Error and/or relief
The trial court erred under section 654 by imposing concurrent sentences on three separate convictions arising from the same single act.
First Holding:
Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. When a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence. The imposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654 because under such a sentence the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served simultaneously.
Authority:
PEN 654
People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796
People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380 [The trial court is required to impose judgment on each count, which involves selecting a term, and then staying execution of the duplicative sentence, the stay to become permanent upon defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.]
Second Holding:
Section 654 provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.
Authority:
PEN 654
People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379
Third Holding:
One provision of the One Strike law, section 667.61(h)), states: “Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person who is subject to punishment under this section.”
There is a split of authority over whether this provision precludes a sentencing court from staying execution of a One Strike sentence under section 654. We conclude that People v. Govan has the better reasons view of the interplay between section 667.61(h) and section 654.
Authority:
People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669
People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1032-1035 [Based on the Govan court’s review of legislative history, the “no suspension clause” must be read in the context of a bar against the grant of probation, and does not supersede section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishment, disagreeing with Caparaz.]
Fourth Holding:
When we interpret a statute, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.
We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.
If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.
Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.
Authority:
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990
Fifth Holding:
Courts have recognized that the suspension clause’s language has a technical meaning unique to a grant of probation. We therefore conclude the Legislature intended for section 667.61(h)’s suspension clause to have its technical, probation related meaning.
Indeed, as used in section 1203(a), “probation” means the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the community under the supervision of a probation officer.
When the Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use must assume that the Legislature was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language. We therefore conclude the Legislature intended for section 667.61(h)’s suspension clause to have its technical, probation related meaning.
Authority:
PEN 7(c) [Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and any others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to that peculiar and appropriate meaning.]
People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1033
People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach) (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 524, 536, fn. 8 [the words ‘suspension of execution’ are employed in conjunction with a grant of probation and have developed into terms of art], (disapproved on another ground by People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1, 7, fn. 3)
People v. Borynack (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 958, 965
Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 850, fn. 3
Sixth Holding:
This interpretation is consistent with how some courts have interpreted similarly worded statutes. Many related criminal statutes with related purposes contain language identical to section 667.61(h). Courts have not historically interpreted similar statutory provisions as precluding a stay under section 654.
Authority:
People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 [We consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.]
People v. Barela (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 152, 160 [holding section 1203.06–with similar language–does not preclude a stay under section 654]
People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach) (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 524, 536, fn. 8 [rejecting as unpersuasive the contention that a prohibition on suspension of execution of sentence under repealed section 12311 precluded a stay under section 654]
Seventh Holding:
We presume that when the Legislature enacted section 667.61 in 1994 and amended it in 2006, the Legislature was aware of how courts had interpreted identical statutory language and that the Legislature intended for that interpretation to also apply to section 667.61.
Where legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar language, we may presume that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.
Authority:
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1367
Eighth Holding:
Finally, we are satisfied that interpreting section 667.61 as allowing a stay under section 654 is consistent with the One Strike law’s legislative purpose in imposing lengthy prison sentences for certain sex offenses.
Although interpreting section 667.61 this way allows for shorter sentences in some circumstances, it does not require it. Rather, it leaves the decision to the trial court’s sound sentencing discretion.
Authority:
PEN 654
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989
Ninth Holding:
When a sentencing court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.
In light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.
The record indicates, however, that the trial court did not understand the scope of its discretion. The court expressly stated it took no joy in imposing the harsh sentence, and that it had imposed counts concurrently wherever it could, but that it had no discretion to impose other than the harsh sentence–that the sentence it imposed were the only options.
Therefore, we must remand for resentencing given the extent of the court’s full discretion under section 654.
Authority:
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424
People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527
(Gary note, of marginal historical interest: Prior to 1998, Penal Code section 654 had exactly the same language as it currently has, and a court was free to impose sentence on any one of the counts to which section 654 applied. See People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1. In response to that Supreme Court decision, the Legislature amended section 654 to require that the court impose sentence on the count containing the longest potential term. Through AB 518, effective 1/1/2022, the Legislature restored section 654 to its former language, thus restoring to the court the discretion to choose on which count punishment should be imposed and executed.)
