze the trial court’s treatment or lack thereof of facts specific to this defendant that demonstrated the abuse of discretion.)

Authority:

PEN 1259

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

Abstracts and Minutes, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000883

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct a hearing on whether to impose the ancillary costs in light of Kopp. The minute order and abstracts of judgment do not reflect the order of the court and must be corrected following that hearing.

First Holding:

At the sentencing hearing, the court did not mention, much less impose, fees under either section 1465.8 or Government Code section 70373. As for restitution fines, defense counsel requested the court consider staying any fines, and the court stated that it was striking the restitution fine and the parole revocation restitution fine, indicating that if that was found to be error on appeal, the court’s intent would be to impose the minimum $300 for both fines.

The minute order, however, reflects that the court ordered the fines in thh amount of $10,000. It then stated that the amounts were suspended. The minute order also included a court operations fee of $80 and a criminal conviction fee of $60. The abstract of judgment did not reflect the restitution fines, but did reflect the other two fees.

The judgment is controlled by the court’s oral pronouncements.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.]

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388 [The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.]

Second Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) provides, in part: “To assist in funding court operations, an assessment of forty dollars ($40) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense.” Government Code section 70373(a)(1) provides, in part: “To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, an assessment shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. The assessment shall be imposed in the amount of thirty dollars ($30) for each misdemeanor or felony.”

The trial court was required to impose these ancillary costs unless it granted defendant fee waivers. The court took neither action at the sentencing hearing. This was error.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 25-26, 29-30

Third Holding:

Although the omission of mandatory assessments may be corrected for the first time on appeal, if we were to do that, the fees would be imposed without defendant having had the opportunity to request they be waived.

Instead, we will remand the matter for the trial court to correct the minutes from the sentencing hearing and to determine whether to impose the court operations fee and the criminal conviction fee consistent with Kopp.

Authority:

People v. Castellanos (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1530

Fourth Holding:

The People did not object when the trial court struck the restitution fine and the parole revocation restitution fine.

When a party fails to object, at the time of sentencing, to a trial court’s decision regarding the imposition of restitution fines, the waiver doctrine precludes appellate relief.

The court struck the restitution fine at the sentencing hearing. Thus, to the extent the court’s minutes reflect otherwise, the minutes should be modified to strike the restitution fines.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302–303

People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000876

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the order of probation to eliminate the provision that the defendant pay the costs of mental health treatment as a condition of probation and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

We review such constitutional challenges to conditions of probation de novo.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

A court may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. In imposing such conditions, a court may require a defendant to complete a residential treatment program. A probation officer, however, may only oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders. A probation officer may not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.

Authority:

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Third Holding:

The defendant raises an argument for the first time in the reply brief. The issue is forfeited for not raising it earlier.

Authority:

People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1106

Fourth Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant who is granted probation to pay the reasonable associated costs. To do so, the court must make an inquiry and determination regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, and issue a separate order for the payment of such costs.

But the payment of such costs cannot be made a condition of probation. The record before us does not show the court inquired into the defendant’s ability to pay before including the provision that she pay these costs, or that it issued a separate order for payment of these costs. Accordingly, condition 7 must be modified to eliminate the requirement that the defenrant pay the costs of treatment associated with this condition.

Authority:

People v. Hall (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 889, 892

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

People v. Hart (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 902, 907

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000875

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse four of the five counts of evading the police under Vehicle Code section 2800.3 and remand for a new disposition order.

The minor’s constitutional challenges to the dispositional order are forfeited on appeal, and we will not consider them.

First Holding:

Dispositional orders in juvenile matters are entrusted to the discretion of the juvenile court. Failure to object to a discretionary dispositional choice forfeits the claim on appeal.

But the forfeiture rule does not apply if the disposition is unauthorized; that is, if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. In those situations, the unauthorized disposition presents a pure question of law.

