Tag Archives: Standard of review

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000899

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The electronic-data conditions are unreasonable under People v. Lent. We therefore strike them and remand for the juvenile court to consider whether to impose revised conditions. We also agree with the parties that the association condition should be modified to include a knowledge requirement.

First Holding:

When a ward of the juvenile court is placed on probation, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward, including conditions of probation that (1) are individually tailored, developmentally appropriate, and reasonable; (2) impose a burden that is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the conditions; and (3) are determined by the court to be fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. A condition of probation that is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Second Holding:

We review conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. To determine whether a probation condition is reasonable, we apply a three-part test under Lent.

A condition cannot be held invalid under Lent unless it meets all three of the following prongs: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not related to future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118-1119

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Third Holding:

In addition to being reasonable, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, or else it is void for vagueness. And when a probation condition imposes limitations on a probationer’s constitutional rights, it must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition—the person’s reformation and rehabilitation—to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Fourth Holding:

Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

Authority:

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 661

Fifth Holding:

We conclude that the conditions are invalid under Lent. As to the first prong of Lent, there is no question that restricting the use of electronics The minor’s conduct involved asking the victim for her phone number, and asked the victim to put his number in her phone contacts list–which she did, but later deleted it. These acts do not establish the requisite relationship between the challenged probation conditions and the minor’s offense (sexual battery by restraint). Generally, decisions finding a sufficient connection between electronics search conditions and an offense rely on the probationer’s use of electronic devices to facilitate the offense.

In Appleton, the defendant met the minor victim online and later sexually assaulted him. The Court of Appeal held that the nexus between the offense and the probation condition at issue was sufficient even though it was somewhat attenuated. In Flores, the Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the condition at issue and the defendant’s drug offense because the defendant used a website and an online program to arrange drug sales through a disguised phone number. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that electronic devices played any role in facilitating the offense.

Here, in contrast, there is no indication that the minor ever actually contacted the victim through an electronic device. Indeed, he did not even have the ability to do so, as he never obtained her contact information. Nor is there any evidence that the victim attempted to communicate with the minor after the offense. The first two prongs of Lent have been met–the condition has no relation to the criminal conduct, and it restrains otherwise lawful conduct.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720

People v. Flores (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 563, 565-566, 573

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Sixth Holding:

The third prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. Thus, the mere fact that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct is insufficient to justify a broad electronics search condition. The electronic-data conditions burden the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the claimed purposes of ensuring compliance with two of his other probation conditions (a no-contact order and prohibition from possessing sexual materials).

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 and fn 4

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 567-568

Seventh Holding:

The court ordered the following probation condition: “The Minor shall not associate with minors under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless in the presence of a responsible adult, or associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad if it (1) impinges on constitutional rights, and (2) is not tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the probationer’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

The restriction is not unreasonable, but it must be tailored to require the minor’s express knowledge that the minor is under the age of 14. Generally speaking, if a probation condition prohibits a probationer from associating with a certain group of people, the condition is unconstitutionally vague unless it also requires that the probationer know a given person is in that group. Here, the minor may not reasonably know that an individual is under 14 years of age.

Thus, we modify the association condition to read: “The Minor shall not associate with minors whom he knows or reasonably should know are under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless he is in the presence of a responsible adult, or unless the associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

Authority:

People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

People v. Bray (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 494, 503

People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 [modifying condition prohibiting association with people under age 18].

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000890

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors that were not presented to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) provides that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

Rule 4.421 of the California Rules of Court provides a list of aggravating circumstances that must be stipulated to by the defendant or determined beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Notwithstanding section 1170(b)(1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2) and (3)

Rules of Court, rule 4.421

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748, 759-760

Second Holding:

These provisions are subject to constitutional limitations under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

For example, the Wiley court held that the defendant was entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence.

Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution, a judge may do no more than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence. If those facts are properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise its discretion under section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1085-1086

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838

Third Holding:

A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors, provided he does so personally and expressly. To be valid, the record must show the defendant’s waivers of the right to a jury are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In making such a determination, we examine the totality of the circumstances unique to each case.

In this case, we determine that the colloquy between the court and the defendant did not adequately inform him of what the aggravating factors were. Without a clear explanation that defendant was entitled to have a jury decide the truth of the specific aggravating factors that the court intended to use against him, or even notice of those aggravating factors, it cannot be said that he knowingly or intelligently waived his right to have a jury decide the truth of those specific aggravating factors, of which he was never made aware.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 308

People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166

People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 990, 991 [a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent]

Fourth Holding:

Because defendant was deprived of a jury trial on the aggravating facts used to justify imposition of the upper term sentence, and there was no knowing or intelligent waiver, we must determine whether he was prejudiced by that error under the Chapman standard.

(Gary note: the court then reviewed the specific facts of the defendant’s criminal record and performance on probation or parole, details of which are case specific and would not add to this summary of an unpublished opinion that cannot be cited.)

Since we cannot conclude the lack of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify the upper term sentence, defendant is entitled to a reversal and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000888

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. There could be no rational tactical reason for defense counsel to concede that the defendant was ineligible.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature amended the definition of felony murder in section 189 to restrict culpability for murder to actual killers, aiders and abettors, and anyone who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life unless the victim was a peace officer.

