Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000456

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After ten years, the unpaid balance of any restitution fines are no longer collectible and the restitution order must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) mandates that in every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. Section 1465.9 was amended effective January 1, 2025, to add subdivision (d) which requires that, on the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The trial court’s reimposition of the fine at resentencing in 2025 did not restart the 10-year clock.

Authority:

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000454

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find that a condition of probation that requires the defendant participate and complete any counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program deemed appropriate by the probation officer was not an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine, it was improper to impose as a condition of probation that the defendant participate at his own expense.

The challenged probation condition should be modified to delete the portion of the condition requiring defendant to be responsible for the payment of the costs/fees of any counseling or rehabilitation/treatment program. The court is directed to issue a separate order for the payment of such costs and fees. Before the court may order defendant to pay any or all costs associated with his probation, it must make an inquiry and determination as to his ability to pay and determine the amount of payment.

First Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation. Instead, the court must issue a separate order for the payment of such costs. Moreover, before ordering a defendant to pay costs of probation, the court must make an inquiry and determination of the defendant’s ability to pay and the amount of payment.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1b(a)

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

Second Holding:

Though we find there was no improper delegation, the defendant’s claim that the condition of probation is an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine has not been forfeited for lack of objection, because it raises a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888

People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172

Third Holding:

A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. Further, the court has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions. We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143

Fourth Holding:

A trial court is governed by the separation of powers doctrine. The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. Although the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212

Fifth Holding:

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359

Sixth Holding:

A probation condition directing that a defendant participate in any treatment program when considering another condition requiring a defendant complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with treatment as prescribed by the probation officer, passes constitutional muster. This is particularly true where the court’s oral comments reflect that the defendant needs treatment for a substance abuse problem. However, where the condition includes the possibility of participation in a residential treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, it is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902-903

People v. Cruz (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310 [Invalidating probation condition that gave the probation officer sole discretion to decide whether the defendant should be subject to GPS monitoring.]

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 1359 [Invalidating condition that provided, “You shall not associate socially, nor be present at any time, at any place, public or private, with any person, as designated by your probation officer.”]

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238,-1241 [Upholding probation condition that directed defendant to “follow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe”]

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307 [Upholding condition that probation officer may unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation program and determine whether defendant successfully completed that program.]

Seventh Holding:

A probation condition should be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. Following that precept, we read the challenged provision here not as delegating adjudicatory powers to the probation officer but as indicating the court’s advance approval of an agreement that the probation officer might reach with defendant. If a probation officer does interpret the condition in an arbitrary manner, defendant may then file a petition for modification of his probation condition. Thus, the probation condition did not improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(b)(1)

PEN 1203.3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 211

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation officer’s actions]

People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658 [If probation officer interprets probation condition in an arbitrary way, the defendant can file a petition for modification of his probation condition.]

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000452

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed the fines and fees without conducting an ability to pay hearing over trial counsel’s objection. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court settled the question of imposition of fines and fees with regard to the ability to pay. We strike the $370 in fines and fees.

First Holding:

A defendant may challenge the imposition of a punitive fine under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions. Equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing court operations and facilities assessments fees as ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 29-30

Second Holding:

On this record, it would not serve the interests of justice or judicial economy to require remand. Appellant has been incarcerated for most of his adult life. Given his current sentence (55 years to life), he will presumably be incarcerated for the rest of his life. Additionally, the probation report does not indicate he has any assets or property. The court has the authority to strike the fines and fees rather than remand the matter for a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

PC 1260 [The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000437

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates a restitution fine of $3,400 to be paid, rather than the $2,400 imposed by the trial court. It must be corrected.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment–likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious–but there is plenty of authority, which I cite below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109 [court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in abstract of judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000436

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in that it indicates that the trial court imposed a restitution fund fine of $330 pursuant to section 1202.4 but at sentencing the trial court stated that the amount of that fine was $300. It must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Abstracts and Minutes, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000427

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for limited resentencing proceedings concerning the imposition of mandatory ancillary costs under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, both of which were omitted from the trial court’s original oral sentencing pronouncements.

First Holding:

The sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court only imposed restitution and parole revocation fines, both in the amount of $500. The court purported to waive all fees and other fines without providing an explanation. Yet, the minute order and the indeterminate abstract of judgment indicate an imposed $200 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, as well as a $150 criminal conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373.

The court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment are properly characterized as ancillary costs. That is, they are funding mechanisms created by the Legislature to raise funds for court operations and facilities; they are not punitive in nature. Imposition of these ancillary costs is mandatory for every criminal conviction except parking offenses. However, due to a robust fee waiver system in civil cases for the same types of ancillary costs, the unavailability of a fee waiver in criminal cases violates equal protection guarantees. Upon request by a criminal defendant, a trial court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). This includes allowing the parties to present and contest any relevant evidence or argument on the question.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 14-15, 26-27, 30

Second Holding:

[Gary Note: The court sidestepped the issue because it remanded for a Kopp hearing, but oral pronouncements prevail over written orders. The court has the authority to order corrections where the abstract of judgment or minute order does not reflect exactly what the court ordered. Had the court decided to order the correction, there are many cases it could have chosen from as authority. I have set forth a few below. Again, the discrepancy was moot in this case.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000425

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Having been sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, it was error to impose the parole revocation restitution fine. The abstract of judgment also must be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded at the sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1202.45(a), provides that the court shall assess a parole revocation restitution fine in every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole. This parole revocation fine statute, however, does not apply in cases where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP and indeterminate terms. The parole revocation fine shall be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 485–486 [parole revocation fine under sec. 1202.45 inapplicable where sentence was death]

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [improper to impose parole revocation fine where the defendant received an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and LWOP]

People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1184 [where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP, there can be no parole, and therefore the parole revocation fine was improperly assessed]

People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075 [parole revocation fine proper where the defendant, in addition to being sentenced to death, also sentenced to determinate term]

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in reflecting the custody credits. The court’s oral pronouncement is correct, and it controls over the abstract of judgment or sentencing minute order. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment that accurately reflects the correct number of days of actual custody credit awarded by the court in its oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts with jurisdiction have the power to order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000417

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a $10 crime prevention fine under section 1202.5. It is ordered stricken. The minute order must be corrected to reflect that the resentencing proceedings were under section 1172.75, not under section 1172.6 as the minute order indicated.

