Error and/or relief
The juvenile court erred when it set minor’s maximum confinement term at 33 years plus 25 years to life. We modify the maximum term of confinement to 25 years eight months plus 25 years to life.
First Holding:
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed SB 1391. The amendment eliminated the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended after the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. One year later, in 2020, the Legislature passed juvenile justice realignment through SB 823. It overhauled juvenile wardship law by closing the Division of Juvenile Justice and transferring jurisdiction over youthful offenders to counties, with the stated purpose of ensuring minors are closer to their families and communities and receive age appropriate treatment.
Authority:
WIC 707(a)
WIC 736.5
O.G. v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2011) 11 Cal.5th 82, 89
In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 448
In re T.O. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 252, 262–263
In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 907
Second Holding:
Section 875, effective May 14, 2021, was added as part of the juvenile justice realignment. Under the new scheme, commencing July 1, 2021, the court may order that a minor who is 14 years of age or older be committed to Secure Youth Treatment Facility if the minor meets certain criteria.
Authority:
WIC 875(a)
In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 78
Third Holding:
Section 875(b)(1) states the baseline term must be based on the most serious recent offense for which the minor has been adjudicated and shall represent the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the minor and to prepare the minor for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community. The baseline term must be consistent with specified guidelines and may deviate by no more than six months.
Authority:
WIC 875(b)(1)
Fourth Holding:
In deciding minor’s placement, the juvenile court has maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular minor before it.
Dispositional orders must conform with the purposes of juvenile delinquency laws, which are “twofold: (1) to serve the best interests of the delinquent minor by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the minor and enable him or her to be a law abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community, and (2) to provide for the protection and safety of the public.
It must consider the broadest range of information in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him adequate care. A disposition hearing record should reflect evidence that the proposed means of rehabilitation will result in probable benefit to the minor, and that the goals of the juvenile law could not have been met by a less restrictive placement.
Authority:
In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413, 432
In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 7
In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392
In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 906
In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614
In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329
Fifth Holding:
Plea bargains are an accepted and integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts. Plea bargaining is a common feature in juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as it is in criminal proceedings in adult court. Similar principles apply in both settings.
A plea bargain is a contract between the accused and the prosecutor. Both of these parties are bound to the terms of the agreement; when the court approves the plea bargain, it also agrees to be bound by its terms. Both the accused and the prosecution are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain. When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.
Authority:
People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929
In re Kenneth H. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 143 [It is well settled that a plea bargain is a tripartite agreement which requires the consent of the defendant, the People and the court]
In re Jermaine B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [Plea bargaining is an accepted practice in our criminal justice system]
People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 533
People v. Armendariz (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 906, 911
People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties must abide by the terms of the agreement]
Sixth Holding:
Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain. A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound. Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.
Authority:
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931
People v. Ames (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1217
Seventh Holding:
The court, upon sentencing, has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea. Such withdrawal is permitted, for example, in those instances where the court becomes more fully informed about the case, or where, after further consideration, the court concludes that the bargain is not in the best interests of society. In deciding whether or not to withdraw approval of a plea bargain, the court may of course be expected to consult the probation report.
Authority:
eople v. Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 873
People v. Superior Court (Gifford) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338
People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 194
Eighth Holding:
A minor who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the juvenile court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal. The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the court—so any error may be corrected. While forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.
Authority:
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880; In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 710
In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on another ground
In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 273–274
United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733–734
In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1155 [A broad or general waiver such as ‘I waive my appeal rights,’ will include error occurring prior to the waiver, but not subsequent error because the defendant could not make ‘a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal any unforeseen or unknown future error]
Ninth Holding:
The juvenile court incorrectly calculated the determinative portion of the term for count 2, the primary offense, as 19 years. Attempted murder, the offense in count 2, has a sentencing triad of five, seven, or nine years, for which the juvenile court imposed the upper term of nine years plus a 10 year term for the attendant gang enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1)(C).
However, section 875(c)(1)(B) specifically states the term chosen by the juvenile court cannot exceed the middle term for which an adult would be eligible, with some exceptions. Therefore, the court erred in imposing the upper term for count 2.
Authority:
WIC 875(c)(1)(B)
Tenth Holding:
The juvenile court also miscalculated the consecutive term for count 1. Count 1 was the subordinate term, and the court was limited to one-third of the middle term plus one-third of the enhancements.
Authority:
PEN 1170.1