Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Case 000778

Error and/or relief

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2011. On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court should not have reimposed the restitution fine, jail classification fee, and booking fee because they are unenforceable and uncollectible.

First Holding:

The trial court originally imposed the restitution fine in July 2011. Since then, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to provide that restitution fines under section 1202.4 are uncollectible and unenforceable after 10 years and that the part of the judgment imposing the fine must be vacated.

Because the restitution fine was originally imposed more than 10 years before the trial court resentenced defendant, under section 1465.9(d), the trial court should not have reimposed the restitution fine when it resentenced defendant in 2025.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

The trial court also should not have reimposed the booking fee and jail classification fee under Government Code section 29550.2, because the Legislature repealed that section effective July 1, 2021. After July 1, 2021, the unpaid balance of court-imposed costs under several statutes, including Government Code section 29550.2, are unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.

Authority:

GOV 6111

Case 000772

Error and/or relief

In light of  Kopp, which was decided while this appeal was pending, we will remand for reconsideration of the restitution and parole revocation fines.

First Holding:

We note that the abstract of judgment indicates that the restitution and parole revocation fines were $300 each, yet the trial court in its oral pronouncement imposed restitution and parole revocation fines of $1,800 each. Ordinarily, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

Here, however, the trial court imposed a restitution fine (and corresponding parole revocation fine) exceeding the statutory minimum before the recent guidance issued by the Supreme Court in Kopp. Because the record is silent as to whether the trial court considered the defendant’s ability to pay or any other excessive fine factor, we will vacate those fines and remand for further proceedings in light of Kopp.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Case 000763

Error and/or relief

The court erred in declining to determine the defendant’s ability to pay fines and fees. Its stated basis was the probation office’s strong stance on rejecting the plea, based on the victim. After sentencing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kopp.

First Holding:

A defendant may challenge the imposition of a punitive fine under the United States and California Constitutions’ excessive fines provisions. The California Supreme Court The court used the “fine” term to refer to penalties provided by the Legislature to punish a criminal offense and included restitution fines and parole revocation restitution fines within that category. Because its decision was issued after the defendant was sentenced, the defendant should be given the opportunity to develop an excessive fines argument in the first instance on remand.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23, 30-31

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution [Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted]

Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution [Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.]

Second Holding:

Because the trial court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the the court operations and court facilities assessments despite his request, we must remand for such consideration. Because there is no rational basis for distinguishing criminal defendants from indigent civil litigants—who are afforded waivers for similar assessments—equal protection principles require the trial court to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing these ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 14-15, 24-31

Case 000755

Error and/or relief

Because of a change in the law while the minor’s case has been pending, the restitution fine ordered by the court must be stricken.

First Holding:

Here, the juvenile court imposed a restitution fine as a condition of probation. At the time of the minor’s disposition, the restitution fine was mandatory. Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature passed AB 1186 which amended Welfare and Instituitons Code section 730.6 to prohibit a court from imposing a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

Second Holding:

An adult or juvenile offender is generally entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while their case is on appeal and not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [applying a revised version of the statute in setting a restitution fine]

In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [rule of retroactivity applies to juvenile delinquency judgments]

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [Where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.

Third Holding:

Because imposing a restitution fine constitutes “punishment” and the minor’s case was not yet final when section 730.6 became effective, we conclude section 730.6 operates retroactively and precludes imposition of a restitution fine. Therefore, the restitution fine should be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 321

Case 000751

Error and/or relief

The trial court having resentenced the defendant under section 1172.75, the matter is remanded for the trial court to determine the credit for time served and for correction of the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing. Thus, the matter should be remanded for defendant’s custody credits to be recalculated, and the abstract of judgment should be amended accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Second Holding:

The section 1202.4(b) restitution fine in the amount of $800 listed on the abstract of judgment filed after the resentencing hearing should be stricken, since the court granted his request to strike all fees and fines, except for direct victim restitution.

(Gary note: The court cited no authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment. I have listed some of the cases the court could have cited.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 000742

Error and/or relief

The crime that the defendant pleaded guilty to is not one to which Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 applies to, so the $50 fee must be stricken.

First Holding:

Health and Safety Code section 11372.5(a) states that every person who is convicted of enumerated offenses must pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee of $50 for each separate offense. The fee only applies to the offenses listed or enumerated in section 11372.5(a).

Authority:

HSC 11372.5

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

Second Holding:

Defendant pleaded no contest to an offense not listed in section 11372.5(a). Thus the trial court could not legally impose the $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee as a probation condition and the fee is, therefore, unauthorized. We therefore strike the fee.

