Category Archives: Juveniles

Elements of crime, Juveniles, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 000773

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the juvenile court’s finding that the minor committed murder as an aider and abettor with implied malice.

First Holding:

An aider and abettor of murder must actually aid and abet the lethal act in order to be convicted of murder.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678

Second Holding:

The trial court announced its finding that, to be liable for an implied malice murder, a direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life endangering act, not the result of that act. The court treated the robbery as the life-endangering act that resulted in the victim’s death.

The court went on to state that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor was an aider and abettor to the robbery with knowledge that his compatriots intended to commit the robbery; did, in fact, intend to aid the perpetrators in the commission of the robbery or attempted robbery, and had knowledge that the act was dangerous to human life.

The opinion in Morris was issued long after the juvenile court sustained the petition, and under Morris, the court’s reasoning was in error.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671

Third Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, a reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.

The same standard of review governs our review of the sufficiency of evidence in juvenile delinquency cases.

Authority:

People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715

In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809

In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653

In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540

Fourth Holding:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. An unlawful killing during the commission of a felony is also murder. Second degree implied malice murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder. Malice may be express or implied.

Authority:

PEN 187(a)

PEN 189(a),(e)

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151

Fifth Holding:

Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. In short, implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another—no more, and no less. This definition is referred to as “simple implied malice murder.”

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

Sixth Holding:

To suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must involve a high degree of probability that it will result in death. Implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of the risk of death to another.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 152

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989

Seventh Holding:

To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. The question of implied malice is to be decided in light of all the circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 942

Eighth Holding:

Under Penal Code section 187, the mens rea required for murder is malice aforethought. Regarding aiders and abettors, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

In the context of implied malice murder, the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

PEN 187

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118

People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991

Ninth Holding:

Murder also requires an actus reus. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.

Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.

Authority:

People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991

Tenth Holding:

As relevant to this aider or abettor theory of liability in a felony-murder, the amended felony-murder rule now states that when a person was not the actual killer, that person must have, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. Section 189(e)(2) requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act.

While the language of Penal Code section 188(a)(3), differs from section 189(e), pursuant to section 188(a)(3), a direct aider and abettor must act with malice aforethought, and act with intent to aid the life-endangering act of the direct perpetrator that proximately causes the death.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)(2)

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 415

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991-992

Eleventh Holding:

Implied malice murder requires attention to the aider and abettor’s mental state concerning the life endangering act committed by the direct perpetrator, such as shooting at the victim, or, as in this case, stabbing him. In other words, the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life. Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 992

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468

People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110

Twelfth Holding:

SB 1437 abolished the natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder, amending section 188 to require that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder shall act with malice aforethought, and that malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. As a result, the natural and probable consequences doctrine can no longer support a murder conviction.

Authority:

PEN 188

In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847-848

Thirteenth Holding:

Instead, with the exception of section 189(e), a conviction for murder requires that a person act with malice aforethought and that a person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.

We conclude the legislative language of Penal Code section 188(a)(3) requires a finding that the accused actually aided the perpetrator in the commission of the life-endangering act, and that the accused’s participation in a dangerous felony as an aider and abettor cannot form the basis for finding implied malice.

Only in this way will a finding that the accused aided and abetted in the commission of implied malice murder reflect a determination of the person’s guilt based on his own actions and subjective intent.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 660-661

Elements of crime, Juveniles, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 000768

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that the minor received stolen property in violation of section 496d(a) (pertaining to the vehicle in which he was a passenger).

First Holding:

The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of the evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases. We examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

While substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, such inferences may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, or speculation.

Authority:

In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545-546

In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540

People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330

Second Holding:

To sustain the petition on the receiving a stolen vehicle count, the People had to prove: (1) the motor vehicle was stolen; (2) the minor knew it was stolen; and (3) the minor received, concealed, or withheld the stolen vehicle from its owner.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224

In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728

Third Holding:

Receipt, or possession of stolen property, may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. Physical possession is also not a requirement. It is sufficient if the defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion over the stolen property.

Constructive possession occurs when the defendant maintains control or a right to control the property; possession may be imputed when the property is found in a place that is immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his or her dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the defendant and another.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224 [construing similar language in context of sec. 496, general receiving stolen property statute]

People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 621-622

Fourth Holding:

Possession may be established through circumstantial evidence and resulting reasonable inferences. However, mere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. Something more must be shown to support inferring of dominion and control. The necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight.

