Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000267

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Error and/or relief:
The trial court failed to calculate her presentence custody credits correctly. We agree the defendant is entitled to three additional days of presentence custody credit. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the correct amount of credit and transmit it to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: There was no authority indicated in the opinion for the correction of the credit for time served, likely because the error is so obvious. For sake of completeness, the following authorities would support the court’s ruling.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(d) [It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in Section 1213.]

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 [A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing.]

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793 [At the time of sentencing, credit for time served, including conduct credit, is calculated by the court. The total number of days to be credited is memorialized in the abstract of judgment and shall be credited upon the defendant’s term of imprisonment. The credit in effect, becomes part of the sentence.]

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000266

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.75, the trial court struck some of the enhancements, but resentenced him to a life term on the balance under the Three Strikes Law as before. Under subsequently decided case law, the trial court should have considered imposing a sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The matter must be remanded for resentencing. In addition, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to including the correct custody credits.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 provides that once the trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. In so doing, the trial court is directed to follow specific instructions while resentencing. For example, it provides that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. In addition, when resentencing, the court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants. The electorate additionally authorized persons presently serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme by filing a petition for recall of sentence. If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors, section 1170.126 provides that he or she shall be resentenced pursuant to the Reform Act unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms: prospective, by exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 231

Fourth Holding:

In Guevara, the California Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a full resentencing under section 1172.75 also permitted the trial court to consider resentencing in accordance with the Reform Act. It held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 must be construed as incorporating the public safety determination under section 1172.126 as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent felony offenders to obtain the benefit of the Reform Act during resentencing.

The court noted that the voters’ intention in passing the Reform Act, particularly by including the requirement of whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, was to strike a balance between reform and safety, and such an intention would be honored by interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s public safety override. Therefore, if a defendant demonstrates eligibility under the Reform Act at a section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court must first determine whether resentencing the defendant under the revised provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If no such risk is demonstrated, the court shall resentence the defendant pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: Proposition 47 in 2014 included a definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was much more specific and more restrictive on what qualified as such than the undefined same language contained in the Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Because Proposition 36 was an initiative, it cannot be amended by the Legislature except as state in Proposition 36. Section 1172.75’s enactment does not qualify to amend Proposition 36. Therefore, the more restrictive definition in PC 1170.18, enacted by Proposition 47, is not the measure for determining whether relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Instead, the standard arising from Proposition 36 applies. Although not in conjunction with section 1172.75, the Supreme Court has previously determined that the more restrictive definition enacted in Proposition 47 did not change the broader standard enacted by Proposition 36 two years earlier. See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347

Fifth Holding:

At the conclusion of the resentencing proceedings, the trial court indicated that it did not need credits; as a result, the number of credits on the abstract of judgment was left blank with a note indicating that “CDCR to recalculate credits.” When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing, as well as the conduct credits ordered at the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397

Amelioration, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000264

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand from a grant of habeas corpus reversing the conviction of attempt murder, it was error for the court to simply strike the punishment attached to that reversed count and fail to conduct a full resentencing. The trial court did not explicitly state it was recalling the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1. However, the court’s actions at the 2023 hearing make clear that it did.

First Holding:

Courts generally lack jurisdiction to modify a defendant’s sentence once execution of the sentence has begun. Section 1172.1 provides an exception to that general rule. It states a trial court may, at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary of the CDCR or the district attorney, recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced. When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.1, the trial court must consider postconviction factors and apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PC 1172.1

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344 [Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced]

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 636–637

Second Holding:

After announcing the People were conceding the defendant’s motion for recall and resentencing, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the gang allegation under section 1385. Assuming the defendant’s judgment of conviction was final at the start of the hearing—as the trial court believed it to be—the court had authority to grant the People’s motion only if it first recalled the defendant’s sentence. In other words, the fact that the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss shows it first recalled the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

PEN 1385

People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114, 121, fn. 8

People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 123

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 666–667 [Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively only to cases that are not yet final]

Third Holding:

By recalling the defendant’s sentence, the trial court effectively vacated the entire judgment, not just the portion related to the gang allegation. Therefore, the court was required to resentence the defendant on each count and enhancement in the same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced. The court also was required to apply changes in the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219 [the recall of appellant’s sentence effectively vacated his original sentence and commitment]

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360 [recall of a defendant’s sentence nullifies the original sentence]

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163 [once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [the “full sentencing rule” applies when a court recalls a sentence under former section 1170(d), a predecessor to section 1172.1]

Fourth Holding:

The court dismissed the gang allegation, but it did not orally pronounce a sentence on the murder conviction or the firearm enhancement, even by reference to the original sentence. Nor is there any indication that the court applied the changes to the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement]

