Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000938

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the judgment to vacate the booking fee imposed pursuant to former Government Code section 29550.2.

Holding:

The main jail booking fee (former Gov. Code, sec. 29550.2), imposed by the trial court at the early 2021 sentencing hearing and reimposed at the 2025 hearing, was repealed by the passage of AB 1869, effective July 1, 2021 AB 1869 enacted Government Code section 6111, which provides that on and after July 1, 2021, the unpaid balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant to section 29550.2 is unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. (Gov. Code, sec. 6111(a).) Accordingly, the main jail booking fee reimposed at the 2025 sentencing hearing must be vacated.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Former GOV 29550.2

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000931

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment fails to list the imposition of the restitution fine that was ordered for the misdemeanor conviction. It must be corrected.

(Gary note: Yep, not a win, but another example of errant abstracts.)

First Holding:

Where a defendant has been convicted of both a misdemeanor and a felony, it is proper for the court to impose separate restitution fines. The parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45 should match the portion of the restitution fine associated with the felony conviction to which a period of parole applied.

Authority:

People v. Holmes (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 539, 546-548

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment is missing the $150 restitution fine imposed on the misdemeanor count. We will direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment including this additional restitution fine. Because the trial court’s minute order following sentencing already includes this amount, no amendment to that document is required.

(Gary note: The court did not cite authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment, so I have listed some cases that the court could have drawn from.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Eighth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000917

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We are not convinced that section 1202.4 is facially unconstitutional, but we will remand this matter to the trial court to give the defendant an opportunity to bring an as-applied challenge to the restitution fine under the excessive fines clauses of the Eighth Amendment and California Constitution.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) requires that in every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. For a felony, the minimum fine is $300 and the maximum is $10,000. Fines for a misdemeanor range from $150 to $1000.

The court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.

A defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

Second Holding:

Due process did not require an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Kopp instructed instead that the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. The excessive fines analysis arises under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.

Authority:

U.S. Const. Eighth Amendment

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23

Third Holding:

Following Bajakajian, our Supreme Court in Lockyer stated that four factors are relevant to determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive:

(1) the defendant’s culpability;

(2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty;

(3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and

(4) the defendant’s ability to pay.

Kopp observed that a fine is excessive only if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense that it punishes, a deferential standard that recognizes that the Legislature makes judgments in the first instance about the appropriate punishment for offenses and judicial determinations of the gravity of a particular criminal offense are inherently imprecise.

Kopp remanded to give the defendant the opportunity to raise such a challenge.

Authority:

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 327–328

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23-24

Fourth Holding:

A statute will be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions if such an interpretation is fairly possible. It would be remarkable and plainly unconstitutional for the Legislature to prohibit a trial court from considering a defendant’s invocation of a constitutional right.

We will therefore not construe section 1202.4 as preventing defendants from raising an excessive fines challenge to the minimum fine. Instead, we read the statute as simply establishing that as a statutory matter in the absence of an excessive fines challenge, a trial court cannot refrain from imposing the minimum $300 restitution fine based on a defendant’s inability to pay alone.

This is congruent with Kopp and excessive fines analysis jurisprudence, which considers a defendant’s ability to pay as one of four relevant factors, not as dispositive on its own.

Authority:

People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 682

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728

People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1070 [While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.]

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 [citing Aviles with approval]

Fifth Holding:

Neither the defendant nor the trial court had the benefit of Kopp when the defendant was sentenced, so she did not present her challenge to the restitution fine through the proper excessive fines analysis that Kopp makes clear is appropriate.

Accordingly, as Kopp itself did, we will remand this matter to the trial court to give the defendant the the opportunity to assert the legal analyses applicable to such a challenge and argue how the particular facts of this case inform such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Sentencing

Case 000895

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand solely as to the fines and ancillary costs ordered in this case on appeal.

First Holding:

Kopp allows challenges based on the excessive fines and equal protection clauses of the federal or state Constitutions.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

Kopp addresses the proper means by which a criminal defendant may challenge the various court ordered payments imposed at criminal sentencings. Those payments fall into three broad categories: fines, ancillary costs, and victim restitution. As to fines, such as restitution and parole revocation payments under Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, there is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Instead, excessive fines analysis, which includes consideration of ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines under either the federal or state Constitutions.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 17, 23

Third Holding:

As to ancillary costs, under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, Kopp explains an equal protection analysis is appropriate and holds that equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment.

