Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001050

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court improperly imposed fines and ancillary costs without considering the defendant’s ability to pay. The ancillary fees imposed on the defendant are vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider whether the defendant has the ability to pay the court operations assessment and the court facilities assessment imposed in his sentence.

First Holding:

We review the imposition of fines and assessments for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1043

Second Holding:

The respondent argues that the defendant forfeited the issue regarding his ability to pay because defense counsel did not object to the fines or assessments imposed. The defendant states that he personally objected that he was unable to pay, preserving the issue for appeal, or his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object.

In light of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the defendant’s challenge.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

Third Holding:

Kopp divided court-ordered payments into three categories: fines, ancillary costs, and victim restitution.

Addressing fines, Kopp held that fines (including restitution fines under section 1202.4) are punitive in nature, that fines should be analyzed under the excessive fines clauses in the United States and California Constitutions, and that courts need not hold a hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing all fines.

By contrast, Kopp continued, ancillary costs (including court facilities fees under Government Code section 70373 and court operations fees under section 1465.8) are not punitive in nature, and equal protection principles require a rational basis for treating ancillary fees for indigent criminal defendants differently than indigent civil litigants. Finding no such basis, Kopp concluded that, when requested, trial courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 18-24, 25, 28, 30

Fourth Holding:

Points perfunctorily asserted in briefing on appeal without argument in support are not properly raised.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Plea bargains, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001044

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a term of 16 months in jail as a condition of probation. The matter must be remanded for resentencing, and for the court to determine the issue of the amount of the restitution fine in light of Kopp.

First Holding:

The trial court imposed a jail term of 16 months as a condition of probation because he had missed his appointment with his probation officer and failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. However, section 19.2 provides that, except in situations not here relevant, in no case shall any person sentenced to confinement in a county or city jail, as a condition of probation upon conviction of either a felony or a misdemeanor, be committed for a period in excess of one year.

Authority:

PEN 19.2

Second Holding:

Although Bailey held that the one-year limit may be waived by the defendant, Bailey is distinguishable because the defendant Bailey entered a knowing and intelligent waiver. There is no evidence here that the defendant was informed of the 12-month limit under section 19.2, and his agreement to the longer term was therefore not a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Authority:

People v. Bailey (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 828, 831

People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 308 [regarding waiver of credit for time served, the gravamen of whether such a waiver is knowing and intelligent is whether the defendant understood he was relinquishing or giving up custody credits to which he was otherwise entitled under section 2900.5]

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 [criminal defendant’s waiver of right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it]

Third Holding:

On remand, the defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive under the federal and state constitutions. As to ancillary costs, if requested by the defendat, the trial court shall consider his inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1), allowing the parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30-31

Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001015

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to stay the court facilities assessment and a court operations assessment based on defendant’s inability to pay. We vacate those orders.

Holding:

If a defendant requests such consideration, a trial court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Here, however, the trial court at resentencing purported to impose but stay the assessments based on inability to pay, rather than waive them.

Because there appears to be no basis to justify denying criminal defendants a waiver of certain ancillary costs when civil litigants may receive such a waiver, we will modify the judgment to strike the imposed but stayed court facilities assessment and court operations assessment.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001004

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal following remand from the defendant’s first appeal, the trial court failed to impose sentence on several counts whose punishment it stayed under section 654. It failed to impose a fine on a fifth count, and it improperly reimposed several other fines.

First Holding:

The court’s failure to pronounce sentence on some of the counts constitutes an unauthorized sentence. When a trial court determines that section 654 applies, the court must impose sentence on every count but stay execution as necessary to implement section 654. This procedure also applies when one of the sentences pertains to a misdemeanor conviction.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380

Second Holding:

The defendant’s conviction under Vehicle Code section 23152(a) (driving under the influence) requires a fine, but the court failed to impose a fine.

Authority:

VEH 23536(a)

VEH 23600

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 [defining an unauthorized sentence as one that cannot lawfully be imposed under any circumstances in a particular case]

Third Holding:

Having concluded that the trial court’s failure to impose sentences and to impose a fine resulted in an unauthorized sentence, we also conclude that remand is required to correct the errors. In other cases, we have exercised our authority under section 1260 to modify judgments in sentencing matters where remand would be futile or unnecessary because the record clearly indicated how the trial court would exercise its sentencing discretion.

Here, however, the trial court did not impose sentences on counts two, four, seven, and nine or the firearm enhancement associated with count two, or impose a fine on count six, either at the original sentencing or at the section 1172.75 resentencing. Given the range of sentencing options for the omitted counts and enhancement and the permissible range of the fine on count six, the record does not clearly indicate what sentences or fine the court would have imposed. Accordingly, remand is required.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473

Fourth Holding:

We disagree with the People that on remand, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing. Section 1260 grants appellate courts the authority to order limited remands for further proceedings that may be appropriate under the circumstances. In resentencing the defendant in 2025, the trial court considered the relevant factors in formulating a sentence it deemed appropriate based on his culpability, criminal history, and his risk of future dangerousness.

The two limited tasks on remand (imposing and staying sentences on the omitted counts that the court had already indicated it intended to stay and imposing a fine on count six) will not alter the overall sentencing scheme the trial court deemed appropriate such that resentencing on all nine counts would be required.

For these reasons, we order a limited remand.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 948-949

People v. Stevens (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1452, 1456 [Correcting a sentencing error by excising only the flawed component of the sentence from the aggregate term may be appropriate in some contexts where the interests of justice and judicial economy do not require a restructuring of the entire sentencing format]

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in reimposing and staying several fees, despite making an implied finding that the defendant did not have an ability to pay. Equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Neither of the applicable statutes nor Kopp allows a trial court to impose then stay the court operations fee or the court facilities fee after it finds a defendant indigent. Once it found the defendant lacked the ability to pay, the court’s option was to not impose the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Sixth Holding:

The statutes authorizing certain other fees that were previously imposed have since been repealed and are now unenforceable and uncollectible. Any portion of a judgment imposing those fees must be vacated.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001001

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(Gary note: This is not a win, but it contains of discussion on what excess credit for time served can apply to in the context of fines or fees.)

Penal Code section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines or nonpunitive assessments.

First Holding:

At the conclusion of the defendant’s proceedings, his credit for time served exceeded the total prison commitment that was imposed. His contention that section 2900.5 requires that his excess credits be applied against the ordered restitution fine and ancillary fees raises a matter of statutory interpretation requiring this court to exercise de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Carranza (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 17, 23.

Second Holding:

Section 2900.5(a) provides that all presentence custody credit awarded to a defendant shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence.

If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied to the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be applied to the base fine.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Third Holding:

Section 2900.5 has undergone several changes, and prior to 2014 included restitution fines as subject to offset by excess days. Since 2017, the relevant language now requires that credit be applied to “any base fine,” with penalties and assessments imposed on the base fine to be reduced by the percentage the base fine has been satisfied. Excess credits cannot be applied to reduce restitution fines. Section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines, nor does it apply to nonpunitive assessments, such as the court operations assessment and the criminal conviction assessment imposed in this case.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92-93

People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 967, fn. 7

People v. Rojas (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 48, 56