Daily Archives: July 16, 2026

Case: 000200

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s sentence on two firearm enhancements and one possession of an explosive device should have been imposed and stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. We modify the judgment accordingly.

First Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414

Third Holding:

When a trial court sentences a defendant to separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding each offense had a separate objective. We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied finding that a defendant had separate intents and objectives for different offenses.

Authority:

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414

In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 43

Fourth Holding:

The sentences on each of three counts were based on his simultaneous possession of two completed assault rifles, and we assume that such possession can constitute two physical acts for the purposes of section 654. Even so, multiple punishment can be imposed consistent with section 654—on two of the three counts —only if substantial evidence in the record supports an implied finding that he had a separate objective in possessing one firearm versus the other. Our review of the record reveals no such evidence. Section 654 also prohibits multiple punishment for both possession of an explosive device and possession of ingredients to make an explosive device, because the explosives the defendant possessed were not actually capable of exploding, and thus identical evidence supported both counts. Both counts were based on the defendant’s possession of the ingredients in the box truck, at the same time and place, and under the same circumstances. Both counts were based on, essentially, the same course of conduct.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358 [suggesting simultaneous possession of different items of contraband’ are separate acts for purposes of section 654]

In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 43

Fifth Holding:

Because it is apparent from the sentence imposed that the sentence would be little changed as a result of remand, in the interests of judicial economy, and given that the parties agree on this remedy, we will modify the judgment to stay the sentences on counts 5 and 6 rather than remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1260 [authority to modify unauthorized sentence]

People v. Burns (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1184 [staying execution of the penalty imposed is the preferred remedy for section 654 error where the reduction in sentence would be relatively minor because in such cases, it would not serve the interests of justice or judicial economy to require remand]

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [exercising authority to modify judgment to impose and stay sentence under section 654 rather than remand for resentencing that will not change defendant’s actual prison time]

Case 000199

Error and/or relief

The defendant was sentenced to state prison after pleading no contest to robbery and injury a girlfriend. The trial court improperly imposed a domestic violence fee. We strike the fee.

Holding:

A domestic violence fee is only authorized when a defendant is granted probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

Case 000198

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing three Life Without The Possiblity Of Parole (LWOP) sentences on each of the two murders, despite the jury having found true three special circumstances as to each murder.

Holding:

The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more special circumstances has been found to be true. Multiple true special circumstance findings do not justify additional punishment.

Authority:

PEN 190.2

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 874 [defendant faced no additional punishment merely as a result of additional special circumstance true finding]

Case 000196 – 000197

Error and/or relief

[Gary note: There were two separate cases, different defendants with similar issues. The court issued separate opinions that were essentially identical for the purposes of these summaries.] In light of recent legislative developments, we determine it was error to deny defendant counsel at the prima facie stage of a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) where the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the RJA. Further, the term “offense” in the RJA should be broadly construed to include the disparate charging and sentencing of enhancement allegations, including gang enhancements. An enhancement may form the basis of a petition for habeas relief alleging a violation of the RJA, and we hold that the current petition should be granted.

First Holding:

When an indigent petitioner files an RJA petition and requests counsel, the superior court must appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the RJA.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39–40, 44

Second Holding:

A cognizable RJA claim may rest on statewide statistical data addressing the disparate charging and sentencing of special-circumstance allegations. The statement by Justice Liu in his dissent from the denial of review in Mendoza recognizes that a cognizable RJA claim may rest on statewide statistical data addressing the disparate charging and sentencing of special-circumstance allegations. By adopting that approach, the Legislature has made clear that discriminatory charging and sentencing practices involving special-circumstance allegations—and, by logical extension, conduct-based enhancements—fall within the scope of the RJA. Assembly Bill 1071 further clarifies that the RJA must be implemented broadly to remedy discriminatory charging and sentencing practices and expressly directs that counsel shall be appointed for an indigent litigant who alleges a plausible claim of an RJA violation.

[Gary note: AB 1071 should be read fully and carefully. Some of its provisions were enacted but do not appear in any California code, such as its section 1(a), in which the Legislature makes clear what its legislative intent was, in contrast to previous interpretations by some Courts of Appeal. It also contains multiple versions of amendments to existing statutes with a statement in section 5 as to which version is enacted, dependent on whether certain other specified legislation is enacted. And it contains an express intention to reject an interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court: “The Legislature again emphasizes its rejection of McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, and its intent that statistical evidence be sufficient for finding a prima facie case and may suffice to show an RJA violation. (See, for example, Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 133 (conc. opn. of Menetrez, J.).)” I originally misread that sentence, because I attributed the second “its” to the Supreme Court. On second reading, I realized that it (a) emphasized the Legislature’s rejection of McClesky, and (b) emphasized the Legislature’s intent that statistical evidence be sufficient for a prima facie case.]

Authority:

Assembly Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2025, ch. 721) (Assembly Bill 1071, effective 1/1/2026) [the Legislature expressly endorsed the broader construction of the RJA reflected in Justice Liu’s dissenting statement in denial of a petition for review In re Mendoza (2024) [2024 WL 5171483] [2024 Cal. LEXIS 7082]

Case: 000195

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the defendant has not been convicted of a serious or violent felony.

Holding:

As counsel notes, the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects that the defendant was convicted of a serious or violent felony. No such conviction appears in the record. The trial court shall prepare a corrected abstract of judgment not indicating the defendant was convicted of a serious or violent felony.

[Gary note: The court included no citation of authority, but the law is clear that an incorrect abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the actual judgment. I have included some cases the court could have cited.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Caudillo (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 122, 126