Category Archives: Sentencing

Case: 000122

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in failing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to twice the principal term for the underlying crime, as opposed to the 25-year-to-life sentence it reimposed. The People concede both of these points. We vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand for a full resentencing with directions to recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

Even where the defendant is serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law, on recall the trial court is required to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act in a section 1172.75 proceeding absent a finding of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Second Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Case: 000121

Error and/or relief

The court failed to recalculate the actual time defendant had served pursuant to the sentence for which he was being resentenced and reflect those credits in the amended abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Second Holding:

Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical error can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Case: 000120

Error and/or relief

The defendant submitted both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for recall and resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court erroneously treated both as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which it denied without prejudice to allow the defendant to separately file a petition under section 1172.6. Though contained in the same envelope and assigned a single case number by the court clerk, there were two separate matters presented to the trial court. The matter is remanded for the trial court to give due consideration to the petition/motion filed for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. There is also an error in the abstract of judgment that should be corrected, depending on the outcome of the hearing on the petition.

First Holding:

The record indicates that defendant submitted not only a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but also a separate motion for resentencing. The title page of the habeas petition states it was being filed concurrently with a motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant included a separate section 1172.6 “motion” with its own title page and caption designating it as such. That defendant, a prisoner, mailed the documents in one envelope as opposed to two, and placed his “motion” for resentencing before the exhibits to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, does not change the fact he submitted a separate “motion” to the court. As for the assignment of only one case number—for the habeas proceeding—this was a clerical matter over which defendant had no control. The trial court was required to consider the motion/petition filed under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960 [where resentencing petition complies with the three facial sufficiency requirements of sec. 1172.6(b), the court proceeds to consider whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under subd. (c)]

Second Holding:

The abstract contains an error on whether the two counts were ordered served concurrently or consecutively. Should the trial court determine defendant is ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, we direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment that corrects this error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical error in their records at any time and appellate courts that have assumed jurisdiction over a case may order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect judgment]

Case: 000119

Error and/or relief

Because punishments on his prison priors were stricken, the trial court ruled that the defendant was ineligible for relief under section 1172.75. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

Holding:

A pre-Rhodius case on point convincingly concluded that section 1172.75 applies to enhancements that were stricken at sentencing, not just those that are imposed but stayed at sentencing. We agree with the Espino majority that there is no sound reason to differentiate between section 667.5 enhancements that have been stayed and those that have been stricken for purposes of sentencing. In each of these cases, the judgment still contains a now-invalid enhancement for a prior prison term.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 193, review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987 [Gary note: The case on review in the Supreme Court was argued and deemed submitted on May 6, 2026. The opinion will likely be rendered within 90 days of that date, or by August 4, 2026]

People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1133

Case: 000117

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s judgment is modified to vacate any portions of the probation related fees imposed by the trial court as part of probation condition No. 14 that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021.

First Holding:

AB 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) repealed the authority to collect various fees. The bill makes the unpaid balance of these fees unenforceable, uncollectible, and requires that any portion of a judgment imposing such fees be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The defendant is entitled to the retroactive application of these ameliorative changes.

Authority:

People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 680

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 258

Case: 000116

Error and/or relief

The defendant petitioned for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. The question before us is whether section 1172.75 entitles the defendant to a resentencing hearing even though the prior prison term enhancements were stricken for the purposes of sentencing. We agree with defendant that he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 applies to enhancements that were stricken at sentencing, not just those that are imposed but stayed at sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 193, review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987 [Gary note: The case on review in the Supreme Court was argued and deemed submitted on May 6, 2026. The opinion will likely be rendered within 90 days of that date, or by August 4, 2026]

People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1133

Case: 000114

Error and/or relief

We conclude that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the defendant’s presentence custody credits and his sentence on the attempted murder count. We accordingly modify the judgment to correct these sentencing errors and affirm the judgment as modified.

First Holding:

While a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole becomes eligible for parole after serving seven years, the correct sentence to be imposed remains life with the possibility of parole, plus any determinate enhancements. The abstract of judgment, which currently describes the sentence on the attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation as “seven years to life,” must be corrected accordingly. [Gary note: The court did not provide its authority for ordering that the abstract of judgment be corrected, but there are many cases it could have cited. I have listed some below, which were not in the opinion but support the correction.]

