Daily Archives: July 30, 2026

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Juveniles, Sentencing

Case: 000272

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter was remanded back to this course following an earlier appeal, for reconsideration in light of People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. We once again affirmed the judgment, but remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to determine whether petitioner was entitled to a Franklin hearing. Petitioner’s appeal was not final until 2017, after Proposition 57 went into effect on November 9, 2016. Thus, his sentence was nonfinal for purposes of Prop. 57’s application. As such, pursuant to Padilla, he is entitled to a transfer hearing

Holding:

Prop. 57 affords the right to a juvenile transfer hearing to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted. Prop. 57 applies to a sentence that was imposed prior to Prop. 57 but later vacated through a subsequent habeas proceeding. Here, petitioner’s case was directly filed in adult court before Prop. 57 was enacted, but his sentence was vacated through a habeas corpus petition subsequent to the effective date. Thus, his sentence was nonfinal for purposes of Prop. 57’s application. As such, pursuant to Padilla, he is entitled to a transfer hearing. Respondent concedes this position. Thus, it is appropriate to grant the requested relief.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 159

Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000271

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The petition for writ of habeas corpus, construed as a petition for mandate, is granted. The defendant filed a petition under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) to challenge his conviction of 25 years earlier. He petition contained statistical data showing that the prosecution charged far more Black defendants for specified offenses than White defendants in that same three-year period. He sought counsel in his petition. The trial court denied it in its entirety.

The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief to secure appointment of counsel. Rather, to obtain counsel, the Racial Justice Act requires habeas petitioners to plead a plausible allegation of a violation of the Act. Second, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for counsel was erroneous because regardless of whether he satisfied the minimal pleading standard governing that request, the court was unaware of its discretion to grant him leave to amend the petition to plead a plausible allegation of a Racial Justice Act violation. Lastly, the trial court erred in invoking the prohibition on successive habeas petitions because the defendant was not required to address procedural bars to relief at this initial stage of the proceedings.

First Holding:

When the issue on review is purely legal, such as the proper interpretation and application of a statute or constitutional provision, our review is de novo. Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose. We begin with the text of the statute and give the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory framework as a whole. If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. Discretionary decisions by the trial court are generally subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard to determine if they were within the bounds of some applicable legal criteria.

Authority:

In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 998

Second Holding:

In 2020, the Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act. The purpose of the Act is to purge racial discrimination from our criminal justice system, and to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing’. In passing the Act, the Legislature recognized that racial bias persists in our criminal justice system because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. The Act acknowledges that all persons possess implicit biases that impact the criminal justice system, and these biases tend to disfavor people of color. The RJA added section 745, which sets forth legal standards governing a claim for relief under the Act. The Act also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 43

People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 993

Third Holding:

In the legislation amending section 1473(e) effective January 1, 2026, the Legislature emphasized the extremely low showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel:  “The Act’s threshold to secure counsel is extremely low, and yet courts have denied counsel to litigants raising Racial Justice Act claims far more than they have appointed counsel The Legislature reaffirms that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.”

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33

Fourth Holding:

If the Legislature amends or reenacts the statute without changing the interpretation placed on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436

Fifth Holding:

The statute now requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent habeas petitioner if the petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of RJA, and obligates the court to determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, instead of a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 44

Sixth Holding:

The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel was erroneous because the court was unaware of its discretion to permit him to amend his petition to satisfy the minimal pleading burden governing his request for counsel. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. Simply stated, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 19

Amelioration, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000270

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.75. While review was still pending in the Supreme Court following the defendant’s appeal of his conviction, the trial court assumed jurisdiction and struck the prior prison term enhancement as directed by the Court of Appeal’s opiniion. More than a year later, the Calfiornia Department of Corrections and Rehabiltation advised that the defendant was on its list of inmates entitled to have their now-invalid prior prison term enhancements stricken. The court recalled the sentence under section 1172.75, but ultimately after the trial court discovered that it had already dismissed the now-invalid enhancement for a prior prison term, it concluded that the defendant was not eligible for resentencing. However, the trial court had no jurisdiction to strike the enhancement while the appeal was pending review in the Supreme Court.

