Category Archives: Juveniles

Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000987

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the juvenile court’s restitution order as modified to reduce the amount of restitution by $110.

First Holding:

In calculating restitution a court need not ascertain the exact amount of loss, and a restitution award based upon estimates and averages. A court retains broad discretion to estimate costs incurred by a party seeking restitution.

Authority:

Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 309-310

Second Holding:

A restitution order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The court’s factual findings supporting restitution are reviewed for substantial evidence and a restitution order that is based upon an error in law constitutes an abuse of discretion. A victim’s restitution right to restitution is to be construed broadly and liberally.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661

Third Holding:

A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion if there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.

There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action. Nonetheless, a juvenile court must use a rational method of calculation and must rely on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence to make the victim whole.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 853, 855-856

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

Fourth Holding:

Restitution hearings are intended to be informal, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof. A prima facie showing of loss may be based on the victim’s testimony. Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the minor’s delinquent acts, the burden shifts to the minor to disprove the amount of the losses claimed by the victim.

Authority:

People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 684

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 362

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

Fifth Holding:

Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. The minor argues that the victim’s testimony was sometimes internally inconsistent; however, inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence, which are matters for the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000953

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in setting the maximum confinement time for the minor to life imprisonment, because it did not make a finding that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.

First Holding:

When committing a juvenile to a secure youth treatment facility as in the case here, the court must set a maximum term of confinement. The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses.

Authority:

WIC 975(c)(1)

Second Holding:

Attempted murder is generally punishable by five, seven or nine years in state prison. However, if the attempted murder is willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and that fact is charged in the accusatory pleading and found true by the trier of fact, the crime is punishable by life in prison with the possibility of parole.

Authority:

PEN 664(a), 190

Third Holding:

A reading of the transcript of the proceedings reveal that neither the prosecution nor the court believed that the charge contained the language invoking a life term for the conviction of attempted murder. The trial court’s statement that “the intent to kill is clear” is insufficient because the mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.

The trial court never found, whether expressly or impliedly, that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The seven-year-to-life maximum term of confinement for count 1 is therefore unauthorized. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new disposition hearing.

(Gary note: The court did not cite additional authority for its reversal and remand order; likely, none was necessary. The court did cite Boatman, but that was on the point that intent to kill is not the equivalent of deliberated and premeditated intent to kill. Much of the court’s reasoning consisted of analysis of the comments at the disposition hearing, where the prosecution and court seemed to be under the impression that the charging document did not invoke the life term provisions, even though, in fact, the charging document did.

(But the oral pronouncements of the court strongly imply that it specifically did not conclude that the act was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” and that an underlying crime was planned, but the shooting was not. Hence, even though the charging document alleged it, the life term cannot be imposed/set as a maximum in the absence of a true finding on the necessary elements.)

Authority:

People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264

Appellate Principles, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000941

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor challenges several conditions of probation. We modify two of them.

First Holding:

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate probation conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. The juvenile court’s discretion, while broad, is not unlimited.

A probation condition is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.

In order to invalidate a condition of probation under this Lent test, all three factors must be found to be present. A condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Second Holding:

We review a juvenile court’s imposition of a probation condition for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6

Third Holding:

Hearsay can at least sometimes be considered at dispositional hearings, and courts may base probation conditions upon information in probation reports.

Authority:

In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 243–244

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

Fourth Holding:

Probation conditions are to be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable reader. We modify the probation condition that the minor not be around anyone known to him to be in possession of any dangerous or deadly weapons by inserting “known to him to be unlawfully in possession of the same.”

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

(Gary note: Olguin supports the first sentence of that summary of the holding. The court did not cite any specific authority in the paragraphs in which it modified the language of that condition itself. However, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, authorizes an appellate court to modify conditions of probation to render them constitutional.)

Fifth Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights.

People have a constitutional right to self-defense. The condition that “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone” must be tailored to, “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone, except for acts of lawful self-defense.”

