Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000385

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minute order and abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that the court imposed the parole revocation fine (PEN 1202.45) on the defendant, who was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Because the parole revocation fine cannot be imposed on person sentence to LWOP, it must be stricken.

First Holding:

The trial court should not have imposed the challenged fines and respectfully request the court modify the judgment by striking them. The abstract must be corrected.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45

People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181–1182, 1185 [Section 1202.45 indicates that it is applicable to a person .whose sentence includes a period of parole]

Second Holding:

The defendant contends he is entitled to an additional day of actual presentence custody credit. The People concede he is correct. Although the defendant did not object at trial, forfeiture of sentencing only occurs when the alleged error involved an exercise of discretion. Because the calculation of credits is purely mathematical, his failure to object at trial does not preclude this court from correcting the error.

Authority:

People v. Aguirre (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000376

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the 2024 resentencing hearing under section 1172.5 pertaining to the defendant’s 2007 conviction, the court imposed a $5000 restitution fine, reducing the $10,000 restitution fine imposed in 2007. Since 10 years had lapsed since the original imposition of a restitution fine, it must be vacated.

First Holding:

Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Section 1465.9(d), applies retroactively to the defendant’s reopened sentence. The restitution fine was first imposed nearly 20 years ago and is now unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9(d).

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681 [SB 136’s changes to section 667.5, former subdivision (b), applied retroactively to sentences that were not final at the time the law became effective]

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000369

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred in failing to conduct a full resentencing. The court erred in its calculation of custody credits, both as to postsentence conduct credits and credits for days in actual custody. The abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment as to the restitution fines and the victim restitution order.

First Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of an offense, a sentencing court has a duty to render judgment and impose the penalty authorized by law. Judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. In rendering the judgment, the court must pronounce sentence on each count for which the defendant sustained a conviction. The failure to pronounce a sentence for each conviction results in an unauthorized sentence that can be corrected at any time.

Authority:

PEN 12

People v. Martinez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411, fn. 6

Second Holding:

At the resentencing hearing following our remand in the earlier appeal, the trial court addressed only the errors we identified in our opinion. Our remand order was not so limited. It was for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, abrogated on another ground by People v. Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985

Third Holding:

The trial court’s statements suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the effect of our order vacating the defendant’s sentence and remanding for a full sentencing, which was the nullification of the previous sentence. Because the prior sentence no longer existed, the court had to construct an entirely new sentence. By failing to orally pronounce a sentence on the nine counts for which it stayed the sentences at the original sentencing, the court failed to render judgment on all of the defendant’s convictions, resulting in an unauthorized sentence. When the trial court stated it was excluding counts it had previously stayed under section 654, the trial court used the term concurrent in connection with section 654. But where section 654 applies, it precludes any multiple punishment, consecutive or concurrent.

Authority:

People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 297

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411, fn. 6

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594

Fourth Holding:

Generally, when an unauthorized sentence is discovered on appeal, a reviewing court affirms the defendant’s conviction and remands the case for the trial court to pronounce a sentence consistent with the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353

Fifth Holding:

Our order for a full resentencing necessarily encompasses calculating the defendant’s custody credits and the appropriate assessments, fines, and restitution awards. When it resentenced the defendant, the trial court was required to credit her with all actual days she had spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Sixth Holding:

A trial court is required to include all aspects of a judgment in its oral pronouncement. That includes fines and direct victim restitution. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment. Upon a defendant’s request, the trial court must hold a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing ancillary costs, like the court operations assessment (sec. 1465.8(a)(1)) and the court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373).

Authority:

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388

People v. Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1751

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000354

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of legislation enacted since the disposition hearing, the $300 restitution fine is ordered stricken in this Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile proceeding. The statutory change regarding joint and severally liability, however, does not apply retroactively.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now states that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in section 602. Because the judgment is not final, the appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

The modification of section 730.6(b)(3), eliminating joint and several liability for juvenile offenders for direct restitution, is not punitive, but civil. Because it is not ameliorative of punishment, there is no presumption that it applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. Enacted after the order imposing direct restitution jointly and severally with other parties, it has prospective effect only, and does not apply retroactively to this minor’s case.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(b)(3)

In re J.L. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 388

Discretion, Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000346

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed a minimum $300 restitution fine and an assessment of $70 in ancillary costs. The trial court held a hearing and determined that the defendant had the ability to pay. We affirm the order on ancillary costs but remand to give the defendant the opportunity to further challenge the restitution fine under Kopp.