(Gary note: This stems from the recognition that in civil cases, the same fees are due, but the superior court may waive them for civil litigants. Kopp concludes that criminal defendants must be given the same consideration, as there is no legitimate reason to discriminate between civil cases and criminal cases for administrative assessments that go toward support of the court system and are not punitive in nature.)

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000894

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The record discloses that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by imposing a fine without specifying the basis of the penalty assessments.

(Gary note: This was not a victory in the purest sense, as it changed nothing for the defendant, whom the trial court found had the ability to pay. I have included this summary for its authority that the court must specify the breakdown of the fine with its various penalty assessments. In the case, the appellate court reversed the imposition of the fine and directed the trial court to reimpose it but specifying the authority for the various assessments that turned the $300 fine into $1170.)

First Holding:

Section 290.3 provides in pertinent part, that every person who is convicted of any offense specified in section 290(c) shall, in addition to any imprisonment or fine, or both, imposed for violation of the underlying offense, be punished by a fine of $300 upon the first conviction or a fine of $500 upon the second and each subsequent conviction, unless the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the fine.

Authority:

PEN 290.3(a)

Second Holding:

The imposition of a section 290.3 fine in the total amount of $1,170 or the imposition of a $300 base fine plus $870 in penalty assessments without citing the statutory basis for the penalty assessments are both unauthorized sentences. An unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time even if there was no objection in the trial court. Such an unauthorized sentence may be corrected even when raised for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Valenzuela, (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1248-1249 [The fine imposed in this case constituted an unauthorized sentence]

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886,

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854

Third Holding:

The trial court imposed the sex offender fine in the amount of $1,170 as set forth in the probation report. We construe the court’s statement to mean that it intended to impose the section 290.3 fine and the corresponding penalty assessments, which are listed in the probation report, but erroneously failed to list each penalty assessment and their respective corresponding amounts at sentencing.

We shall therefore modify the judgment to include a $300 section 290.3 fine and penalty assessments in the following amounts: a $60.00 Court Surcharge (sec. 1465.7), a $150.00 State Court Facilities Construction Fund Fee (Gov. Code, sec. 70372(a)), a $300.00 State Penalty Assessment (sec. 1464), a $210.00 County Penalty Assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 76000), a $30.00 DNA Identification Fund Fee (Gov. Code, sec. 76104.6), and a $120.00 DNA Identification Fund fee (Gov. Code, sec. 76104.7).

Authority:

PEN 290.3

PEN 1465.7

GOV 70372(a)

PEN 1464

GOV 76000

GOV 76104.6

GOV 76104.7

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000891

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6, the court should have stricken the restitution fine, as it was more than 10 years old.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to state that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. Here, the trial court imposed the $200 restitution fine more than 10 years before denying the defendant’s resentencing petition. As the People concede, that fine must therefore be vacated

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000887

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this appeal from denial of resentencing under section 1172.75, we find that the court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to resentencing because the prior prison term enhancement had not been imposed.

First Holding:

In Rhodius, the court held that section 1172.75(a) applies to enhancements that were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment, regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed.

If the enhancement is no longer authorized under the current version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a) renders the enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth therein.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1068

Second Holding:

In Espino, the court expanded on Rhodius to hold that an enhancement is imposed for purposes of section 1172.75 where the sentencing court strikes the punishment for the enhancement but not the allegation itself. The court explained that imposing a sentence on a criminal defendant has legal effect, and a true finding on a prior prison term allegation is a part of the sentencing order, even when the associated punishment is stricken.

It follows that, as a matter of ordinary usage, an enhancement included in the sentence in a criminal case may be imposed even if the punishment for that enhancement is stricken.

