Category Archives: Juveniles

Discretion, Duty of the court, Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001112

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the juvenile court to order the minor to pay restitution to the victim at the rate of (a specific dollar amount was named) per month, where the court had not ordered an amount of restitution that was owed, and had not declared that the amount could not be determined at the present time.

Remanded to the juvenile court. For the purposes of making an order regarding the amount of restitution payable by the minor, the court needs to determine what the amount of loss is, or if, instead, the loss cannot be ascertained at the time of disposition.

First Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6(a)(2) provides that upon a minor being found to be a person described in section 602, the court shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (b).

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

Second Holding:

Section 730.6(b)(1) provides that restitution to the victim, who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct, shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court at any time during the term of the commitment or probation.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(b)(2)

Third Holding:

Because the statute authorizes the restitution amount to be determined at any time during the term of the commitment or probation, restitution orders may be made after the disposition order, even years later.

Authority:

In re A.R. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 184, 187-188 [court affirmed 2021 restitution order where disposition order was made in 2016]

Fourth Holding:

Restitution in a juvenile wardship case may be ordered either pursuant to section 730.6, or alternatively as a condition of probation.

Authority:

WIC 730(a)(1)

In re T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 844-845 [holding that section 730.6 specifies when restitution must be imposed, and section 730 states when restitution may be imposed as a condition of probation]

Fifth Holding:

Generally, an order of restitution will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. The court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law or fails to use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.

Authority:

In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016

Sixth Holding:

The record should be harmonized if possible, including consideration of the probation report. However, we do not believe it is possible in this instance to do so.

(Gary note: The appellate court noted that the probation report’s observations and recommendations were inconsistent because of the lack of determination of the amount of restitution.)

Because of inconsistencies in the probation report, we cannot assume that the court incorporated its recommendations. We must remand to the juvenile court to make the necessary findings.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599

In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 292 fn. 4 [where the probation conditions in question only appear in a probation department form and nowhere else in the record, the reviewing court would nevertheless assume that these conditions were in fact imposed]

Appellate Principles, Juveniles, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001068

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief:

The evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the minor was the driver of the vehicle.

(Gary note: This is typical of fact-driven results, where facts unique to a case in an unpublished opinion, but I think it’s valuable to note that the court viewed the available video footage itself to conclude that the minor was actually in the back seat of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and at the very least, the evidence was insufficient even under the deferential standards to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

(In this case, getting the exhibits to the appellate court for viewing clinched the win for the minor. Without that, the appellate court would have had to rely on the law enforcement testimony, and it likely would have found that, from its role as an appellate court (i.e., not a determiner of the facts, which is the role of the trial court), the juvenile court jurisdiction would have to be sustained (i.e., in “adult court” terms, the conviction would have to be affirmed).

First Holding:

To evaluate the minor’s claim that the evidence was insufficient, we review the record for substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor committed the crimes.

In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

In re Z.A. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1424

In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631

Second Holding:

In determining whether findings are supported by substantial evidence, we resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.

(Gary note: As I indicated above, the trial court examined the dashcam recording and determined that it was impossible for the minor to have been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, despite the testimony of two law enforcement officers who had reached a different conclusion from their own review of the video. The balance of the opinion pertains to the appellate court’s observations of the scenes depicted in the video and offers no additional legal information pertinent to these summaries. The court simply found the evidence insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor was the driver.)

Authority:

People v. Demolle (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1117, 1176

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 001062

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court erred in setting a maximum confinement term.

First Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 726(d)(1) states that the juvenile court shall specify a maximum term of confinement if the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian. Because the juvenile court did not remove the minor from parental custody, the juvenile court was not called upon to set a maximum term of confinement.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129

Second Holding:

Where a juvenile court’s order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.

Authority:

In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592

Amelioration, Eighth Amendment, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001031

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A sentence of more than 72 years to life plus two life terms imposed in 1995 on a 16-year-old minor is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).

If the court resentences, the court must then consider whether to transfer the case back to juvenile court for a transfer hearing to determine whether the matter should be retained under juvenile court jurisdiction or transferred back to adult court, applying Proposition 57.

First Holding:

Section 1170(d)(1) allows juvenile offenders to petition for recall and resentencing after 15 years of incarceration if they were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).

Authority:

PEN 1170(d)(1)

Second Holding:

A sentence of 72 years eight months to life, plus two life sentences is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, and therefore, the defendant is eligible for resentencing under equal protection principles. As the two life sentences carry a minimum of seven years on each, the effective sentence in this matter is more than 86 years to life. Under that sentence, the defendant would not be released before he reached 102 years of age.

Authority:

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056

People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 50, 68 [sentence of 84 years to life was the equivalent of LWOP and constituted cruel and unusual punishment]

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 273 [under sec. 3046, where two indeterminate sentences run consecutively, a defendant must serve the full minimum term of each before becoming eligible for parole]

Third Holding:

A petition under section 1170(d)(1) must include a statement describing the defendant’s remorse, work toward rehabilitation, and a statement that one of four qualifying circumstances is true.

The four qualifying circumstances under section 1170(d)(2), are:

(A) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law.

(B) The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall.

(C) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant.

(D) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse.