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 1

In re Carlos C. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 997, 1002, 1004

People v. McDonnell (1917) 32 Cal.App. 694, 704

Discretion, Juveniles, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000926

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude that the juvenile court erred when it found all five statutory criteria weigh in favor of transferring the minor to criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(a)(3)(A)–(E)), and when it found him not amenable to rehabilitation.

(Gary note: After setting out the holdings I have listed below, the opinion goes into great detail analyzing the evidence in the case under the criteria required to be considered by the juvenile court in deciding whether to retain the minor in juvenile court or to transfer the minor to adult court. The analysis is quite extensive and completely fact-heavy. Since an unpublished opinion cannot be cited as authority, the court’s analysis could not be used in any briefing to compare and contrast with any other defendant’s scenario. So I have not included that portion of the opinion.)

First Holding:

With respect to whether the minor can be rehabilitated within the two-year period the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over him given his age and the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving these criteria favor transfer to criminal court and, therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings in the prosecution’s favor on these issues.

Although the weight to be given each of the five criteria is within the juvenile court’s discretion, and the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five criteria predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other criteria might point to a different result, the juvenile court’s ultimate finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 159

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417

Second Holding:

Where, as here, the juvenile court has abused its discretion in evaluating the evidence and applying the operative legal standards, it is appropriate to remand the matter so the court may reconsider the evidence and its ultimate determination through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.

Authority:

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 162

In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288

J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714–715 [exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles]

Third Holding:

When a minor age 16 or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the prosecution may move to transfer the minor to criminal court. Upon the motion, the juvenile court must order the probation officer to submit a report on the minor’s behavioral patterns and social history. The parties may submit other relevant evidence’ in connection with the transfer motion. In determining whether to transfer a minor to criminal court, the juvenile court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E) of section 707, subdivision (a)(3).

These criteria are: (1) the degree of criminal sophistication by the minor; (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (3)the minor’s previous delinquent history; (4) the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.

Section 707 also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to each of the five criteria. And consideration of these factors is now mandatory rather than discretionary.

Authority:

WIC 707

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 158-159, 160

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164-165

Fourth Holding:

As amended by AB 2361, section 707 now provides that in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

This changed the finding a juvenile court must make before ordering a transfer in two ways: (1) raising the standard of proof; and (2) requiring a new specific finding regarding amenability to rehabilitation.

It also amended section 707 to require the court to recite the basis for its decision in an order that includes the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284

Fifth Holding:

The weight to be given to each of these criteria is within the court’s discretion. However, to transfer a minor to criminal court, the juvenile court must ultimately find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

The prosecution bears the burden of proof. Nothing in section 707 indicates that the court is required to give equal weight to each of the five criteria or that it would necessarily be an abuse of discretion to find that one criterion outweighed the other criteria.

This standard requires a finding of high probability The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.

Authority:

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186

D.W. v. Superior Court (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 109, 116

In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 159, 161

C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1035

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998, fn. 2

In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286

Sixth Holding:

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. The court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court’s erroneous understanding of applicable law is subject to reversal. But we do not reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial court.

We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings, not against them. We are concerned only with whether the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings. When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165, 169

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000921

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was 16 years old when he committed attempted murder on two people, and he was convicted by plea as an adult in 2015. He subsequently petitioned under section 1172.6 for recall of his sentence in light of changes to the law on liability for murder and attempted murder by those who were not the direct perpetrators. He was resentenced to five years in prison.

On appeal, he contends correctly that the court should have conducted a transfer hearing in light of changes in the statute enacted through Proposition 57.

Holding:

In 2016, voters passed “The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016” to obligate the People to criminally charge a minor in the juvenile court unless the juvenile court determines after a transfer hearing that the minor should be tried and sentenced as an adult.

This part of the act applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. When a court vacates a criminal sentence after a successful petition for resentencing, it reacquires jurisdiction to reimpose punishment and the judgment reverts to being nonfinal for that purpose.

The parties agree that the defendant is entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing, and for these reasons so do we.

But we emphasize: Whatever potential that hearing may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of guilt.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, 304, 305–307

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158, 161-162, 167, 169-170