Authority:

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 [claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal and corrected whenever error comes to the attention of the reviewing court]

People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231-1233 [striking unauthorized fee on appeal]

Case 000739

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4, but because defendant is serving terms of LWOP, the court did not impose a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. The minute order and abstract of judgment, however, reflect a parole revocation restitution fine was imposed and suspended. They must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls, and we may correct a clerical error in recording the judgment at any time. Consequently, we will direct the trial court to correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to omit reference to imposition of a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Case 000737

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the $200 restitution fine imposed by the trial court on resentencing must be vacated, as section 1465.9(d) requires such a fine that is more than 10 years old to be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4 states a court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

Second Holding:

Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. This section not only authorizes, but mandates, vacation of a portion of a judgment for the purpose of striking the now-unauthorized assessments.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626

Case 000733

Error and/or relief

We strike the protective order, because none of the offenses involved domestic violence. We also remand to give the defendant the opportunity to present evidence on his ability to pay the restitution fine and assessments.

First Holding:

Although initially charged with crimes involving domestic violence, his guilty plea was to a crime that did not involved domestic violence as defined in section 13700 or in Family Code section 6211. His crime is not specifically listed in section 136.2(i)(1), and it does not require registration as a sex offender. Hence, the trial court was without authority at sentencing to issue the criminal protective order for the victim’s benefit under section 136.2(i)(1). As the court did not have statutory authority to issue the criminal protective order, it must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901

Second Holding:

The court imposed a $2,400 restitution fine, as well as a $2,400 parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45. The court also imposed a $40 court operations assessment (sec. 1465.8(a)(1)) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373(a)(1)).

After sentencing, while this matter was still on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kopp. As to punitive fines, including restitution fines, the court found that due process does not require a trial court to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.

However, the court also noted that both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit excessive fines, and held that the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.

As to court operations assessments and court facilities assessments, which are ancillary costs, the court held that equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment.

Because neither defendant nor the trial court had the benefit of Kopp’s reasoning and holding at the time of the sentencing hearing, we will direct the court to give defendant an opportunity to challenge the restitution fine and the assessments under Kopp.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13, 23, 30

Case 000728

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court should have vacated the restitution fine that was imposed more than 10 years earlier. We remand the case for the court to determine the defendant’s ability to pay the parole revocation restitution fine, which is not vacated by section 1465.9(d).

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 added subdivision (d) to section 1465.9, which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. It does not, however, apply to the parole revocation restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

In Kopp, our Supreme Court clarified that, although fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime, the excessive fines analysis under the state and federal Constitutions is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines, such as parole revocation fines. In addition, a trial court must conduct an ability to pay hearing before imposing a restitution fine (or corresponding parole revocation fine) that exceeds the statutory minimum of $300.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 23, 17, 30

Case 000719

Error and/or relief

Although the trial court did not orally impose any fines or fees at sentencing, the minute order and abstract of judgment include a $300 restitution fine, a $300 parole revocation fine, a $40 court operations assessment, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment. The abstract of judgment and the minute order must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.

First Holding:

The oral imposition of sentence constitutes the judgment in an action, and the minutes and abstract of judgment cannot add anything substantive to the oral pronouncement. The oral pronouncement controls if there is a discrepancy, and the court clerk lacks the authority to add fines or fees not imposed by the trial court. If the clerk includes fines or fees in the minute order or abstract of judgment that were not orally imposed, those fines and/or fees must be stricken from the minute order and abstract.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 387-389, 385-390

People v. Rowland (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 119, 124

Second Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 need not be imposed if the trial court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states those reasons on the record. Thus, a restitution fine under section 1202.4 is a discretionary sentencing choice. A corresponding parole revocation fine is mandatory only if a restitution fine is imposed. Although the People argue the judgment should be modified to include the omitted fines, they did not object to the omission at sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302, 303

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 853

Third Holding:

The court operations assessment and criminal conviction assessment are both mandatory, and we may address such an omission because the failure to impose them results in an unlawful sentence. The judgment is modified to impose a $40 court operations assessment and a $30 criminal conviction assessment. The trial court is directed to correct the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment to omit the $300 restitution fine and the $300 parole revocation fine, and to forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 853

Case 000718

Error and/or relief

Where the defendant has been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), the court cannot impose a parole revocation restitution fine.

Holding:

In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole, the court shall, at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount. Where a defendant has been sentenced to LWOP or death, the section does not apply. We order the trial court to modify the judgment by striking the parole revocation fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45

People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183 [When there is no parole eligibility, the fine is clearly not applicable.]

People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475, 482, fn. 6