Authority:

People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 224

People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 429 [evidence the defendant was passenger in car and found standing close to car trunk containing stolen goods insufficient to infer possession for conviction of receiving stolen property]

People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [evidence defendant was passenger in car with stolen chain saw in rear seat insufficient evidence to infer his possession of stolen item]

Fifth Holding:

The car was stolen and the minor knew the car was stolen, but there is no substantial evidence that the minor possessed or aided in withholding the car from its owner.

While it is true that conscious possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen, the issue here is whether, as a mere passenger, he actually or constructively possessed the stolen car as a section 496d conviction requires.

Aiding and abetting the commission of a crime requires some affirmative action. Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.

There was no evidence to show the minor directed the driver to speed away from the pursuing officers or otherwise directed any movement of the Infiniti as a passenger. There was no evidence that the minor had an opportunity to get out of the car before the traffic stop, or once the driver sped away from the officers.

The record is also devoid of any evidence regarding the minor’s relationship to any of the other occupants of the car, and the gang expert conceded the minor had no documented gang-related contacts apart from this one incident.

Absent evidence showing the nature and extent of the relationship between the minor and the other occupants, or the circumstances of the minor’s affirmative actions beyond simply running from the Infiniti, we conclude the evidence established nothing more than that the minor was a passenger in the stolen car, but not that he aided and abetted in the vehicle theft or in withholding the stolen vehicle from its rightful owner.

Authority:

People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574

People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 420-421

People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868

People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 57

People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1039 [presence at crime scene, by itself, is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting; relevant factors for determining aider and abettor liability may include presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense]

Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000755

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of a change in the law while the minor’s case has been pending, the restitution fine ordered by the court must be stricken.

First Holding:

Here, the juvenile court imposed a restitution fine as a condition of probation. At the time of the minor’s disposition, the restitution fine was mandatory. Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature passed AB 1186 which amended Welfare and Instituitons Code section 730.6 to prohibit a court from imposing a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

Second Holding:

An adult or juvenile offender is generally entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while their case is on appeal and not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [applying a revised version of the statute in setting a restitution fine]

In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [rule of retroactivity applies to juvenile delinquency judgments]

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [Where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.

Third Holding:

Because imposing a restitution fine constitutes “punishment” and the minor’s case was not yet final when section 730.6 became effective, we conclude section 730.6 operates retroactively and precludes imposition of a restitution fine. Therefore, the restitution fine should be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 321

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000734

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed as a condition of probation: “Do not associate or communicate with your co-participant and anyone you know who is on probation, parole, or a gang member” The defendant objects to the inclusion of the phrase “or a gang member.” The condition must be modified.

First Holding:

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Although courts have broad discretion to set conditions of probation, the trial court’s discretion in setting the conditions of probation is not unbounded.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624

Second Holding:

A term of probation is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality Conversely, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct that is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the minor was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 48

Third Holding:

When a gang condition imposed by the juvenile court involves non-criminal conduct and prohibits a minor from engaging in otherwise legal conduct, we can uphold it only if there is a reasonable connection between the condition and the offense or between the condition and future criminality. Gang-related probation conditions are reasonably related to preventing future criminality when there is evidence of the minor’s affiliation with criminal street gangs.

In the absence of evidence of gang affiliation or association with gang members or risk of gang involvement on the minor’s part, the gang condition is not tailored to his future criminality. In this case, any connection between the minor’s offense and gang activity is speculative.

Accordingly, the condition is modified to “Do not associate or communicate with your co-participant and anyone you know who is on probation or parole.”

Authority:

In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1236

People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case 000717

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed a condition requiring the minor to participate in counseling and/or an education program as directed by his probation officer. This condition is too indefinite and we reverse and remand for the court to modify or strike it.

First Holding:

Although the minor did not object to this condition, we may still consider his challenge because it presents a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887

Second Holding:

A juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation. And the court may empower the probation department with authority to supervise probation conditions. But, while a court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may also result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Third Holding:

The court did not specify any particular kind of counseling or education program. Indeed, by putting “and/or” between education and counseling, the court did not make clear whether the minor must participate in education, counseling, or both. Because the condition in this case contains no standard by which the probation department is to be guided, the condition is too broad and must either be stricken or rewritten to provide the necessary specificity.

Authority:

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359

Fourth Holding:

We acknowledge the line between an appropriate delegation of details and an improper delegation of judicial authority may not always be clear. But the trial court must at least select a specific category of educational or therapeutic programming.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902–903 [striking condition requiring defendant to participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation officer because the court must choose between residential and outpatient programming]

Cf. People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 301, 302, 308 [approving condition requiring defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program as approved by the Probation Officer because any attempt to specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious practical difficulties]