Authority:

PEN 3046(a)(1)

PEN 664(a)

People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4 [shorthand pronouncement of seven years to life where statutory term is life with the possibility of parole is incorrect because it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

The trial court miscalculated the credit for time served. The defendant is entitled to three additional days, and the abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly. [GARY NOTE: The court did not provide any authority for this correction, most likely because it is so obvious that it must be corrected. Authorities supporting the court’s order (but not cited by the court) could include those I set forth below, among others.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527

Case: 000112

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in finding the defendant was ineligible for a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, because his judgment includes a now-invalid prison prior and thus the court’s order must be reversed. [At the original sentencing, the court had imposed and stayed the one-year prior prison term.]

Holding:

Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

Case: 000106

Error and/or relief

The trial court modified the defendant’s sentence only to the extent required under sections 1172.75 and 1170.18, but otherwise left the balance intact, finding that the defendant remained a danger to the public. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate the days of actual custody and to correct the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Because the sentence was modified under PC 1172.75, the trial court erred in not calculating the actual days in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s finding that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(1)

Third Holding:

The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that it is highly probable the facts which he asserts are true.

Authority:

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998

Fourth Holding:

The narrow definition of danger to public safety under PC 1170.18 does not apply to the undefined term of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. [GARY NOTE: after the opinion in this case 000106 was filed, the Supreme Court ruled in Guevara that it was constitutionally necessary to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act’s understanding of the term “unreasonable risk to public safety” within the meaning of section 1170.126 (enacted by initiative) in order to reconcile the application of section 1172.75 (enacted by the Legislature) to those who would otherwise qualify but are serving a sentence under the Three Strikes Law (an initiative provision).]

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 374, 374-375

[People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838]

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a determinate term of 14 years instead of 10 years, and it must be corrected. [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority, most likely because the error and solution are obvious. There are many relevant cases supporting this holding, some of which I have set out below.]

Authority:

People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938

People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Case: 000105

Error and/or relief

The section 12022.7(a) enhancement, which was stayed at sentencing, must instead be stricken under subdivision (g) of the statute because infliction of great bodily injury is an element of battery with serious bodily injury; and the trial court improperly limited the defendant’s presentence conduct credits to 15 percent of actual days served.

First Holding:

A sentence cannot be enhanced by section 12022.7 for infliction of bodily injury if that is an element of the underlying offense.

Authority:

PEN 12022.7(g)

Second Holding:

Great bodily injury is an element of battery with serious bodily injury.

Authority:

People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375–1376

People v. Otterstein (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1550

People v. Johnson (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 384, 391

People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1616

People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531

People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696–697

Third Holding:

Serious bodily injury is the essential equivalent of great bodily injury.

Authority:

People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831

People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117 [noting that a true finding on a great bodily injury enhancement would effectively establish the elements of the charged battery with serious bodily injury]

Fourth Holding:

Section 246 is not a violent felony per se so section 2833.1 does not limit behavior credit to 15 percent.

Authority:

In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476, 491E

Case: 000104

Error and/or relief

Under section 654, the trial court should have stayed the sentence imposed on either of two counts, each of which was based on the same assault and committed with the same intent and objective.

First Holding:

Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment under more than one provision for any act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. This section applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 309

People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant possessed a single intent and objective is a factual question subject to substantial evidence review on appeal. However, where the facts are undisputed, whether Penal Code section 654 precludes multiple punishment is a legal question, subject to de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552, fn. 5

People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603

People v. Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 493

People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1552, 1560 [multiple punishment precluded where mayhem and assault convictions were based on a course of conduct in which the defendant threw the victim down, punched her, took a box cutter that she tried to use to defend herself, and used the weapon to slash the victim]

Third Holding:

A course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment.

Authority:

People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11

People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1253

Case: 000103

Error and/or relief

We conclude the concurrent sentences on two counts constitute multiple punishment proscribed by section 654. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to stay the sentence on the second of those two counts.

First Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. Section 654 proscribes multiple punishment for crimes arising from a single act. This statutory protection has also been extended to proscribe punishment for multiple crimes arising from an indivisible course of conduct.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Second Holding:

Errors in the applicability of section 654 are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the point was raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as error on appeal. This is an exception to the general rule that only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. This exception is not required by the language of section 654, but rather by case law holding that a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction and imposes an unauthorized sentence when it fails to stay execution of a sentence under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295

Third Holding:

The accepted procedure where section 654 applies is to sentence defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on certain of the convictions to which section 654 is applicable. Accordingly, the sentence for either of the two counts should be stayed instead of running concurrent as the court did here.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353

Fourth Holding:

An appellate court has the discretion to modify a judgment to stay sentences that should have been stayed. An appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment, or may remand for further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473