Error and/or relief
[Gary note: There were two separate cases, different defendants with similar issues. The court issued separate opinions that were essentially identical for the purposes of these summaries.] In light of recent legislative developments, we determine it was error to deny defendant counsel at the prima facie stage of a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) where the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the RJA. Further, the term “offense” in the RJA should be broadly construed to include the disparate charging and sentencing of enhancement allegations, including gang enhancements. An enhancement may form the basis of a petition for habeas relief alleging a violation of the RJA, and we hold that the current petition should be granted.First Holding:
When an indigent petitioner files an RJA petition and requests counsel, the superior court must appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the RJA.
Authority:
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39–40, 44
Second Holding:
A cognizable RJA claim may rest on statewide statistical data addressing the disparate charging and sentencing of special-circumstance allegations. The statement by Justice Liu in his dissent from the denial of review in Mendoza recognizes that a cognizable RJA claim may rest on statewide statistical data addressing the disparate charging and sentencing of special-circumstance allegations. By adopting that approach, the Legislature has made clear that discriminatory charging and sentencing practices involving special-circumstance allegations—and, by logical extension, conduct-based enhancements—fall within the scope of the RJA. Assembly Bill 1071 further clarifies that the RJA must be implemented broadly to remedy discriminatory charging and sentencing practices and expressly directs that counsel shall be appointed for an indigent litigant who alleges a plausible claim of an RJA violation.
[Gary note: AB 1071 should be read fully and carefully. Some of its provisions were enacted but do not appear in any California code, such as its section 1(a), in which the Legislature makes clear what its legislative intent was, in contrast to previous interpretations by some Courts of Appeal. It also contains multiple versions of amendments to existing statutes with a statement in section 5 as to which version is enacted, dependent on whether certain other specified legislation is enacted. And it contains an express intention to reject an interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court: “The Legislature again emphasizes its rejection of McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, and its intent that statistical evidence be sufficient for finding a prima facie case and may suffice to show an RJA violation. (See, for example, Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 133 (conc. opn. of Menetrez, J.).)” [I originally misread that sentence, because I attributed the second “its” to the Supreme Court. On second reading, I realized that it (a) emphasized the Legislature’s rejection of McClesky, and (b) emphasized the Legislature’s intent that statistical evidence be sufficient for a prima facie case.]Authority:
Assembly Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2025, ch. 721) (Assembly Bill 1071, effective 1/1/2026) [the Legislature expressly endorsed the broader construction of the RJA reflected in Justice Liu’s dissenting statement in denial of a petition for review In re Mendoza (2024) [2024 WL 5171483] [2024 Cal. LEXIS 7082]