Category Archives: Sentencing

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 001098

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing under section 1172.6, the court may have erred in reimposing criminal gang activity enhancement without examining whether it meets the requirements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333.

The briefing submitted in conjunction with the ruling on the section 1172.6 proceedings does not adequately address whether the application of AB 333 is retroactive where section 1170.6 is invoked. The matter is remanded for resentencing and the parties may address the question of retroactivity of AB 333 in the superior court proceedings.

First Holding:

When the middle term is applied, appellate courts have held that the plain language and statutory context of section 1170(b) are clear the Legislature did not intend to impose evidentiary or proof requirements or restrictions on the imposition of a middle term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1223

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. Application of AB 333 here essentially increases the probability defendant’s gang enhancement, imposed prior to the effective date of AB 333, is not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 566–567 [Assembly Bill 333 narrowed the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and common benefit to a street gang]

Third Holding:

While section 1172.6 clearly provides the unusual remedy of challenging certain final convictions of murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter convictions, and clearly provides that the sentence on all counts (including those other than the murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter convictions) must be based on present law, it is not immediately clear where in the statute the Legislature provided the unusual remedy of challenging all of the petitioner’s other convictions.

The defendant does cite toTrent for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to retroactive application of ameliorative laws after a successful petition under section 1172.6. But the fact that AB 333 applies to nonfinal judgments is clear and undisputed. The question is whether these particular proceedings (i.e., sec. 1172.6) allow for challenges to the convictions (rather than challenges to the prior sentence made at resentencing) on counts or enhancements other than murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(d)(3)

People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251

Fourth Holding:

On remand, the trial court must award defendant 55 days of presentence conduct credits. The Attorney General concedes this issue and we accept the concession.

(Gary note: The court cited no authority for its directive to award presentence conduct credits, undoubtedly because the law is well settled. For your convenience, I have listed authority below that the court could have relied on.)

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673

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Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 001097

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Following resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in not recalculating the defendant’s credit for time served.

Holding:

The trial court must calculate actual custody credits and include any such credits in the new amended abstract of judgment. Time served in custody shall be credited at resentencing when a judgment is subsequently declared invalid or is modified during the term of imprisonment. It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the total number of days to be credited.

When a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Garner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118 [a judgment must include a custody credit award that includes time spent in prison prior to the resentencing hearing leading to this appeal]

Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 001096

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant sought relief under section 1172.75 by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court reviewed the petition, struck the two now-invalid prior prison term enhancements and denied the request for resentencing, concluding that the previously entered judgment was final. It did not appoint counsel, there was no full resentencing, and the defendant was not present for the decision.

The court erred. The judgment is reversed with the direction to the trial court to appoint counsel for the defendant and to conduct a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each prior prison or county jail term the defendant served if the defendant had not remained free of custody for the preceding five years. Effective January 1, 2020, SB 136 amended section 667.5(b) by limiting the enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses only.

In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483, which made SB 136’s changes to the law retroactive, and added what is now section 1172.75. Section 1172.75(a), provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(c) sets forth procedures for the trial court to recall sentences that include the now invalid enhancements and to resentence the defendants.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681

Second Holding:

When a defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75, a resentencing court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

At resentencing, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

The court shall appoint counsel to represent a defendant at resentencing proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(5)

Third Holding:

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be at all critical stages of the proceeding, including sentencing and resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 673

Fourth Holding:

Other than to strike the one-year prison priors, the trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing, believing it could not do so because the judgment was final. However, section 1172.75, including subdivision (d)(2), applies retroactively to final judgments like the defendant’s.

Because the statute mandates striking the now invalid enhancements, the statute by its express terms—backed by supportive case law—also requires that defendant receive a full resentencing.

Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction and the duty to reconsider the entirety of the defendant’s sentence, not just the one-year prison priors.

Authority:

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case 001095

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in concluding at the prima facie stage that the defendant was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as an aider and abettor. The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437, which amended provisions of the Penal Code pertaining to the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Regarding the felony-murder rule, SB 1437 added section 189(e), which states that a participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of qualifying felonies in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

(1) The person was the actual killer.

(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2(d).

As to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, section 188(a)(3) now provides that, except for felony-murder liability as stated in section 189(e), in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

SB 1437 created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended, by filing a petition for resentencing under what is now section 1172.6.