Authority:

PEN 1170(d)(2)

Fourth Holding:

Recall and resentencing entitles eligible defendants to the benefits of retroactive ameliorative changes to the law, such as Proposition 57, which eliminated the prosecution’s right to file charges for eligible crimes against a minor directly in adult court without a fitness or transfer hearing.

Authority:

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 449

People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 48-49 [ordering superior court to transfer case to juvenile court to hold hearing under Prop. 57 where court had recalled LWOP sentence under sec. 1170(d)(1) for a defendant who had committed crimes when he was 17 years old]

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304, 309 [Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative change to the criminal law, and therefore, it applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.]

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161-162 [once a superior court recalls a sentence, it becomes nonfinal, and Proposition 57 applies retroactively]

People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 971, 996 [because sentence was vacated under (what is now section 1172.6), defendant’s sentence became nonfinal for purposes of Proposition 57]

Fifth Holding:

In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide.

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. In sentencing a juvenile homicide offender the trial court must have the ability to impose a sentence less than LWOP after taking into account youth-related factors and whether the offender may be rehabilitated.

Tha California Supreme Court in Caballero applied the holding in Graham to a 110 years-to-life sentence, describing the sentence as a term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.

Authority:

Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 82

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 477

People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 267-268

Sixth Holding:

In Contreras, the California Supreme Court considered whether a lengthy term-of-years sentence, though not clearly exceeding a juvenile offender’s natural lifespan, may nonetheless impinge on the same substantive concerns that make the imposition of LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.

The Contreras court concluded that sentences of 50 years or more to life for juvenile nonhomicide offenders were the functional equivalent of LWOP sentences for purposes of the Eighth Amendment because, as contemplated by Graham:

(1) confinement with no possibility of release until age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely to allow for reintegration into society;

(2) a juvenile offender who has no chance to leave prison for 50 years has little incentive to become a responsible individual;

(3) a 50-years-to-life sentence, though less harsh than LWOP, is still an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile, who will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender;

(4) Graham’s observation that juveniles have limited ability to consider consequences when making decisions applies to a sentence of 50 years to life just as it does to a sentence of LWOP; and

(5) a judgment that a juvenile offender will be incorrigible for the next 50 years is no less questionable than a judgment that the juvenile offender will be incorrigible forever.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 356, 364

Seventh Holding:

By leaving section 1170(d)(1) in place after enacting section 3051 (which sets up a scheme of parole eligibility consideration for juvenile and young offenders), the Legislature has signaled its preference for section 1170(d)(1) to persist rather than to be stricken, thereby ensuring section 1170(d)(1) provides relief in addition to the relief provided by section 3051.

Authority:

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1063

Discretion, Juveniles, Standard of review

Case 001022

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the juvenile court’s order releasing information to [Person A] pertaining to the minor’s juvenile court proceedings, because the information accompanying the request was insufficient to justify the disclosure of confidential juvenile court matters.

First Holding:

he petition for release stated simply that the records pertaining to the minor’s juvenile file were being requested because of an ongoing law enforcement investigation. The petition did not provide any information about the law enforcement investigation. It did not indicate who was or were the subjects of the investigation. It does not state that the minor is a subject of, or somehow involved in, the investigation.

Even assuming the petitioner is a law enforcement employee, it does not explain why the requested records are necessary or have substantial relevance to a legitimate need of the petition (or the law enforcement agency. It does not describe in detail the reasons the file is being sought and its relevance to the proceeding or other purpose for which petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the file.

The petition lacks any details demonstrating good cause to grant the request.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552(a)(2)

Second Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 authorizes a case file to be inspected without a court order by the attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor.

If [Person A], as a law enforcement officer, is actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor, she would have been authorized to access the file without a court order and would not have needed to file a petition.

Authority:

WIC 827(a)(1)(E)

Third Holding:

The Legislature has expressly stated that juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential. Section 827 sets forth detailed provisions to protect this confidentiality. It specifies who is authorized to inspect case files without a court order. Section 827 also contains provisions that permit unauthorized persons to directly petition the juvenile court for access to the confidential records.

Under section 827 the juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records to unauthorized persons. This statutory scheme reflects a legislative determination that the juvenile court has both the sensitivity and expertise to make decisions about access to juvenile records.

Authority:

WIC 827

J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1337

Fourth Holding:

Rule 5.552 dictates the procedure for, and judicial review of, a request to access a juvenile case file pursuant to section 827.

The petitioner must identify the specific file sought and describe in detail the reasons the file is being sought and its relevance to the proceeding or other purpose for which petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the file.

The petitioner bears the burden to show good cause justifying access to the records. If the petitioner does not show good cause, the court must deny the petition summarily.

If there is good cause, the court may set a hearing. Whether or not the court conducts a hearing, if the court determines that there may be information or documents in the records sought to which the petitioner may be entitled, the court must conduct an in camera review of the case file and any objections.

In determining whether to authorize disclosure, the court must balance the interests of the child, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public and may permit access only insofar as is necessary, and only if petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner. To grant the petition, the court must find that the need for access outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of the juvenile case file.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552

Fifth Holding:

Generally, a juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records pursuant to section 827.

Review of a juvenile court’s decision to release juvenile records under section 827 is for abuse of discretion.

The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.

Here, the juvenile court applied the law dictating petitions to access juvenile case files to undisputed facts. Therefore, we review whether its decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Authority:

In re Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541

Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712