Tag Archives: Standard of review

Defenses, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000300

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We order the protective order modified to strike [person x] as a protected person. We reject the defendant’s claim that the trial erred in not sua sponte instruction on the defense of unconsciousness.

First Holding:

Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. For purposes of the defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting. The law presumes that a person who appears to be acting in a state of consciousness is conscious. Accordingly, the burden is on a criminal defendant to produce evidence rebutting this presumption of consciousness. If a defendant produces substantial evidence that he or she was unconscious, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on the theory; the failure to do so is error. In this case, the defendant did not rebut the presumption of his consciousness, and it was therefore not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on unconsciousness sua sponte.

Authority:

PEN 26

People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417

People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 804

Second Holding:

Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent, but it is not a defense to a general intent crime. Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime. Reckless evasion of a peace officer is a specific intent crime.

Authority:

People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 805

People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899

People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 788

People v. Taylor (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1203-1206

Third Holding:

We review de novo whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury.

Authority:

People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78

Fourth Holding:

A case is not authority for propositions not considered.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480

Fifth Holding:

Where a defendant is convicted of certain defined crimes of domestic violence, the trial may issue a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. Such orders are limited to defendants convicted of crimes that qualify as domestic violence and where the protected person qualifies as a victim of said crimes. The trial court does not have authority to restrain a defendant from contacting a person who was not present during or otherwise suffered harm from the crime.

For instance, a protective order covering children who were present but asleep during a domestic violence incident was found to be improper in Lopez. With respect to the issuance of a legally authorized criminal protective order, we imply all findings necessary to support the judgment, and our review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied findings.

The record here contains no substantial evidence from which the trial court reasonably could conclude that [person x] was a victim of the crime subject to protection under section 136.2(i)(1).

Authority:

PEN 136.2,(i)(1)

People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237

People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648

People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 217

People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 212 [absent evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that appellant had harmed or attempted to harm two children, the court lacked authority to issue the no-contact protective order as to the children]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000298

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although a trial court has broad discretion in imposing terms and conditions when sentencing a criminal defendant to probation instead of imprisonment, any conditions imposed must have some relationship to the crime and be designed to prevent future criminality. In this case, one of the probation conditions imposed required defendant to participate in mental health and substance abuse testing and treatment. Not only was this unconnected to the underlying crime, any suggestion in the probation and sentencing report that defendant suffered from mental health or substance abuse issues was wholly unsupported. Therefore, that probation condition must be stricken.

Holding:

A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. But such discretion is not unlimited: A condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. A probation condition will be upheld unless all of the following are true: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. We review a challenge to the conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000296

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and that conviction must be reversed. We also conclude the court’s use of the pre-AB 333 pattern jury instruction was prejudicial. This requires reversal of the gang enhancements, the substantive gang offense (count 7), and the related section 12022.53(d) and (e)(1) gang related firearm use enhancements.

First Holding:

Attempted voluntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to kill the named victim, although the intent is mitigated by heat of passion or imperfect self-defense.

Authority:

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583

Second Holding:

The jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime. When the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime under a single count, either the prosecution must elect the act relied upon or the court must instruct the jury to agree on the same criminal act. The unanimity instruction exists to prevent jurors from convicting a defendant based on different instances of conduct, thereby ensuring all 12 jurors are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same act constituted the offense. A unanimity instruction is required when the record shows evidence of more than one crime that could support conviction under a single count. But if the evidence shows only a single discrete crime, no instruction is necessary.

Authority:

People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142

People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132

People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877

People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569

People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 727

People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281

Third Holding:

Determining whether a particular instruction was required presents a predominantly legal mixed question of law and fact. We therefore review claims of instructional error de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568

People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579

People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569

Fourth Holding:

In a criminal case, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case. The correctness of jury instructions is determined by considering the charge as a whole, not by viewing individual instructions in isolation.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953

People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192

Fifth Holding:

To determine whether the trial court properly instructed on the kill zone theory, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. Under this standard, the question is whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant intended to kill everyone within the zone of harm as a means of killing the primary target.

Authority:

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 193, 203 [Without substantial evidence showing the defendant acted with intent to kill a primary target, the essential basis for a concurrent intent analysis is not satisfied]

Sixth Holding:

The standard for assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is highly deferential. We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In conducting our review, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. We also accept all logical inferences the trial court could have drawn from circumstantial evidence. The question is not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s finding. The judgment must be upheld unless it appears that, under no hypothesis whatsoever, is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.