At the same time, the Legislature added section 1170.95, later renumbered to section 1172.6, which allows a person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, to file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts, if, among other things, the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder because of the changes to the law wrought by SB 1437. I

f the petition makes a prima facie case for relief the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. At this hearing, the People have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under the law as it exists now, with the trial judge sitting as factfinder.

Authority:

PEN 189

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

When conducting a prima facie review, the court takes the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

If the record of conviction does not conclusively demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent to be convicted on a theory of murder that remains valid, denying relief at the prima facie stage is improper.

A preliminary hearing transcript is part of the record of conviction for these purposes, and courts may rely on them when reviewing petitions at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975

People v. Barboza (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 955, 965-966

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 568 [there is no dispute that the record of conviction the parties may consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.]

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision at the prima facie stage de novo. Reviewing de novo, we therefore find that the defendant established a prima facie case for relief, and the trial court should not have denied his petition for failing to do so.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Fourth Holding:

At the hearing, the defendant’s counsel stated that he was appointed to determine eligibility pursuant to 1172.6, and concluded the defendant was not eligible.

The defendant’s counsel cited cases involving defendants who made a prima facie showing for the proposition that a guilty plea is a judicial admission. That it’s an admission that he was, in fact, the killer, and therefore the defendant could not state a prima facie case for relief. Based on this, the court summarily denied the defndant’s petition.

Contrary to the court’s and counsel’s understanding below, a guilty plea (without more) is not an admission to any particular theory of guilt, and therefore cannot render a defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

Moreover, the record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, does not contain any facts definitively foreclosing the defendant’s eligibility for relief. It is undisputed that the defendant was not the sole participant in either the burglary or murder of the victim.

Nor is there any clear evidence the defendant was the actual killer—indeed, the only evidence presented suggests that the co-defendant, not not the defendant, was the actual killer.

Authority:

People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977 [By pleading guilty, the defendant admitted every element of the charged offense but the defendant did not admit facts supporting liability on any particular theory. Accordingly, the guilty plea did not constitute an admission that the defendant acted with malice.]

Fifth Holding:

The People assert the doctrine of invited error. The doctrine of invited error is an application of the estoppel principle and applies when a party invites the court or the jury to commit error.

Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. It is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.

However, for the doctrine to apply, it must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake. In order to apply the doctrine, the record must show only that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice, it need not additionally show counsel correctly understood all the legal implications of the tactical choice.

In other words, the invited error doctrine applies so long as counsel made a conscious, tactical choice even if such choice was based on a misunderstanding of the law.  We conclude that on this record defense counsel’s decision to concede that the defendant is ineligible for relief was not a deliberate tactical choice.

Put simply, there was no possible tactical purpose for counsel’s decision to concede the matter. The defendant did not stand to receive any possible benefit from this concession, and therefore the decision to concede could only have been a genuine mistake.

Authority:

People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1072

Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 83

People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 970

People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 658

Sixth Holding:

Even if the invited error doctrine did apply, we would still reach the merits.

Because a deliberate tactical choice by counsel may be an incompetent one, courts have recognized that defendants barred from raising error under the invited error doctrine may instead claim they received ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, courts may also address the merits of an otherwise procedurally barred claim in order to avert any claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. T

hus, even if we concluded the defendant had invited the error he now complains of, we would exercise our discretion to reach the merits anyway to avoid the same result obtaining through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

We reverse the order denying the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition and remand. On remand, we direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause and to conduct further proceedings as required under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610,

People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000886

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

1n 1991, for a crime committed in 1989, the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). When his case came up for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2025, the court believed its only discretion was to impose less than the upper term on the determinate portion of his sentence. Defense counsel agreed. This was error. The court also erred in its calculation of credit for time served. And the restitution fine must be struck.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required trial courts to impose a sentence enhancement of one additional year for each of a defendant’s prior prison or jail terms. Section 1172.75(a) now provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b) is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(b) and (c) mandate that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identify eligible individuals whose sentences include now-invalidated section 667.5 enhancements, and that the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

While conducting the resentencing, section 1172.75(d)(2), provides the express instruction that the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

Section 190.2(a) provides that where there has been a finding of certain enumerated special circumstances in connection with a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder, the penalty is death or LWOP. Section 1385 previously provided the trial court with the discretion to strike or dismiss the special circumstances.

Although the statute only authorizes such relief upon motion of the court or application of the prosecution, the defendant nevertheless has the right to invite the court to exercise its power by an application to strike a count.

Failure by a defendant to make such a request under section 1385 results in forfeiture of the issue. In the interests of justice, and in consideration of defendant’s alternative argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

PEN 1385

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141, 1144

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

Third Holding:

Contrary to Section 1385, however, section 1385.1 provides that a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive. The section was enacted as of June 6, 1990, via voter initiative Proposition 115. The dispute here centers around whether section 1385.1 serves as a bar to the trial court’s discretion to strike section 190.2 special circumstances when the court is resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 for a pre-June 6, 1990, crime.