People v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 521, 532 [at sentencing, the court must orally pronounce the term of imprisonment]

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [trial court erred by failing to pronounce sentence on a count before staying its execution]

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his right to a full resentencing by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Generally, a defendant must raise an issue in the trial court to preserve it on appeal. However, that general rule does not apply to an unauthorized sentence, which a defendant may challenge on appeal despite not objecting below. Here, the trial court recalled the defendant’s sentence, which effectively vacated his entire sentence. However, it never pronounced a new sentence on the murder conviction and firearm enhancement. The court’s failure to do so resulted in an unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [court committed unauthorized sentencing error by failing to pronounce a sentence on a count before ordering it stayed]

Sixth Holding:

Even if the forfeiture rule applied, we would exercise our discretion to consider the issue on the merits in order to forestall an inevitable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate courts have discretion to consider issues not preserved for review]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399–400 [declining to apply forfeiture rule where defendant failed to object to the lack of full resentencing under section 1172.75]

Seventh Holding:

Where, as here, the defendant did not receive a full resentencing to which he was entitled, the proper disposition is to remand for a full resentencing. Accordingly, we remand the case for the trial court to resentence the defendant in accordance with section 1172.1. In doing so, the court must consider postconviction factors and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. When resentencing the defendant on remand, the court may not reinstate the gang allegation it dismissed under section 1385.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [remanding case for resentencing where the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under section 1172.75]

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1278–1279 [same]

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 [when the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing]

Duty of the court, Jury trial, Pleading, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000263

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in not holding a hearing under Marsden when the defendant attempted to have substitute counsel. The trial court erred in imposing the upper term based on its own conclusion that the defendant’s prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. The matter is remanded for the trial court to hold a proper Marsden hearing. If the court grants the motion, the court must appoint new counsel to represent her and conduct a new trial. If the court denies the motion, the court is to reinstate the convictions. The judgment is reversed, and the trial court is directed to give the People an opportunity to prove applicable aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury (or the court, if if the defendant waives her right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances) and to resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. Once the defendant clearly indicates to the trial court a request for the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel, the court must hold a hearing to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the request. A proper and formal’ Marsden motion is not required—the defendant need only clearly indicate to the trial court ‘in some manner’ that he or she is requesting the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 863-864

People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1179

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

Second Holding:

The trial court erred in not holding a Marsden hearing when the defendant said she wanted to fire her court-appointed attorney. While stating a desire to fire one’s court-appointed attorney, without more, may not be sufficient to require a Marsden hearing, the trial court interrupted the defendant after she said “I feel like” and did not allow her to say more. And though the defendant never said she wanted to replace her current attorney with a different court-appointed attorney, that’s because, when the defendant began to explain why she did not want her current attorney to represent her, the court did not give her the chance to state her reasons.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90 [if at any time during criminal proceedings, a defendant requests substitute counsel, the trial court is obligated, pursuant to Marsden, to give the defendant an opportunity to state any grounds for dissatisfaction with the current appointed attorney]

People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346 [refusal by the trial court to afford a defendant an opportunity to set forth the reasons underlying his request for the substitution of appointed counsel constitutes an abuse of discretion]

Third Holding:

The trial court’s concern that the defendant’s request during jury selection was a delay tactic was legitimate, but it did not justify refusing to hold a Marsden hearing that would allow the court to hear her reasons and weigh them against the effects of delaying the trial.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 627, 652 [delay in resolving a Marsden motion is a significant factor that the court is obligated to consider in evaluating the timeliness of the defendant’s request to substitute counsel]

Fourth Holding:

The court also erred in ruling that the defendant’s only choices were to retain an attorney or represent herself. Those were not her only two choices. She also had the right to make a showing under Marsden, if she could, she was entitled to substitute counsel.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 573 [defendant may request substitute counsel at any time during criminal proceedings]

People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90 [same]

Fifth Holding:

The standard for prejudice regarding a denied Marsden motion is under Chapman. Under the Chapman harmless error standard, the burden is on the People, not the defendant, to demonstrate that the violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Loya (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 932, 945

People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 601

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 349

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

The court imposed the upper term based on the court’s finding that the defendant’s prior convictions and adjudications were numerous and of increasing seriousness. The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. the aggravating circumstance the trial court relied on here in imposing the upper term, increasing seriousness of the defendant’s prior convictions, was not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury (or by the court after a jury trial waiver).

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Seventh Holding:

Such an error is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Here, the court relied on only one aggravating circumstance: prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. Determining whether that allegation is true, however, requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them. While the evidence may have been sufficient to support a finding of increasing seriousness, a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion based on the totality of the defendant’s criminal conduct and the applicable sentences for those transgressions. Because a rational juror could find the defendant’s convictions were not of increasing seriousness, the error is not harmless under Chapman.