Authority:

People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507-508

People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849 [we resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the judgment, and all conflicting evidence will be resolved in favor of the decision]

People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919, superseded by statute on other grounds

People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411

People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139

People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 329

Seventh Holding:

The jury was instructed on the gang participation law as it existed at the time of trial. Because subsequent amendments under AB 333 changed the elements considerably and the defendant’s judgment is not final, the gang-related convictions must be retried under the new law.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 394

People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 610

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000295

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There are two defendants, both convicted of murder and other matters. We reverse all counts of the conviction of Defendant A because of instructional error. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the other errors urged by Defendant A. As to Defendant B, we reverse the conviction on the firearm offenses because of instructional error, and agree that the jury’s true findings on gang enhancements and related gang-related firearm enhancements must be vacatedand remanded because of changes in the law of gang criminal activity.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion is 70 pages long and goes into extensive discussion of the elements of murder. The reversals were based on the absence of proper jury instructions. I have chosen to summarize only a few of the pronouncements in the opinion rather than present a treatise on the elements of murder. I will, however, send the opinion to attorneys on request.]

First Holding:

Due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the meanings of “willfully,” “deliberately,” and “with premeditation,” or with the instructions describing aider and abettor liability for murder, Defendant A’s conviction for first degree murder requires reversal.

To be guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, the jury must be instructed that a person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.

Authority:

People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561

Second Holding:

We evaluate the failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense for prejudice under Chapman. Under this standard, we must reverse the conviction unless after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 642

People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607

Third Holding:

We review a claim of instructional error de novo. Review of the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law. Generally, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the evidence and that are necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case. It also has a duty to refrain from giving incorrect instructions or instructions on principles of law that are irrelevant and that would have the effect of confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on the relevant issues. The trial court’s duty in this regard extends to lesser included offenses that find substantial support in the evidence. In determining the correctness of jury instructions, we consider the entire charge of the court, in light of the trial record.

Authority:

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, 584

People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 798-799

People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 388–389

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162

People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 926

Fourth Holding:

An erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense requires reversal of a conviction if, taking into account the entire record, it appears reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred. In a noncapital case, a failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser necessarily included offense that is supported by the evidence is state law error that we review for prejudice under Watson. Under Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error. We also consider the instructions as a whole, the jury’s findings, and the closing arguments of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 169, 178

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 716

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955

People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 831

Fifth Holding:

We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review. When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.

Authority:

People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088

People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028

Sixth Holding:

AB 333 amended section 186.22, by, among other things, modifying the definitions of “pattern of criminal activity” and “criminal street gang,” as well as clarifying what is required to establish that an offense benefits, promotes, furthers, or assists a criminal street gang. Section 186.22 now requires proof of the following additional requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses must have commonly benefited a criminal street gang where the common benefit is more than reputational; (2) the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang members, as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense cannot be used as a predicate offense.

To benefit, promote, further, or assist means to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.

Authority:

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 345

Seventh Holding:

Because the changes to the criminal street gang statute in AB 333 are ameliorative,those changes apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions are not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

Discretion, Standard of review

Case: 000294

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion when it found the defendant unsuitable for mental health diversion despite acknowledging he did not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike.”

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Second Holding:

A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Third Holding:

A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. A trial court further abuses its discretion if its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377

Fourth Holding:

A defendant is suitable for mental health diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(1)-(4)

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Fifth Holding:

Under section 1170.18, an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a “super strike,” which includes any homicide or attempted homicide offense, any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death, and sexually violent offenses.

Authority:

PEN 1170.18(c)

PEN 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)

Sixth Holding:

A trial court may not deny diversion to an otherwise eligible defendant unless it finds the defendant is likely to commit one of these offenses. In making this determination, the trial court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450

Seventh Holding:

The trial court found defendant unsuitable for mental health diversion despite acknowledging that he was not likely to commit a super strike offense. That acknowledgment was reasonable, given that defendant had never previously been convicted of a super strike offense and was not charged with a super strike in the underlying cases. Under the circumstances, there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion defendant was likely to commit a super strike.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 897

Eighth Holding:

To the extent the trial court was relying on defendant’s history of noncompliance with medication, self-medicating with methamphetamine, his unwillingness to obey court orders, and probation violations, this was also an error. None of these past personal flaws is a reason that the Legislature has identified as valid for denying mental health diversion. Further, none of these reasons is consistent with the underlying purpose of the mental health diversion statute, namely to provide treatment to break the cycle of criminal recidivism for those with diagnosed disorders. Given that the court’s rationale failed to justify its decision to deny defendant mental health diversion, we must vacate the trial court’s orders.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 897 [expanding the reasons to deny diversion is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the mental health diversion statute]E

 

Amelioration, Discretion, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000292

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this appeal following resentencing under section 1172.75, the abstract of judgment must be amended to accurately reflect his actual custody credits, and several fines and fees must be reduced or vacated.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75(a) invalidated sentence enhancements imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5. With exceptions not relevant here, the statute requires that sentences that include these invalid enhancements be recalled and the defendant resentenced.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion. Section 1172.75(d), vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

Third Holding:

An appellate court may not substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court. The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s decision. Unless that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the decision, even if it might have ruled differentlyin the first instance.

