Error and/or relief
The defendant filed a petition under section 1170(d) for recall of his sentence. The trial court did not appoint counsel and summarily denied appellant’s petition to recall because it found he had not been incarcerated in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for at least 15 years as required by section 1170(d)(1)(A). We find the trial court’s ruling on the calculation of appellant’s period of incarceration was erroneous as a matter of law, and appellant’s preconviction custody must be included to calculate he had been incarcerated for 15 years when he filed his section 1170(d) petition.
The matter is remanded for the superior court to appoint counsel and conduct the hearing as provided in section 1170(d).
First Holding:
When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing, if the defendant meets additional statutory requirements.
Authority:
PEN 1170(d)
Second Holding:
When a trial court is not aware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion, a defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.
Authority:
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 771-772
Third Holding:
The empanelment of separate juries at the defendant’s original trial in 2010 was likely based on Aranda and Bruton. Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant. The problem addressed in Bruton and Aranda may be solved by the use of separate juries for codefendants, with each jury to be excused at appropriate times to avoid exposure to inadmissible evidence.
Authority:
People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518
Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123
People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68
People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1208
People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 27
Fourth Holding:
Appellant filed his petition based on the recall and resentencing provisions of section 1170(d), effective January 1, 2013. Under Graham, the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who committed non-homicide offenses. In response to Graham, the Legislature enacted section 1170(d), creating a recall and resentencing procedure for certain juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP terms.
Authority:
In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049
People v. Gibson (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 315, 322–323
Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 442
Fifth Holding:
On appeal, we review statutory interpretations de novo. We review the trial court’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence, and do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence.
Authority:
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032
People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26
Sixth Holding:
Absent a specific statutory definition of “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years” we may look to its plain meaning as understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a dictionary definition. The Legislature did not use the word sentenced in section 1170(d)(1)(A). Instead, it used the word “incarcerated.”
Based on the plain meaning of “incarcerated,” the defendant’s period of incarceration for purposes of a section 1170,(d)(1)(A) began to run on the date the defendant was placed in jail, i.e., incarcerated, for the relevant charges.
Authority:
People v. Ruiz (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1031, 1032
Seventh Holding:
Section 1171 expressly addresses the trial court’s procedures in postconviction proceedings to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. It defines a postconviction proceeding to mean a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75. Section 1171(c)(1) states that upon receiving a request to begin a postconviction proceeding that is authorized in law, the court shall consider whether to appoint counsel to represent the defendant. This section does not prevent the court from assigning counsel at a later time.
Authority:
PEN 1171