The unauthorized sentence concept is a narrow exception to the general requirement that only preserved claims are reviewable on appeal. And while reviewing courts have the discretion to consider forfeited claims on appeal, they should do so rarely, keeping in mind that the forfeiture rule exists to encourage prompt detection and correction of error and to promote the state’s interest in finality of judgments.

Authority:

In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130-1131

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351, 354

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885

People v. Fisher (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 745, 751-752

In re H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 817-818

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 [the unauthorized sentence exception is designed to provide relief from forfeiture for obvious legal errors at sentencing such as a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum]

Second Holding:

Further, we disagree with the minor’s contention that his constitutional challenges to the disposition present pure legal questions. His challenges ask us to consider his self-evident lesser culpability relative to an older juvenile. But culpability determinations are for the trier of fact, not an appellate court.

Authority:

People v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 915-916

Third Holding:

Finally, the minor contends we should consider his forfeited claims because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise them. But trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise novel claims like the ones here.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [to forestall a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts can exercise their discretion to reach the merits of the claim].

In re Grinder (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 845, 871-872

People v. Foster (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 379, 385.

Fourth Holding:

We decline to exercise any discretion we might have to consider these forfeited claims because doing so (1) would be unfair to the People and the juvenile court, which had no opportunity to address the claims below, and (2) would undermine both the state’s interest in finality of judgments and litigants’ incentive to seek correction of error in the first instance.

Further, we should not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us. Accordingly, the minor’s constitutional challenges to the dispositional order are forfeited on appeal, and we will not consider them.

Authority:

In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713-714

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130-1131

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351,

Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hunter) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245, 1275, fn. 31

Fifth Holding:

Penal Code section 26 provides, in relevant part, that all persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. ….

Authority:

PEN 26

Sixth Holding:

Clear proof means clear and convincing evidence. The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact.

We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the juvenile court’s findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. In determining capacity the juvenile court must consider the child’s age, experience, and understanding.

A minor’s knowledge of his act’s wrongfulness may be inferred from the circumstances, such as the method of its commission or its concealment.

Authority:

In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 538-539

Seventh Holding:

While the language of the statute refers to knowledge of wrongfulness, the question is whether a minor appreciates the wrongfulness of their conduct. As minors approach the age of 14, they are increasingly likely to appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts.

Authority:

In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232

People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 281

In re J.E. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 309, 314

Eighth Holding:

Cases are not authority for propositions not considered.

Authority:

B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11

Ninth Holding:

Four of the five Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings must be stricken. A charge of multiple counts of violating a statute is appropriate only where the actus reus prohibited by the statute—the gravamen of the offense—has been committed more than once. A defendant may properly be convicted of multiple counts for multiple victims of a single criminal act only where the act prohibited by the statute is centrally an act of violence against the person.

Authority:

Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 349

People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159

Tenth Holding:

Vehicle Code section 2800.3 provides that whenever willful flight or attempt to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of section 2800.1 proximately causes serious bodily injury or death, the person driving the pursued vehicle shall be punished. Felony evading, as defined by the Legislature, in Vehicle Code section 2800.3, is not a crime of violence.

Under Wilkoff and Garcia there can be only one Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true finding here. Thus, four of the five Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings must be stricken.

Authority:

VEH 2800.3

Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 349

People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1163

People v. Sanchez (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 970, 973-974 [Because dispositive elements of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 can be satisfied by conduct that does not necessarily pose a high probability of death, it is not a felony inherently dangerous to human life.]

Eleventh Holding:

It is improper to raise new contentions in a reply brief. Further, appellate arguments may be deemed forfeited when they do not contain meaningful analysis and citation to supporting authority.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642-643

People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793

Twelfth Holding:

In criminal court, when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. The same principle applies in juvenile court. Since we strike four of the juvenile court’s Vehicle Code section 2800.3 true findings, a new disposition is required.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1140 [every time a ward appears for disposition, the court may consider the minor’s entire history and the order must be all encompassing]