Authority:

People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment reflects credit for time served but reflects 326 fewer days than the defendant is entitled to. It must be corrected to reflect the correct number of days.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [defendant entitled to all actual custody days since arrest, including date of resentencing]

Fifth Holding:

The trial court imposed a $30 criminal conviction fee on each count pursuant to Government Code section 70373. It also imposed a court operation fee of $40 per count pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). However, Government Code section 70373 only applies to convictions after the statute’s January 1, 2009 effective date. Similarly, the court operations fee is only applicable to convictions after the statute’s 2003 operative date. Because the defendant suffered the convictions in 1995, the criminal conviction and court operations fees must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, 1000

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753, 754

Sixth Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago. Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066

SeventhHolding:

The parole revocation fine must be reduced from $300 to $200. At the resentencing hearing, the court imposed a $300 restitution fine and imposed and stayed a $300 parole revocation fine. However, because the trial court originally imposed a $200 restitution fine, and the court may not impose a more severe punishment on resentencing, we agree with the parties that the stayed parole revocation fine must be reduced to $200, matching the originally imposed restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Pleading, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000291

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This was a People’s appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion under section 995 to set aside counts and enhancements in the information that the magistrate found insufficient evidence to support at the preliminary hearing. Grant of section 995 motion affirmed.

[GARY NOTE: This opinion went into depth analyzing the sufficiency of evidence on the question of gang common benefit and whether the members collectively engaged in the pattern of criminal gang activity that the statute requires. It discussed several published cases as example that guided its decision. I have not included the discussion or the cases cited, as that depth is beyond the scope of this blog. I’m happy to provide the full opinion to any attorney who asks me for it.]

First Holding:

Under section 995, an information will be set aside if the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable cause. To establish probable cause sufficient to withstand a section 995 motion to dismiss, the People must make some showing as to the existence of each element of the charged offense. Reasonable or probable cause’ means such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. Probable cause signifies a level of proof below that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The showing required at this stage is exceedingly low, and an information should be set aside only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a necessary element of the offense charged.

Authority:

Hale v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 268, 271 [a defendant may utilize section 995 to strike invalid enhancement allegations]

People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 545

People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473

People v. Superior Court (Mendez) (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 268, 276

People v. Garcia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 864, 870–871

Second Holding:

When we review a section 995 motion, we disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate. We must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the information and decide whether there is probable cause to hold the defendants to answer, i.e., whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt.

Authority:

People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 654 [reviewing denial of sec. 995 motion made after magistrate struck special circumstance allegation]

Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072

Third Holding:

As here with respect to the gang evidence presented by the prosecution, where the facts are undisputed, the determination of probable cause constitutes a legal conclusion which is subject to independent review on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 315, 326

People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 582 [independent standard of review applies when magistrate determines that the People did not put forth sufficient evidence to support the charges]

Fourth Holding:

Not every crime committed by gang members is related to a gang. Concerned with lax interpretations of the prior gang law that allowed for overly expansive application of gang enhancements, the Legislature amended section 186.22 effective January 1, 2022. The amendments to section 186.22 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang and increased the prosecution’s burden of proof by altering the definition of a criminal street gang and instituting new requirements to prove that a criminal street gang engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Authority:

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 744

People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 961, fn. 6

Fifth Holding:

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence that a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion that gang’s predicate offenses were either committed for the gang’s common benefit or that the gang members collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity as defined under section 186.22. Finding insufficient evidence that the gang meets the definition of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, we discern no error in the trial court’s partial grant of the section 995 motion as to the gang enhancements and gang related firearm enhancements as to all defendants.

Authority:

Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000287

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the $200 restitution fine pursuant to section 1465.9(d).

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. If the language of the statute contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. The 10-year period starts with the original imposition of the fine and does not restart on resentencing. We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354

People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 13

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601 review granted 3/11/2026 (S295038)

Duty of counsel, Effective assistance of counsel, Pleading, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000280

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

As to one of the counts the trial court improperly imposed an upper term sentence. The aggravating facts were found true by the judge rather than by the jury. Thus, we shall vacate the upper term sentence. On remand, the People may elect to retry the aggravating facts; if not, the court may proceed to resentencing.

