Case 000890

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors that were not presented to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) provides that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

Rule 4.421 of the California Rules of Court provides a list of aggravating circumstances that must be stipulated to by the defendant or determined beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Notwithstanding section 1170(b)(1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2) and (3)

Rules of Court, rule 4.421

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748, 759-760

Second Holding:

These provisions are subject to constitutional limitations under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

For example, the Wiley court held that the defendant was entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence.

Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution, a judge may do no more than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence. If those facts are properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise its discretion under section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1085-1086

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838

Third Holding:

A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors, provided he does so personally and expressly. To be valid, the record must show the defendant’s waivers of the right to a jury are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In making such a determination, we examine the totality of the circumstances unique to each case.

In this case, we determine that the colloquy between the court and the defendant did not adequately inform him of what the aggravating factors were. Without a clear explanation that defendant was entitled to have a jury decide the truth of the specific aggravating factors that the court intended to use against him, or even notice of those aggravating factors, it cannot be said that he knowingly or intelligently waived his right to have a jury decide the truth of those specific aggravating factors, of which he was never made aware.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 308

People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166

People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 990, 991 [a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent]

Fourth Holding:

Because defendant was deprived of a jury trial on the aggravating facts used to justify imposition of the upper term sentence, and there was no knowing or intelligent waiver, we must determine whether he was prejudiced by that error under the Chapman standard.

(Gary note: the court then reviewed the specific facts of the defendant’s criminal record and performance on probation or parole, details of which are case specific and would not add to this summary of an unpublished opinion that cannot be cited.)

Since we cannot conclude the lack of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify the upper term sentence, defendant is entitled to a reversal and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775