Authority:

AD

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Abstracts and Minutes, Due process, Equal protection, Jury trial, Racial Justice Act, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000262

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by permitting the prosecution’s peremptory challenge to a juror, within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 (CCP 231.7), which requires reversal. The court also erred in denying the defendant’s motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) to support his claim that racial bias infected his case. We conclude the trial court misapplied the applicable legal standards. We conclude that the trial court erroneously applied the law in denying the defendant’s motion for discovery. The defendant also contends that the abstract of judgment should be corrected because it does not reflect the trial court’s ruling regarding his fees and fines. Because we reverse the conviction, we need not reach this issue.

First Holding:

Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race. Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Excluding by peremptory challenge even a single juror on the basis of race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude.

Authority:

People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759–760

People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1157

Second Holding:

After studies showed that the existing analysis under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 was inadequate to prevent racial discrimination, the Legislature enacted CCP 231.7, effective in criminal trials beginning January 1, 2022, to establish a new process for identifying unlawful bias in the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 539–540

Third Holding:

In contrast to the three-step Batson/Wheeler procedure, under CCP 231.7, there is no requirement that the objecting party first make a showing of purposeful discrimination. Rather, upon objection, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised. The trial court shall evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. In doing so, the court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943

People v. Hinojos (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 524, 540–541

Fourth Holding:

Unlike in the Batson/Wheeler analysis, the ultimate question for the trial court is not whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in purposeful discrimination. The statute expressly recognizes that discrimination in violation of this section need not be purposeful, but may involve unconscious bias, which includes implicit and institutional biases. The trial court shall sustain the objection to the use of the peremptory challenge if the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person [aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California], would view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. The statute defines “substantial likelihood” as more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Hinojos (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 524, 541

Fifth Holding:

CCP 231.7, subdivisions (e) and (g) provide two separate lists of presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. Each of these subdivisions sets out a distinct process by which a court determines whether a presumptively invalid reason can be absolved of that presumption.

Authority:

CCP 231.7(e),(g)

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 793

Sixth Holding:

The denial of an objection shall be reviewed de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. Erroneous denial of a challenge is deemed prejudicial and requires reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

Seventh Holding:

We review the factual underpinnings of a discovery order for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court of Solano County (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th pp. Supp. 36, 55

Eighth Holding:

Penal Code section 745 authorizes a defendant to file a discovery motion at trial as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of an alleged violation, and requires the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing if the defendant makes a prima facie showing of the violation.

Authority:

PEN 745

Ninth Holding:

To establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case. This is a notably less demanding standard than the prima facie requirement set forth in the statute for granting an evidentiary hearing, and a standard that should not be difficult to meet.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court of Solano County (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 159

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 244 [trial court should consider the relevance of the proffered facts to the claims of racial bias to determine whether a minimally plausible basis exists to grant discovery—a low threshold]

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th pp. Supp. 36, 44 [reversing denial of discovery motion where defendant had minimally proffered a plausible factual foundation for a potential violation of the RJA]

Tenth Holding:

[Gary note: The abstract of judgment apparently did not reflect the court’s order regarding fines and fees. The opinion gave no further information, because the issue would be addressed on remand for other reasons. But the law is clear that the court could have ordered correction of the abstract of judgment and minute orders. I have set forth some cases it could have relied on had it addressed the issue.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000242

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court failed to update the credits for time served, and awarded only the credits allowed at the original sentencing 12 years earlier. This was error, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to recalculate the proper credits as of the date of the resentencing hearing.

Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Ca1.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000232

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted provisions to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. Pretrial diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

If the defendant is eligible, the court also must determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Fourth Holding:

The trial court failed to apply the presumption that, given the timely diagnoses of mental health disorders, the mental condition contributed to his behavior. The burden then was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence tha there was no causal connection.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Fifth Holding:

However, while eligibility and suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they are met. Because of the existence of this residual discretion, the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in accordance with the current law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000227

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in its calculation of his custody credits. The court awarded custody credit of 461 days, the amount of custody credit listed on the defendant’s original abstract of judgment from 2012. The matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s custody credits; the court shall amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served. As stated in section 2900.5, it is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to that section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in section 1213.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396 [resentencing courts must recalculate actual time served]

Abstracts and Minutes, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000220

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant must be resentenced in light of enhancement-related errors and that the minute order from the bench trial on the defendant’s prior convictions requires correction. Therefore, we remand for resentencing and direct the minute order to be corrected.