First Holding:

The original imposition of the section 1202.5 crime prevention fine was unauthorized.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [claims of unauthorized sentencing error may be raised at any time]

Second Holding:

Under section 1202.5(a), courts are required to impose a $10 crime prevention fine on a defendant who is convicted of a theft-related offense listed in the statute. Here, the $10 crime prevention fine was unauthorized because defendant’s convictions are not among the offenses listed in section 1202.5(a). Thus, we strike the $10 crime prevention fine from defendant’s sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5(a)

People v. Jefferson (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 660, 663

Third Holding:

The minute orders refer to the proceedings as taking place pursuant to section 1172.6. As the record is clear these were resentencing proceedings pursuant to section 1172.75, this appears to be a clerical error.

[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for the order or observation regarding the correction of the minute order, but there is authority aplenty. The court could have cited one or more of the cases I have set out below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000406

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The provision in the probation order requiring the defendant to reimburse the county for public defender and probation related services must be stricken.

Holding:

Section 1465.9(a) provides that the balance of any court-imposed costs imposed under former section 987.8, authorizing public defender fees, and former section 1203.1b, authorizing probation services fees, as those sections read on June 30, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. Accordingly, we will strike the portion of the probation order authorizing these fees.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(a)

People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 602-603

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 625

Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000395

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the defendant requested the court impose the minimum restitution fine and the court did not consider his ability to pay and imposed fines exceeding the statutory minimum, we reverse and remand solely for reconsideration of imposition of the fines.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) requires trial courts to impose a restitution fine when a defendant is convicted of a felony unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so. For felony convictions, the required fine is not less than $300 and not more than $10,000. A defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine of $300. And for those defendants whose sentence includes a period of parole, the trial court must impose a parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount. The latter fine shall be suspended unless the person’s parole is revoked.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

PEN 1202.45

Second Holding:

A trial court must conduct an ability to pay hearing before imposing a restitution fine that exceeds the statutory minimum of $300. As in Kopp, the trial court here imposed restitution and parole revocation fines exceeding $300 without conducting an ability to pay hearing. And there is no affirmative evidence indicating that the trial court knew that defendant’s ability to pay was a factor in determining the fine to be imposed. Nor did the trial court indicate that it considered counsel’s objection that the defendant could not afford to pay fines exceeding $300. The trial court only stated that counsel’s “comments are noted for the record.” Thus, we cannot conclude the trial court considered the defendant’s financial wherewithal in deciding to impose more than the minimum fine. We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing because the imposed fines exceeded the minimum.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000394.txt

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Having sentenced the defendant to a term of life without the possibility of parole, it was error to impose the parole revocation restitution fine. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement regarding the sentence imposed on the prior convictions.

First Holding:

Because defendant was also sentenced to LWOP, the court should not have imposed the parole revocation restitution fine.

Authority:

PC 1202.45

People v. McInnis (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 853, 866-867

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment inaccurately reflects the total number of years imposed for the prior serious felony enhancements requiring correction. The defendant’s determinate abstract of judgment inaccurately reflects a total of 25 years of prior serious felony enhancements, broken out as 20 years on first line and 5 years on the second line. The trial court imposed four five-year prior serious felony enhancements for a total of 20 years on the murder count. We will direct the trial court to prepare an amended determinate abstract of judgment to correct this mathematical error.

[GARY NOTE: The court did not cite any authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but plenty exists. The court did not cite the case, but it could have cited.]

Authority:

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Eighth Amendment, Sentencing

Case: 000386

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment and a court facilities assessment. We therefore remand to the trial court to conduct an inability to pay hearing as to those assessments.

First Holding:

Under Kopp, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment and a court facilities assessment.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

Restitution fines and parole revocation fines under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45a), respectively, are punitive fines. Court operations assessments and court facilities assessments, under section 1465.8(a)(1) and Government Code section 70373(a)(1), respectively, are ancillary costs and not punishment. As to punitive fines, subject to the Eighth Amendment, a court may impose a nonexcessive fine as punishment. therwise, an excessive fines analysis applies to punitive fines imposed in excess of the minimum. Because the trial court here imposed punitive fines in the minimum amounts of $300 and stayed the parole revocation fine, they are not subject to an inability to pay hearing, as the defendant concedes.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13-15

Third Holding:

However, ancillary costs do implicate equal protection principles. The court operations and facilities assessments are ancillary costs intended to raise funds for the courts. A criminal defendant cannot avoid the imposition of these costs regardless of indigency. By contrast, an indigent civil litigant may have similar fees waived entirely. Where the Legislature has already determined that both criminal defendants and civil litigants should be charged similar amounts for the same reasons, there appears no rational basis to deny only indigent criminal defendants the ability to avoid those costs. Accordingly, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Therefore, the trial court here should have considered the defendants’s inability to pay before imposing the $40 court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) and the $30 criminal conviction assessment fee under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 18, 28-29, 30