First Holding:

The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Trial on the circumstances in aggravation alleged in the indictment or information shall be bifurcated from the trial of charges and enhancements. The jury shall not be informed of the bifurcated allegations until there has been a conviction of a felony offense.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

When a trial court imposes an upper term sentence by relying on aggravating facts not proven in compliance with section 1170(b)(2), the sentence must be vacated, and the matter must be remanded for resentencing unless the reviewing court finds that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 744–775

Third Holding:

In this case there was a jury trial, but the aggravating facts were not alleged in the information, they were not found true by the jury, and they were not stipulated to by the defendant. The error was prejudicial under the federal constitutional standard of review. Therefore, we must vacate the upper term sentence as to count six and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Fourth Holding:

The People argue that the defendant forfeited this claim because he did not object to the error during the sentencing hearing. We agree that the defendant has forfeited this claim. However, we will exercise our discretion and not apply the forfeiture rule because it will have the effect of converting an appellate issue into a habeas corpus claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to preserve the question by timely objection.

Authority:

People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1128

Duty of counsel, Effective assistance of counsel, Evidence, Standard of review

Case: 000279

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find merit in the defendant’s claim of prejudicially ineffective assistance with respect to the court’s admission of the law enforcement witness testimony, and therefore reverse.

First Holding:

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion.

Authority:

EVID 353

People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [a defendant forfeits an argument on appeal where [s]he fails to object at all to the evidence in the trial court or when [s]he objects on substantively distinct grounds]

People v. Wilson (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1030 [defendant forfeited claim of prosecutor misconduct in closing argument, including based on an asserted violation of the Racial Justice Act, by failing to assign misconduct and request a jury admonishment]

Second Holding:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Authority:

People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694

Third Holding:

In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we exercise deferential scrutiny. The appellant must affirmatively show counsel’s deficiency involved a crucial issue and cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics. We presume counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that his or her actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. When the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, defendant must show that there was no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s act or omission.

Authority:

People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332, 351

People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679

People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198

Fourth Holding:

An attorney may choose not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 609-610

People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 48 [counsel’s decision not to object is generally a matter of trial tactics]

Fifth Holding:

This is the rare case where there is no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to object to the testimony of the two police officers concerning whether a drug exchange took place and the defendant’s involvement. Opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt.

[GARY NOTE: the balance of this issue was very fact-dependent, with the court implicitly finding that there could have been no legitimate tactical reason for the attorney to not object to the testimony.]

Authority:

People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77

People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47

People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 820, 827-829

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 61 [trial court properly excluded proposed expert testimony that certain wounds were accidental and essentially that the defendant lacked the required intent, which was tantamount to expressing an opinion as to defendant’s guilt because it proposed to dispose of an essential element of the crime]

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000274

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the section 1172.6 petition for recall of sentence based on its conclusion that the defendant was ineligible for relief because there was substantial evidence that he was convicted on a still-valid theory of murder.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As part of these ameliorative changes, malice, a key element the People must prove in a murder prosecution, may no longer be imputed to a defendant solely because the defendant participated in another crime. Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.

Authority:

SB 1437

PC 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 967

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Second Holding:

The trial court used an incorrect legal standard to deny the petition at the prima facie stage. The court erred by applying the substantial evidence standard in concluding defendant was ineligible for relief. The statute does not permit a court to deny a petition at the prima facie stage based on a determination that substantial evidence shows defendant is ineligible for relief. Instead, at this stage, the defendant need only make a prima facie case for relief. In this inquiry, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

Third Holding:

Should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000273

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to impose the upper term based on its own conclusion that the defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness, where there was no waiver of a jury or stipulation by the defendant. Defendant was not advised of his right to a jury trial on the aggravating facts, nor did he explicitly waive his right to jury trial on those aggravating facts. The trial court erred in imposing an upper term sentence in the absence of such a waiver.

First Holding:

The trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. This jury trial right is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence. A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Second Holding:

A sentencing judge may only use the information in the record of conviction for the limited function of determining the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense. A determination that defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them. Thus, defendant was entitled to a jury determination on this aggravating factor.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1081-1083

Third Holding:

Defendant must personally waive the right to a jury trial in open court. The waiver must be explicit and will not be implied from a defendant’s conduct. Therefore, a defendant’s failure to object also would not preclude his asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 16

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46