First Holding:

Subject to limited exceptions, the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur. Remittitur transfers jurisdiction back to the inferior court so that it may act upon the case again, consistent with the judgment of the reviewing court. Until the remittitur issues, the lower court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the order or judgment on appeal. So complete is this loss of jurisdiction effected by the appeal that even the consent of the parties has been held ineffective to reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal and that an order based upon such consent would be a nullity.

Authority:

People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554

People v. Scarbrough (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 916, 923

Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 10

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044

In re Lukasik (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 438, 443

People v. Burhop (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 808, 813

Second Holding:

Because the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to strike the sentencing enhancements when it did [while the matter was still on appeal], the court’s order is void and vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time. Because the order striking the prior conviction enhancement is void, the only judgment that applied to defendant’s case was the original judgment that included the section 667.5 enhancement. The court therefore erred when it declined to resentence defendant by striking the section 667.5 enhancement during a new resentencing hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(c), (d)(1), (d)(2)

People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660

People v. Vasilyan (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 443, 450

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case: 000269

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the electronics search condition as currently framed is invalid under Lent and In re Ricardo P. We therefore strike the condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider the imposition of a modified electronics search condition in conformance with Ricardo P. and this opinion.

First Holding:

A juvenile court is authorized to impose any reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Notably, the permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults, given that juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and that the state stands in the shoes of the parents in caring for the minor’s well being when it asserts jurisdiction over the minor.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 909–910

Second Holding:

This broad discretion, however, is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. As the Supreme Court has explained, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first question is whether the minor’s use of an electronic device bore a relationship to his assault of the victim with force likely to produce great bodily injury. In the context of electronics search probation conditions, some Courts of Appeal have found that use of an electronic device is related to an offense when the device was used to commit, plan, or facilitate that offense. In this case there was no indication that the minor used an electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his assault of the victim.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720, 724 [electronic device was involved in the offense where defendant met his victim through social media]

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [electronic devices involved in transportation of controlled substances where defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

Fourth Holding:

Other Courts of Appeal have found that electronic devices were not related to an offense when the connection between electronic device usage and an offense was more tangential. For example, in Alonzo M., the mere fact that electronic devices were stolen during the minor’s commission of automobile burglaries and purse snatch robberies did not compel the conclusion that electronic devices related to these offenses. Similarly, in Amber K., the minor’s use of social media before and after a school fight was found to be insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Lent.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 158-164 [observing the condition could not be upheld under either of first two Lent prongs]

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 564–566

Fifth Holding:

As indicated, there appears no dispute the second prong of the Lent test has been met. And for good reason: it is well-established that there is nothing inherently illegal about using electronic devices.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Sixth Holding:

The third prong of Lent requires that we assess whether the electronics search condition requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. The third prong of Lent contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. An abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality is insufficient. A condition can survive only when there is information in the record establishing a connection between the search condition and the probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history and when the burden imposed by the condition is proportionate to the legitimate interests served by that condition.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1121-1122

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166

Seventh Holding:

Following Ricardo P. and Alonzo M., we conclude the broad-ranging electronics search condition burdens the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the probation department’s legitimate interest in monitoring” his compliance with his probation terms, including the order to stay away from the victim.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees

Case: 000268

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment does not accurately state the sentence imposed. It reflects the imposition of a variety of fines and fees. The trial court struck all fines and fees pursuant to People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 [regarding inability to pay] and ordered that anything that could not be stricken be stayed. Although we will affirm the trial court’s orders, we will remand with directions to correct the abstract of judgment.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: There was no authority indicated in the opinion for the correction of the abstract. The error is so obvious that it hardly seems necessary to provide authority. Nonetheless, there is authority the court could have cited. The appellate court may direct the trial court to correct clerical errors in an abstract of judgment.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Gary Note:

[Gary note: Duenas was disapproved by the California Supreme Court to the extent it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kopp. Kopp is a must-read on the issue of the obligation of trial courts AND of the defendant (or defense counsel) regarding whether to impose certain fines and fees and the nature of the challenges available to the defendant. I have included the citation to Kopp below for your convenience, but it was not mentioned in this decision. Because of the nature of the issues raised in the brief, it was not necessary for the Court of Appeal to revisit the action of the trial court regarding imposition and staying or striking of fines and fees. The only issue was the inaccuracy of the abstract of judgment.]

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1