Authority:

PEN 1385.1

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Fourth Holding:

Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. However, defendant argues pursuant to McDavid that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion when it failed to strike his special circumstances because it was unaware that it had any discretion to do so.

We therefore examine whether the trial court had any discretion in this regard, which is a question of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.

Authority:

People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023

Fifth Holding:

The Nguyen court noted that section 1385.1 operates only prospectively, therefore, a trial court may dismiss a special circumstance allegation attached to any murders committed before June 6, 1990, the date that section 1385.1 became effective. Nguyen specifically relied upon Tapia.

In Tapia, Proposition 115 took effect while the defendant was in the process of being prosecuted for first degree murder. The defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to conduct voir dire pursuant to the new Proposition 115 procedures.

In examining whether Proposition 115’s provisions could be applied to crimes committed prior to its effective date after consideration of ex post facto concerns, the Supreme Court separated the provisions into four separate categories depending on their impact upon defendants.

Relevant to this inquiry, the high court expressly categorized section 1385.1 as falling within the category of provisions that change the legal consequences of criminal behavior to the detriment of defendants and therefore cannot be applied to crimes committed before the measure’s effective date.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286-287, 297

Sixth Holding:

The mandate in section 1172.75(d)(2), that the trial court apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” evidences a legislative intent that defendants are to be treated with more leniency, not less, when being resentenced pursuant to this statute. Because the trial court clearly expressed more than once its belief that it did not have any discretion with respect to the LWOP sentence on Count 1, we deem the court to have abused its discretion and reverse.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023 [A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.]

Seventh Holding:

The court court failed to award the defendant 2 days of credit for time served, and we modify the judgment accordingly.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority, but it seems obvious that the court has the power to modify the credit for time served to the correct number. I have cited authority the court could have relied on. The issue does not seem so much a matter of the trial court refusing to award credit; rather, it was a mathematical error. I speculate that perhaps the court did not award credit for the first day in custody. Counting days is different than determining the number of days between dates. From January 1 through January 31 is 31 days, counting. But if you subtract January 1 from January 31, you will realize only 30 days.  For credit for time served, the correct number is the counting number–31 in my example.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Eighth Holding:

As part of defendant’s original 1991 sentencing, the court ordered him to pay $10,000 to the state Restitution Fund pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 (formerly Govt. Code sec. 13967(a).) In light of section 1465.9, which compels that restitution fines older than 10 years be vacated, we vacate that fine. In Salstrom, the court determined that the reference to 10 years is from the date the restitution fine was originally ordered.

Resentencing does not reset the 10-year limitation. Applying section 1465.9 to reduce defendant’s sentence as part of a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing gives effect to both statutes.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652-653 [detailing the history of the restitution statutes]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601, review granted on unrelated issues, March 11, 2026, S295038

Mejia v. Reed (2000) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 [when two codes are to be construed, they must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof]

Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case 000884

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage on the ground that the record of conviction showed the defendant is ineligible for resentencing. The trial court exceeded the limited scope of review permitted at the prima facie stage under section 1172.6 and engaged in fact finding that should have been reserved for the evidentiary stage.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.6 the prima facie inquiry is limited. While a court may consider whether the record of conviction refutes eligibility allegations at this stage, a trial court should not engage in fact finding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. Indeed, at the prima facie stage, the strength of the evidence in the record is not material.

Instead, at the prima facie stage the question in applying section 1172.6 is not whether it is likely that the defendant was convicted of murder on a now-invalid grounds but whether the court’s jury instructions or other aspect of the record of conviction foreclose that possibility that possibility as a matter of law.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562, 564, 567 fn. 10

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470

Second Holding:

Although the verdict and jury instructions on the special circumstance found true by the jury showed that two of the three requirements for direct aiding and abetting liability were satisfied, the record of conviction did not show that the final requirement was satisfied and, thus, did not establish direct aiding and abetting liability as a matter of law.

In addition, while the special circumstance finding suggests that the jury found the defendant guilty of murder based on direct aiding and abetting, which remains a valid theory, it is possible that the jury found him guilty based on conspiracy and a natural and probable consequences theory, which is now invalid.

Under the strict test that the Supreme Court has interpreted section 1172.6 to impose, the record of conviction does not conclusively refute the defendant’s allegations that he was convicted of a now-invalid theory of murder, and the trial court should have proceeded beyond the prima facie stage to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether in fact he was convicted based on a now-invalid theory.

Authority:

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470

Third Holding:

We review trial court orders at the prima facie stage de novo.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Fourth Holding:

in determining whether a prima facie case has been shown, trial courts may examine jury instructions, the verdict, and other parts of the record of conviction to determine whether that record refutes the petition’s allegations. But at the prima facia stage, hearing transcripts may not be used to prove disputed facts. If the record of conviction contains facts refuting the allegations in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner. However, the record of conviction must establish conclusively such facts.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 568

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Fifth Holding:

To establish liability for murder under the theory of direct aiding and abetting, the prosecution must show that the defendant [1] aided or encouraged the commission of the murder [2] with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [3] with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission. The trial court’s special circumstance finding established only two of these requirements.

Authority:

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 466