Here, because the jury’s true finding was neither stricken nor dismissed, it remained imposed within the meaning of section 1172.75. The order denying the defendant’s motion for resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing under section 1172.75(d), as well as for proceedings on any motion for relief under section 1465.9(d), which states that restitution fines greater than 10 years old must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57

People v. Fuentes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 218, 225, [striking the punishment for an enhancement merely serves to prohibit a certain purpose for which the allegation may be used; it does not operate to defeat the factual finding of the truth of the allegation]

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000886

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

1n 1991, for a crime committed in 1989, the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). When his case came up for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2025, the court believed its only discretion was to impose less than the upper term on the determinate portion of his sentence. Defense counsel agreed. This was error. The court also erred in its calculation of credit for time served. And the restitution fine must be struck.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required trial courts to impose a sentence enhancement of one additional year for each of a defendant’s prior prison or jail terms. Section 1172.75(a) now provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b) is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(b) and (c) mandate that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identify eligible individuals whose sentences include now-invalidated section 667.5 enhancements, and that the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

While conducting the resentencing, section 1172.75(d)(2), provides the express instruction that the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

Section 190.2(a) provides that where there has been a finding of certain enumerated special circumstances in connection with a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder, the penalty is death or LWOP. Section 1385 previously provided the trial court with the discretion to strike or dismiss the special circumstances.

Although the statute only authorizes such relief upon motion of the court or application of the prosecution, the defendant nevertheless has the right to invite the court to exercise its power by an application to strike a count.

Failure by a defendant to make such a request under section 1385 results in forfeiture of the issue. In the interests of justice, and in consideration of defendant’s alternative argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

PEN 1385

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141, 1144

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

Third Holding:

Contrary to Section 1385, however, section 1385.1 provides that a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive. The section was enacted as of June 6, 1990, via voter initiative Proposition 115. The dispute here centers around whether section 1385.1 serves as a bar to the trial court’s discretion to strike section 190.2 special circumstances when the court is resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 for a pre-June 6, 1990, crime.

Authority:

PEN 1385.1

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Fourth Holding:

Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. However, defendant argues pursuant to McDavid that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion when it failed to strike his special circumstances because it was unaware that it had any discretion to do so.

We therefore examine whether the trial court had any discretion in this regard, which is a question of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.

Authority:

People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023

Fifth Holding:

The Nguyen court noted that section 1385.1 operates only prospectively, therefore, a trial court may dismiss a special circumstance allegation attached to any murders committed before June 6, 1990, the date that section 1385.1 became effective. Nguyen specifically relied upon Tapia.

In Tapia, Proposition 115 took effect while the defendant was in the process of being prosecuted for first degree murder. The defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to conduct voir dire pursuant to the new Proposition 115 procedures.

In examining whether Proposition 115’s provisions could be applied to crimes committed prior to its effective date after consideration of ex post facto concerns, the Supreme Court separated the provisions into four separate categories depending on their impact upon defendants.

Relevant to this inquiry, the high court expressly categorized section 1385.1 as falling within the category of provisions that change the legal consequences of criminal behavior to the detriment of defendants and therefore cannot be applied to crimes committed before the measure’s effective date.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286-287, 297

Sixth Holding:

The mandate in section 1172.75(d)(2), that the trial court apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” evidences a legislative intent that defendants are to be treated with more leniency, not less, when being resentenced pursuant to this statute. Because the trial court clearly expressed more than once its belief that it did not have any discretion with respect to the LWOP sentence on Count 1, we deem the court to have abused its discretion and reverse.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023 [A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.]

Seventh Holding:

The court court failed to award the defendant 2 days of credit for time served, and we modify the judgment accordingly.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority, but it seems obvious that the court has the power to modify the credit for time served to the correct number. I have cited authority the court could have relied on. The issue does not seem so much a matter of the trial court refusing to award credit; rather, it was a mathematical error. I speculate that perhaps the court did not award credit for the first day in custody. Counting days is different than determining the number of days between dates. From January 1 through January 31 is 31 days, counting. But if you subtract January 1 from January 31, you will realize only 30 days.  For credit for time served, the correct number is the counting number–31 in my example.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Eighth Holding:

As part of defendant’s original 1991 sentencing, the court ordered him to pay $10,000 to the state Restitution Fund pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 (formerly Govt. Code sec. 13967(a).) In light of section 1465.9, which compels that restitution fines older than 10 years be vacated, we vacate that fine. In Salstrom, the court determined that the reference to 10 years is from the date the restitution fine was originally ordered.

