Tag Archives: Elements of crime

Case 000577

Error and/or relief

The conviction of section 270 must be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This determination presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. In considering a sufficiency challenge, we do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.

Authority:

People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

Second Holding:

Section 270 (failure to provide necessities to a minor child) states that violation is a misdemeanor unless a court of competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication in either a civil or a criminal action that a person is the parent of a minor child and the person has notice of such adjudication. While felony punishment can be imposed constitutionally on persons previously found guilty of a violation of section 270, the statute violates equal protection to the extent felony punishment is grounded solely on an earlier legal determination of paternity.

Authority:

PEN 270

People v. Gregori (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 353, 356

Case 000576

Error and/or relief

Though we find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the abstract of judgment contains errors that must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment. The search condition should be modified to delete the requirement that the defendant subject her computers and recordable media to searches; (2) the alcohol conditions should be deleted; and (3) the total fines should be reduced from $1,260 to $740.

[Gary note: there was no legal analysis presented on the probation conditions issues, because the People agreed they were improper, and the court accepted the concession without further discussion or citation to authority.]

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment contains errors that must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment. The search condition should be modified to delete the requirement that the defendant subject her computers and recordable media to searches; (2) the alcohol conditions should be deleted; and (3) the total fines should be reduced from $1,260 to $740.

[GARY note: the appellate court did not cite authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment, but there is considerable authority that the court could have relied on, which I set forth below:]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, we consider only the evidence presented and we disregard the jury’s not guilty or not true findings on other counts or enhancements.

Authority:

Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319

People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578

People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 452–453

People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 405–406

Third Holding:

Great bodily injury under section 245 is defined as an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm. A fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description. Where to draw that line is for the jury to decide. Great bodily injury can include contusions, abrasions, lacerations, and bruising.

The use of hands or fist alone has been held sufficient to support a conviction of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Whether a fist used in striking a person would be likely to cause great bodily injury is to be determined by the force of the impact, the manner in which it was used and the circumstances under which force was applied.

Whether the force used by the defendant was likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for the trier of fact to decide. In this context, likely to produce great bodily injury means more than a mere possibility. The evidence must prove more than a mere possibility that the force actually used would result in greater than moderate harm.

Authority:

People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702

People v. Sandoval (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 357, 361 [noting that great bodily injury is significant or substantial physical injury that is more than minor or moderate]

People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64

People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 752

People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 464

People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 176

People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 527-528

People v. Thiel (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1213

In re Nirran W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1161–1162 [rejecting defendant’s argument that one blow to the face of the victim could not have been likely to cause great bodily injury]

People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028 [the statute focuses on force likely to produce great bodily injury; whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial]

Case 000572

Error and/or relief

The gang and gang-related firearm enhancements must be vacated in light of the amendments under AB 333.

First Holding:

AB 333, which amended section 186.22, was enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022. The amendments AB 333 made to section 186.22 apply retroactively to the defendant’s case. The substantive amendments to section 186.22 require us to vacate the jury’s findings on the gang allegations and gang-related firearm allegations. We remand the matter to afford the prosecution the opportunity to retry these allegations, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

AB 333 added new elements to the substantive gang offense and gang enhancements in section 186.22—for example, by requiring proof that gang members collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses were committed by gang members, that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying offenses provided more than a reputational benefit to the gang. These changes had the effect of increasing the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Third Holding:

When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error. On this record, reversal of the gang enhancements is required, and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to establish the additional elements on remand, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275, 280

Fourth Holding:

In addition to amending section 186.22, AB 333 added section 1109, which requires that the trial of a gang enhancement charged under section 186.22(b), be bifurcated from and follow trial of the underlying offenses when requested by the defendant. AB 333’s enactment of section 1109 became effective almost two years after defendant’s trial. But section 1109 is not retroactive and therefore does not apply.

Authority:

PEN 1109

People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129 [disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, at p. 31]

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

Fifth Holding:

The same rationale applies to the jury’s findings on the section 12022.53(e)(1) firearm allegations, which require findings under section 186.22(b). Section 12022.53(e)(1) provides for enhanced firearm penalties for any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if the prosecution pleads and proves that (1) the person violated section 186.22(b), and (2) any principal in the offense committed a firearm violation specified in section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d).

Here, the jury found three section 12022.53(e)(1) allegations true as to the defendant. Because this enhancement depends on a finding pursuant to section 186.22(b), the changes to section 186.22 made by AB 333 require that the true findings on these allegations also be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(e)(1)

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346-348

Case 000561

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of child endangerment where the child was not near the endangering activity (an insecure location where a firearm was stored in the home).

First Holding:

We generally review allegedly improper jury instructions de novo. Resulting error is reviewed under either Chapman, which requires the prosecution to show federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or under the less strenuous standard of Watson, which requires the defendant to demonstrate the reasonable probability of a more favorable result and generally applies to state-law errors. An instructional error involving a single element will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances, such as where the element was undisputed, the defense was not prevented from contesting the omitted element, and overwhelming evidence supports the omitted element.

Authority:

People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 828

Second Holding:

In evaluating a claim that a conviction lacks sufficient evidence, we review the whole record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Such evidence can include not only circumstantial evidence, but also all reasonable inferences drawn from it. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, but we neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

Authority:

People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1019

People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 286

People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206

Third Holding:

Failing to deny children access to a loaded firearm is sufficient to constitute circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm and death.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 91

Case 000558

Error and/or relief

The restitution amount is wrong, and the protective order is unauthorized.

First Holding:

Appellant contends changes to section 1001.36 that went into effect after she was denied pretrial diversion apply to her case. We agree. Appellant further contends this matter should be conditionally reversed and remanded so the trial court can exercise its discretion to determine her motion for pretrial diversion in light of the amendment. We disagree.

Appellant has forfeited this claim. Frahs, decided in 2020, made clear that recently enacted section 1001.36 applied in nonfinal cases. Thus, when the law was amended effective January 1, 2023, appellant should have known the amendments applied retroactively. Once the law was amended, appellant had more than three months before she pled and more than seven months before she was sentenced to seek reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of diversion. She did not.

Authority:

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631-632

People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 6

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 128 [failure to seek reconsideration excused where amendment to statute effective after entry of plea but only 10 days before sentencing]

Second Holding:

In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of such deficient performance. The record is silent, however, why defense counsel failed to seek reconsideration under the amended law.

It is possible that counsel was unaware of the newly passed statute. It is also possible, however, that counsel had sound reasons not to pursue the issue. For example, appellant may have changed her mind and decided to refuse to accept the treatment required for participation in the diversion program. Because trial counsel’s reasons for not raising the issue are not readily apparent, the issue is more appropriately considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Authority:

People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692

People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267

People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. We apply the substantial evidence standard in a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual finding necessary for a victim restitution order. Sentencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and the source from whence it comes because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. It may make a restitution order based on truncated evidence such as declarations or probation reports, business records, and checks.

Authority:

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663

People v. Jessee (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 501, 507

People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275

People v. Plains All American Pipeline L.P. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 872, 898-899

Fourth Holding:

The total restitution awarded to the victim includes two computational errors. The court erroneously included a $4,520 attorney fees bill twice and included $880 for an unknown reason. We will correct those errors.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes a court to issue an order restraining a defendant for up to 10 years when the defendant has been convicted of a qualifying crime. Appellant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under section 245 is not a qualifying crime under section 136(i). The court did not have statutory authority to issue the protective order, therefore, the order must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901