Pursuant to section 1172.6, a person previously convicted of murder or attempted murder may file a resentencing petition when all of the following conditions apply:

(1) the charging document filed against the petitioner permitted the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, or another theory of imputed malice;

(2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter; and

(3) the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 188

PEN 189

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Second Holding:

At the prima facie stage of a resentencing matter, the court evaluates both the petition and the record of conviction. If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.

If, on the other hand, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. Denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is reviewed de novo.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 97

Third Holding:

In this case, the dispositive issue under section 189 is whether the jury’s special circumstance findings (in the early 1990s, when the case was tried) conclusively establish the defendant’s liability for felony murder as a nonkiller aider and abettor. That is, we must determine whether the jury necessarily found that if the defendant was not the actual killer, he at least–with the intent to kill–aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

A finding of intent to kill made pursuant to a special-circumstance murder allegation is relevant and binding on the petitioner in a resentencing proceeding.

Importantly though, a resentencing petition puts at issue whether all elements of the murder offense are established by a valid theory.

Authority:

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462, 453-460 [addressing a gang-murder special circumstance]

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 659

Fourth Holding:

The true findings as to the special circumstance allegations do not establish that the jury necessarily found his conduct met the actus reus required for aiding and abetting murder under section 189(e)(2). Section 189(e)(2) requires proof that a nonkiller defendant not only intended to kill, but also assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. Section 189(e)(2) requires that the nonkiller aid or abet the actual killer in the lethal act itself, and not just the underlying felony.

While the special circumstances findings established that the defendant had the intent to kill and aided a cohort, the jury was not required to find that the defendant aided the actual killer in the act of killing.

Further, the instructions on the special circumstances referred to murder in the first degree, which may have led jurors to consider the instructions on first degree murder. Those instructions on murder contained no-longer-valid theories, which may have led the jury to believe the defendant aided or abetted in the commission of first degree murder without finding that he assisted in the lethal act itself.

True findings as to special circumstance allegations did not necessarily establish defendant was a direct aider and abettor even though jury received general instruction regarding aider and abettor liability.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)(2)

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 693

In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 587–588

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Gary Musings, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 001093

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a sentence under the One Strike law, because the date of the offense was prior to the amendment in 2006 that added the section violated by the defendant to the list of crimes that may be prosecuted under the One Strike law.

First Holding:

In 1994, the Legislature enacted the “One Strike” law requiring indeterminate life sentences for certain sex offenses committed under particular circumstances. Prior to 2006, section 288.5 did not qualify as a One Strike offense. Consequently in 2006, the Legislature amended section 667.61 to encompass continuous sexual abuse under section 288.5(a), as a One Strike offense.

Authority:

PEN 667.61

People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1173–1174

Second Holding:

At sentencing, the trial court sentenced the defendant under the One Strike law for his count 7 conviction. However, the 2006 amendment to the One Strike law was inapplicable the defendant’s crime of continuous sexual abuse conviction because the crime took place from 1997 to 2001. Consequently, the trial court improperly applied the One Strike law retroactively. As a result, we vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing at which defendant has a right to be present with counsel.

Authority:

Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42–43

(Gary note: This case demonstrates the importance of reviewing the statutes in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Counsel should not just assume that the version of the statute in existence today applied at the time the crime was committed. While I firmly believe counsel should always check, it just cries out with red flags when the crime in question occurred decades earlier. Where was counsel? Yes, I’m Monday Morning Quarterbacking here, but I just cannot fathom representing someone facing serious sex charges decades old and not checking to see if the very complex provisions of the One Strike law even apply.

(I am not embarrassed to soapbox here. Attorneys do not have easy jobs, and criminal defense attorneys need to understand that they are critical in how much life and liberty remain for their criminal clients. We cannot take it for granted that the probation department and the prosecution and the judge got it right. We have to examine every detail and ethically exploit every possibility to ensure that our clients, if convicted, do not serve one minute in custody longer than legally permitted by law and under their circumstances.

(Our clients are real people, and they have to count on us to do our best, and they deserve our best. No one who thinks otherwise should even consider being a criminal defense attorney. Raise your hand if you think a day in jail or a day in prison is like a day in the park with the kids or pets. Raise your hand if you have no problem paying the level of fines and fees imposed, particularly when assessments are piled on top of the stated fine. Raise your hand if you don’t think these penalties mean anything to your clients, or at least that they don’t care whether you are able to minimize the custody or the financial burdens.)