First Holding:

A person convicted of a crime can, and in some cases must, be ordered to pay a variety of punitive fines along with other nonpunitive ancillary costs. Some statutes require the imposition of fines and ancillary costs regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. Other statutes require a finding of the ability to pay or allow for its consideration. Restitution fines under section 1202.4 are considered punitive fines, whereas assessments to fund court facilities and operations are considered ancillary costs. The distinction between punitive fines and other imposed payments is important because it impacts whether a given form of required payment is initially challenged under, and then reviewed under, the constitutional excessive fines clauses, or under the constitutional provision for equal protection.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 12, 14-15, 18 [we analyze fines and ancillary costs separately because different justifications support each, and different constitutional protections apply]

Second Holding:

If requested by a defendant, the court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 25-26, 30 [in light of the Legislature’s provision of fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment]

Third Holding:

In reaching its conclusion that the defendant did not meet his burden to show his inability to pay the ancillary costs, the court considered his potential to earn wages while in prison and his general ability to work, which was within its discretion to do. The trial court did not state that it was relying solely on the defendant’s ability to earn wages while in prison. The court found simply that he is capable of working. The trial court’s conclusion that he had the ability to pay $70 in court assessments was not arbitrary or irrational.

Authority:

People v. Fish (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 730, 739 [collecting cases]

People v. Santos (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 934 [factors to consider in determining ability to pay may include, among others, the defendant’s realistic ability to earn prison wages or obtain employment]

People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490, disapproved in part as stated in Kopp, at p. 23, fn. 17. 490 [trial court may consider potential prison pay during the period of incarceration” in determining inability to pay]

People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 229 [ability to pay includes the ability both to obtain prison wages and to earn money after release from custody]

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it]

Fourth Holding:

Punitive fines are subject to a different approach. There is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the defendant’s ability to pay, but in such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 23

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 22

Fifth Holding:

A court has discretion to impose a nonexcessive fine as punishment, even on indigent defendants. Thus, the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry for excessive fines is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 21, 23

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334

Sixth Holding:

Under section 1202.4(b), the restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. The court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. A defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

Seventh Holding:

A court’s ruling on ability to pay is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating his or her inability to pay the imposed amounts.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 21, 24

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868

People v. Lowery (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1046, 1057, 1053

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000338

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

When it initially granted the defendant probation, the court waived various fines and assessments based on indigence. On revocation of probation, the court imposed a restitution fine and other assessments. Remanded for the court to consider the defendant’s challenges to the fees and assessments in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.

First Holding:

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Kopp a defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive. Because Kopp was decided after entry of the juidgment on appeal here, the defendant should have the opportunity to make such a challenge. Though the court could determine that the issue was forfeited for lack of objection, forfeiture may be excused where to require defense counsel to raise an objection would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 127 [Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a right derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law.]

Second Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4(b)(1) is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. ) Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), states that the minimum restitution fine is $300 for each felony conviction and that the maximum fine is $10,000. Section 1202.4, subdivision (c), allows the court not to impose the restitution fine for compelling and extraordinary reasons, but states the defendant’s inability to pay is not a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose the minimum fine. Thus, the defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4
People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13, 30

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 423

People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356

People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1033 [Under section 1202.4(c), the trial court may not consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the minimum restitution fine of $300, but the court may consider the defendant’s ability to pay if the court imposes a restitution fine above the minimum.]

Third Holding:

Although fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime, the “excessive fines analysis” under the United States and California Constitutions, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. But there is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 and fn. 17

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) requires, to assist in funding court operations, an assessment of $40 to be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Government Code section 70373(a)(1) requires, to ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, that $30 assessment be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Both costs are mandatory. But equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373(a)(1)

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 15

People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 405

Elements of crime, Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000310

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support an enhancement based on a finding that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Imposition of a restitution fine is now precluded by subsequent legislation. We modify the judgment to strike the gang enhancement and vacate the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 186.22 was amended by AB 333, significantly narrowing the circumstances in which the enhancement would apply. As amended, the statute now requires, among other things, that the two predicate offenses necessary to establish a pattern of criminal gang activity must each have been committed within a specified date range by two or more gang members for the common benefit of the gang, and this benefit must have been more than reputational. Here, the evidence of predicate offenses offered by the prosecution showed three possible crimes, two of which were committed by a single gang member without anything to indicate a value to the gang that was more than reputational. This is insufficient to establish a basis for the gang enhancement as amended by AB 333