First Holding:

Several of the errors raised involve the trial court’s exercise of discretion and were forfeited by the defendant’s failure to object below. Nonetheless, we have doubts about whether the trial court in fact exercised its discretion in failing to impose certain enhancements and making other sentencing choices, especially given discrepancies between the court’s tentative sentences and its final sentences. There also appears to be at least one error resulting in an unauthorized sentence that the parties do not raise. Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to remand for both defendants to be fully resentenced so that the court can ensure the sentences reflect its intent in accordance with the law.

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130

Second Holding:

Weapon enhancements must be either imposed consecutively or stricken. Such an enhancement cannot be imposed concurrently.

Authority:

PEN 1385

PEN 12022

Third Holding:

Unless stricken, prior-serious-felony and prior-prison-term enhancements are added once to each count on which an indeterminate term is imposed and once for the combined counts on which an aggregate determinate term has been imposed.

Authority:

People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1141

People v. Minifie (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1256, 1260

Fourth Holding:

A sentencing court may not impose terms for both a prior-serious-felony enhancement and a prior-prison-term enhancement that are based on the same underlying conviction.

Authority:

People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 612

Fifth Holding:

If a prior-conviction enhancement or punishment for it is stricken in the interest of justice, the enhancement should not also be imposed and stayed under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1008–1009

Sixth Holding:

The trial court should ensure that it sufficiently explains its discretionary sentencing choices on the record.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.406

Seventh Holding:

There were several errors in the minute order that must be corrected.

[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its directive that the abstract be corrected, but the law is very clear that it has that authority. I have cited some cases that the court could have relied on.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fifth Amendment, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000206

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true findings on the gang enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements are vacated. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the enhancement allegations under the law as amended by AB 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Several years after the defendant was sentenced, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1(a)(1), based on the defendant’s exceptional conduct while incarcerated. The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced him to 40 years to life, despite the recommendation by both parties that the sentence be reduced to a determinate term less than half that 40-year minimum. The trial court erred in not examining the impact of AB 333, which amended the gang activity statutes significantly. When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and the defendant regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of AB 333’s ameliorative changes to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312 [the application of law to undisputed facts is a question of law subject to de novo review]

Second Holding:

The evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial was insufficient to establish that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang beyond enhancing its reputation. Accordingly, we must vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements under section 186.22(b)(1), as well as the true findings on the gang-related firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).

Authority:

People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 239–240

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206, fn. 11

Third Holding:

Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial. Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669-670

Fourth Holding:

Whether the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000203

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying his expungement request under Penal Code section 1203.4 and in failing to consider his request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). Because the court did not address his request under section 17(b), on remand it must do so.

First Holding:

An order denying relief under section 1203.4 is appealable.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 114

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 provides in pertinent part that a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation is entitled as a matter of right to have the plea or verdict changed to not guilty, to have the proceedings expunged from the record, and to have the accusations dismissed. If the petitioner meets the criteria for relief under section 1203.4, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 249-250

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991

People v. Lewis (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 294, 297-298

Third Holding:

As of 2023, section 1203.4 provides that a petition for relief under this section shall not be denied due to an unfulfilled order of restitution, and an unfulfilled order of restitution shall not be grounds for finding that a defendant did not fulfill the condition of probation for the entire period of probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(c)(3)(A) & (B)

Fourth Holding:

When a crime is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor it is commonly referred to as a “wobbler,” and the trial court may reduce the offense to a misdemeanor at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor. In exercising its discretion, the court considers several factors, including “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.

Authority:

PEN 17(b)(3)

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877,

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 790-791

Fifth Holding:

Grand theft by embezzlement of property valued at more than $950, the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is a wobbler. The trial court should have addressed the defendant’s request to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.

Authority:

People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 75

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Fines and fees

Case: 000192

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment contains a clerical error regarding the imposed fines. The defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence on some counts and a determinate sentence of others. Two different forms are used–one is the abstract for the indeterminate sentence, the other for the determinate sentence. Though the court imposed only one restitution fine and one parole revocation restitution fine, both fines appear on both forms. While not necessarily improper, it can lead to an ambiguity. In an abundance of caution, and because we agree the duplicate reference could possibly lead to confusion, we direct the clerk of the court issue an amended determinate abstract of judgment, leaving the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine reflected only on the indeterminate abstract of judgment, form CR-292.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction and it cannot add to or modify the judgment which it purports to digest or summarize. Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts that have properly assumed jurisdiction can order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Caudillo (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 122, 126

Second Holding:

A trial court must accurately set forth all fines and fees in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 [If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency]

Third Holding:

The court has authority to order correction of abstracts of judgment to avoid ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Frey (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 139, 142 [finding ambiguity between the court’s order and the statement on the abstract of judgment form required correction]