Daily Archives: July 23, 2026

Case: 000237

Error and/or relief

The sentencing court erred by considering aggravating circumstances not proven at trial. Because we reverse and remand for resentencing, we need not address the defendant’s contention that the court committed dual use error by relying on same fact—that he was was armed with or used a firearm—to both impose enhancements and sentence him to the upper term. He may raise his dual use argument at resentencing.

First Holding:

The defendant’s attorney did not object to dual use of facts or reliance on factors in aggravation that were not proved at trial. In general, claims not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. This includes claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.

However, an appellate court may decline to apply the forfeiture rule. Where an otherwise forfeited claim presents an important question of constitutional law or a substantial right, the appellate court may exercise discretion to review the claim. Thus, in People v. Gonzalez, this court declined to apply forfeiture to the defendant’s section 1170(b) claim where the defendant did not refer to the statute at sentencing, citing the defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and stating the application of amended section 1170(b) implicates a constitutional right.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 326-327

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568

People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1030, fn. 10

Second Holding:

The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Third Holding:

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea). Under the current version of section 1170(b)(2), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper. When the trial court actually relies on improperly proven aggravating facts to justify an upper term sentence, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs and the Chapman standard of reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt must be satisfied.

Authority:

People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Case: 000236

Error and/or relief

The abstracts of judgment for all of the defendants reflect assessments that were not orally pronounced (in fact, the trial court had found that the defendants did not have the ability to pay the fees) and must be stricken. The People agree. We agree with the parties and will order those assessments stricken from the abstract of judgment.

Holding:

It is well settled that an abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize. When an abstract of judgment does not reflect the actual sentence imposed in the trial judge’s verbal pronouncement, the court has the inherent power to correct such clerical error on appeal, whether on our own motion or upon application of the parties.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Case 000235

Error and/or relief

After the initial conviction was overturned on appeal, and the defendant was again convicted at trial, it was error for the trial court to impose consecutive terms for counts that had been imposed concurrently following the first trial.

Holding:

If a defendant successfully challenges his conviction and obtains a new trial, the due process and double jeopardy clauses of the California Constitution prohibit the imposition of a greater sentence following retrial.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1403

People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1275–1276 [modifying sentence after trial court imposed a more severe penalty after the second trial]

Case: 000234

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that one of the counts was to be served concurrently rather than consecutively as the abstract currently show.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that one of the counts was to be served concurrently rather than consecutively as the abstract currently show.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion listed no authority for its order directing the correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious. Other opinions have cited authority for the proposition that the appellate court itself has the power to correct the abstract of judgment. For convenience, and because my point in presenting unpublished cases in the first place is to provide education on principles that might not be obvious to find in published opinions that deal with new and nuanced problems, I have set forth some authority the appellate court could have cited.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case: 000233

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s pre-sentence motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA).

First Holding:

Good cause for RJA discovery requires only a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act could or might have occurred. Good cause for RJA discovery is a minimal plausible justification standard less onerous than the prima facie showing of an RJA violation under section 745(c) that should not be difficult to meet. The statistical and academic materials presented with the defendant’s motion satisfied the minimally stringent requirements for discovery, entitling him to further evidentiary development of his RJA claim.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138

Second Holding:

The trial court must exercise its discretion to decide the appropriate scope of disclosure by weighing the following: whether the material requested is adequately described; the material’s relative availability to the responding entity and the defendant; the request’s timeliness; the risk of causing unreasonable delay or imposing an undue burden on the responding entity; and the risk of violating third-party confidentiality, privacy rights, or protected governmental interests.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 168

City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134