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 752–753

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 now prohibits imposition of restitution fines on juvenile offenders. This provision is retroactive. We therefore vacate the $100 restitution fine.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000301

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though affirming the trial court’s reimposition of the original sentence (minus the now-invalid enhancements for prior prison terms), it remanded the matter to the trial court to expressly state which fines and fees it was imposing, as it was not clear from the record.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment lists several fines and fees, some of which are mandatory. The trial court, however, imposed only direct restitution (which is also listed in the abstract). A superior court’s failure to orally impose mandatory fines or assessments results in an unauthorized sentence that the appellate court may correct on appeal. But we do not believe the superior court sufficiently addressed ability to pay. It mentioned ability to pay only in the context of the direct restitution. It sidestepped the issue of ability to pay, treating it as irrelevant to the issue of direct victim restitution. As the court did not orally impose any additional fines or fees, the defendant had no meaningful opportunity to raise his ability to pay with respect to them.

Authority:

People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153–1157

People v. Pack-Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 859 [ability-to-pay principles have not been extended to a victim restitution payment under section 1202.4(f)]

People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 338

People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 777

Second Holding:

By statute, restitution fines and probation restitution fines under section 1202.4(b) and section 1202.45 that exceed the $300 minimum shall account for ability to pay. And because of equal protection principles, a court must consider ability to pay before imposing ancillary assessments under section 1465.8(a)(1) and Government Code section 70373. As to the remaining fine in the defendant’s case, under section 1202.5, the parties do not dispute the fine must be set with ability to pay in mind, but is mandatory if affordable. Given this, we will order a limited remand for the superior court to consider the mandatory fines and assessments omitted from its oral sentencing pronouncements in connection with defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Third Holding:

Regarding restitution fines, section 1465.9 has recently been amended to provide that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. At least one Court of Appeal has held a court conducting a section 1172.75 resentencing cannot reimpose a restitution fine that is more than 10 years old and has held, instead, the fine should be stricken. As no restitution fine has been properly imposed, we are in no position to consider striking it, and the superior court can consider these developments on remand.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Fourth Holding:

Walker approved Court of Appeal decisions that viewed section 1385 as calling for holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors. Gonzalez did not create a new rule of law, but rather corrected a superior court’s misunderstanding regarding the term endangerment to public safety in section 1385(c)(2). The statute defines the term as a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others, which does not contemplate a laser-like focus on dangerousness at the time of sentencing. The superior court in Gonzalez had expressly limited its consideration to the defendant’s current dangerousness despite the call of the statute, a mistake not present here.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)(2)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Fifth Holding:

We need not, and typically do not, address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

Authority:

People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129, 183, fn. 13

People v. Adir Internat., LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 275, 298

Fines and fees, Jurisdiction, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case: 000299

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On revoking probation, the court added an additional restitution fine to the original restitution fine and modified an eight-month consecutive term to an eight-month concurrent term in the same case, and then a 16-month concurrent term in a second case. On notice from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that the 8-month concurrent term was unauthorized because the the one-third of the middle term clculation applies only to consecutive terms. The trial court then converted the eight-month concurrent term to 16 months concurrent. The second restitution fine was unauthorized and must be stricken. The court had no authority to change the original eight-month consecutive term to either a concurrent eight-month term or a sixteen-month concurrent term, because at the time probation was granted, the court imposed a sentence (two years on the principal count and eight months on the subordinate offense) in that case, with execution suspended pending successful completion of probation. The matter is remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

A restitution fine imposed at the time probation is granted survives the revocation of probation. Because of this, an additional restitution fine imposed at the time probation is revoked is unauthorized and must be stricken from the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 779

People v. Chambers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 819

Second Holding:

There is a distinction between a probation grant in which imposition of sentence has been suspended (meaning, no sentence has been declared) and one where sentence has been imposed (meaning, a term has been specified) with the execution of that term suspended during the term of probation. In the former (imposition of sentence suspended), on revocation the court is free to choose whatever sentence options were available had probation never been granted. In the latter, the only choices are to reinstate probation or to revoke probation and order the previously imposed sentence executed.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(c)

People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081

People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1424

Third Holding:

The letter from CDCR did not constitute a recommendation for recall of the sentence and resentencing under section 1170.1 that the sentence be modified. It was merely a letter seeking clarification on whether a lawful sentence had been imposed. Thus, the court could not base its resentencing on a response to the notice contemplated by section 1170.1.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 986-987

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 791–792

Fourth Holding:

When the parties negotiate a plea agreement that grants probation incorporating and conditioned upon the service of a specified term in custody, the resulting term of incarceration constitutes a material term of, the parties’ agreement. As such, the term is not subject to subsequent modification without the consent of both parties, and cannot be altered solely on the basis of the trial court’s general statutory authority to modify probation during the probationary period. Further, a plea agreement requiring an unauthorized sentence is not enforceable. On the other hand, once the court approves a plea bargain, it cannot change the agreement without the consent of the parties. When a guilty plea is invalidated the parties are generally restored to the positions they occupied before the plea bargain was entered.

