Daily Archives: July 18, 2026

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000210

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion when declining to fully strike the firearm enhancement or strike it and impose a lesser firearm enhancement. The trial court errantly focused only on the defendant’s past and present danger to public safety, and not whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety in the future. The trial court erred in deciding whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety because, as the record of the sentencing hearing indicates, it focused solely on defendant’s past conduct and the circumstances of the murder. In the context of section 1385, the key question is forward looking—whether striking the enhancement would likely endanger public safety. Thus, even if the trial court struck the enhancement, the defendant would still be serving an indeterminate 15-to-life term with parole eligibility subject to the Parole Board and Governor’s review. The trial court must consider this future-looking issue for purposes of public safety.

First Holding:

A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [reminding that a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion]

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022,Penal Code section 1385 was amended to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. It reads, in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so …. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” Subparagraphs (A) to (I) list nine distinct mitigating circumstances, including, as is relevant here, subparagraph (C) where the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Subparagraph (C) states in this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674

Third Holding:

Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. For a defendant facing a lengthy indeterminate sentence, the inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. This future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public safety.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

 

Sentencing

Case: 000209

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in recalculating the defendant’s custody credits. It stated that he spent four days in custody and earned two days of conduct credit. The court, however, awarded only four days. The matter is remanded for recalculation of presentence custody credits. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Holding:

Under section 4019(e), a defendant begins to earn conduct credits after being committed for a period of four days or longer. Here, the defendant was in custody for four days and was therefore entitled to two days of conduct credit.

Authority:

PEN 4019

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000208

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court resentenced defendant the defendant pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. The court failed to award credit for the time the defendant served in custody. The court imposed repealed fees. The resentencing minute order should be clarified to reflect the proper order in which the defendant must serve the terms comprising his sentence. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to recalculate defendant’s custody credits and to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order as indicated in this opinion and forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract and minute order to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

First Holding:

Were a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. This means a court resentencing a defendant must credit the defendant with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time. The updated total of credits must then be added to the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

PC 2900.1

PC 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1129-1130

Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group Aug. 2025 update) secs. 15:15, 15:20, 15:24, 26:6

Second Holding:

The trial court was not authorized to impose fees under former Government Code section 29550.2. (Former Gov. Code, sec. 29550.2.) The Legislature repealed that statute effective July 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, sec. 25.) Even if Government Code section 29550.2 were still in effect, the Legislature has declared such fees unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. (Gov. Code, sec. 6111(a).) Accordingly, we vacate the main jail booking fee and the main jail classification fee imposed by the trial court.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Third Holding:

Whenever a person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of imprisonment shall be served first. The minute order for the resentencing hearing states that the determinate is to be served consecutive to the indeterminate sentence. The minute order must be corrected.

[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its order to correct the minute order. But there is much authority allowing a court to correct errors in abstracts of judgments and minute orders. I have set forth a few below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000207

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate the trial court’s finding that defendant’s 2014 conviction for violating former section 186.22(a) constituted a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of Three Strikes sentencing and imposition of a prior serious or violent felony conviction enhancement. Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings to include the option to retry the allegation and for resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted AB 333 to narrow the definition of criminal street gang in order to focus on true gang-related crimes, having determined that in practice the original definition of a criminal street gang was not narrowly focused on punishing true gang-related crimes. The Legislature in AB 333 redefined the term criminal street gang so as to truly target the population of criminals for which an enhanced punishment is warranted. AB 333 made significant changes to the elements of gang offenses and enhancements as defined in section 186.22

Authority:

People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 576

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

Though the prior conviction of what purported to be a serious felony was sustained in 2014, where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

APeople v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fifth Amendment, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000206

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true findings on the gang enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements are vacated. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the enhancement allegations under the law as amended by AB 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Several years after the defendant was sentenced, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1(a)(1), based on the defendant’s exceptional conduct while incarcerated. The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced him to 40 years to life, despite the recommendation by both parties that the sentence be reduced to a determinate term less than half that 40-year minimum. The trial court erred in not examining the impact of AB 333, which amended the gang activity statutes significantly. When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and the defendant regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of AB 333’s ameliorative changes to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312 [the application of law to undisputed facts is a question of law subject to de novo review]

Second Holding:

The evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial was insufficient to establish that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang beyond enhancing its reputation. Accordingly, we must vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements under section 186.22(b)(1), as well as the true findings on the gang-related firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).

Authority:

People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 239–240

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206, fn. 11

Third Holding:

Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial. Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669-670

Fourth Holding:

Whether the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]