Resentencing does not reset the 10-year limitation. Applying section 1465.9 to reduce defendant’s sentence as part of a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing gives effect to both statutes.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652-653 [detailing the history of the restitution statutes]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601, review granted on unrelated issues, March 11, 2026, S295038

Mejia v. Reed (2000) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 [when two codes are to be construed, they must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof]

Abstracts and Minutes, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000883

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct a hearing on whether to impose the ancillary costs in light of Kopp. The minute order and abstracts of judgment do not reflect the order of the court and must be corrected following that hearing.

First Holding:

At the sentencing hearing, the court did not mention, much less impose, fees under either section 1465.8 or Government Code section 70373. As for restitution fines, defense counsel requested the court consider staying any fines, and the court stated that it was striking the restitution fine and the parole revocation restitution fine, indicating that if that was found to be error on appeal, the court’s intent would be to impose the minimum $300 for both fines.

The minute order, however, reflects that the court ordered the fines in thh amount of $10,000. It then stated that the amounts were suspended. The minute order also included a court operations fee of $80 and a criminal conviction fee of $60. The abstract of judgment did not reflect the restitution fines, but did reflect the other two fees.

The judgment is controlled by the court’s oral pronouncements.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.]

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388 [The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.]

Second Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) provides, in part: “To assist in funding court operations, an assessment of forty dollars ($40) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense.” Government Code section 70373(a)(1) provides, in part: “To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, an assessment shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. The assessment shall be imposed in the amount of thirty dollars ($30) for each misdemeanor or felony.”

The trial court was required to impose these ancillary costs unless it granted defendant fee waivers. The court took neither action at the sentencing hearing. This was error.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 25-26, 29-30

Third Holding:

Although the omission of mandatory assessments may be corrected for the first time on appeal, if we were to do that, the fees would be imposed without defendant having had the opportunity to request they be waived.

Instead, we will remand the matter for the trial court to correct the minutes from the sentencing hearing and to determine whether to impose the court operations fee and the criminal conviction fee consistent with Kopp.

Authority:

People v. Castellanos (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1530

Fourth Holding:

The People did not object when the trial court struck the restitution fine and the parole revocation restitution fine.

When a party fails to object, at the time of sentencing, to a trial court’s decision regarding the imposition of restitution fines, the waiver doctrine precludes appellate relief.

The court struck the restitution fine at the sentencing hearing. Thus, to the extent the court’s minutes reflect otherwise, the minutes should be modified to strike the restitution fines.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302–303

People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000876

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the order of probation to eliminate the provision that the defendant pay the costs of mental health treatment as a condition of probation and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

We review such constitutional challenges to conditions of probation de novo.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

A court may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. In imposing such conditions, a court may require a defendant to complete a residential treatment program. A probation officer, however, may only oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders. A probation officer may not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.

Authority:

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Third Holding:

The defendant raises an argument for the first time in the reply brief. The issue is forfeited for not raising it earlier.

Authority:

People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1106

Fourth Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant who is granted probation to pay the reasonable associated costs. To do so, the court must make an inquiry and determination regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, and issue a separate order for the payment of such costs.

But the payment of such costs cannot be made a condition of probation. The record before us does not show the court inquired into the defendant’s ability to pay before including the provision that she pay these costs, or that it issued a separate order for payment of these costs. Accordingly, condition 7 must be modified to eliminate the requirement that the defenrant pay the costs of treatment associated with this condition.

Authority:

People v. Hall (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 889, 892

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

People v. Hart (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 902, 907

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000869

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand to the trial court for resentencing to determine the fines and fees and order them on the record.

First Holding:

The probation report recommended a $10,000 restitution fine, a $10,000 parole revocation fine, and an $80 court security fee. The sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment reflect these amounts. But the transcript does not reflect that the court ordered appellant to pay these fines and fees. The trial court is responsible for determining the fines and fees and its oral pronouncement controls over any inconsistent minute order.

Authority:

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

Second Holding:

No parole revocation fine shall be imposed if the defendant is sentenced to life without parole.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45

People v. Jenkins (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 805, 819

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000865

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We order correction of the abstract of judgment, which incorrectly lists the fines and fees imposed in this case as stayed, not waived, contrary to the trial court’s oral pronouncement.

Holding:

We order correction of the abstract of judgment, which incorrectly lists the fines and fees imposed in this case as stayed, not waived, contrary to the trial court’s oral pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [a reviewing court may correct a clerical error in an abstract of judgment at any time]