Authority:

People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931, 935

In re Daniel M. Williams (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 936, 945 [the trial court cannot approve a plea bargain that calls for an unlawful sentence]

People v. Aragon (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 749, 756–757

People v. Baries (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 313, 319 [The concurrent sentence was unauthorized and could not have been lawfully imposed. It must be vacated, and the trial court must give the defendant, if she chooses, the opportunity to withdraw her plea since it cannot be honored.]

People v. Griffin (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1119

Amelioration, Discretion, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000292

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this appeal following resentencing under section 1172.75, the abstract of judgment must be amended to accurately reflect his actual custody credits, and several fines and fees must be reduced or vacated.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75(a) invalidated sentence enhancements imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5. With exceptions not relevant here, the statute requires that sentences that include these invalid enhancements be recalled and the defendant resentenced.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion. Section 1172.75(d), vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

Third Holding:

An appellate court may not substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court. The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s decision. Unless that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the decision, even if it might have ruled differentlyin the first instance.

Authority:

People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment reflects credit for time served but reflects 326 fewer days than the defendant is entitled to. It must be corrected to reflect the correct number of days.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [defendant entitled to all actual custody days since arrest, including date of resentencing]

Fifth Holding:

The trial court imposed a $30 criminal conviction fee on each count pursuant to Government Code section 70373. It also imposed a court operation fee of $40 per count pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). However, Government Code section 70373 only applies to convictions after the statute’s January 1, 2009 effective date. Similarly, the court operations fee is only applicable to convictions after the statute’s 2003 operative date. Because the defendant suffered the convictions in 1995, the criminal conviction and court operations fees must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, 1000

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753, 754

Sixth Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago. Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066

SeventhHolding:

The parole revocation fine must be reduced from $300 to $200. At the resentencing hearing, the court imposed a $300 restitution fine and imposed and stayed a $300 parole revocation fine. However, because the trial court originally imposed a $200 restitution fine, and the court may not impose a more severe punishment on resentencing, we agree with the parties that the stayed parole revocation fine must be reduced to $200, matching the originally imposed restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000289

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude that section 654 did not apply here because the trial court granted defendant probation without imposing sentence, so we affirm the judgment. But we direct the trial court to correct the clerk’s minute order to reflect the oral pronouncement as to the jail probation condition and restitution fine and corresponding stayed probation revocation fine as $300 each.

First Holding:

There is an apparent discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement imposing a probation condition of 300 days in county jail and the clerk’s minute order splitting the 300 days between the two counts, showing 150 days under each count. The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order. The court’s oral pronouncement was clear. It imposed a probation condition of 300 days in county jail. We order the clerk’s minute order corrected to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of a probation condition of 300 days in county jail.

Authority:

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 187-188

Second Holding:

Generally, section 654, which precludes multiple punishment for a single act, does not apply when a court grants a defendant probation. A grant of probation is neither punishment nor a criminal judgment. It is an act of grace and clemency designed to allow rehabilitation. No punishment is imposed. Section 654 does not apply where no punishment is imposed. This is so even if probation is conditioned on jail time. Here, because the trial court granted defendant probation without imposing a sentence, section 654 does not apply.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Stender (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 413, 425, overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 240

People v. Wittig (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 124, 126-127 137

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 965

Third Holding:

The minute order conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the latter which ordered only the mandatory minimum fines (here, $300), not the $1,000 fine included in the minutes. When there is a discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement and the clerk’s minute order or the abstract of judgment, the record of the oral pronouncement controls. We order the clerk’s minute order corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of the mandatory minimum restitution fine of $300 and the corresponding stayed $300 probation revocation fine.

Authority:

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000287

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the $200 restitution fine pursuant to section 1465.9(d).

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. If the language of the statute contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. The 10-year period starts with the original imposition of the fine and does not restart on resentencing. We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354

People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 13

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601 review granted 3/11/2026 (S295038)